Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mind and Its Place in Nature', 'The Origin of the Work of Art' and 'Presupposition and Conversational Implicature'

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent

15585	Later Heidegger sees philosophy as more like poetry than like science [Heidegger, by Polt]
	Full Idea: In his later work Heidegger came to view philosophy as closer to poetry than to science.
	From: report of Martin Heidegger (The Origin of the Work of Art [1935], p.178) by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 5 'Signs'

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals

10990	Conditionals are truth-functional, but unassertable in tricky cases? [Grice, by Read]
	Full Idea: The 'conversational defence' of the truth-functional view of conditionals is that a conditional may not be assertible in difficult cases.
	From: report of H. Paul Grice (Presupposition and Conversational Implicature [1977]) by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch.3

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception

7628	Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund]
	Full Idea: Broad, one of the most important modern defenders of the representative theory of perception, explicitly rejects the inferential component of the theory.
	From: report of C.D. Broad (Mind and Its Place in Nature [1925]) by Barry Maund - Perception Ch.1
	A reaction: Since the supposed inferences happen much too quickly to be conscious, it is hard to see how we could distinguish an inference from an interpretation mechanism. Personally I interpret things long before the question of truth arises.

19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature

10991	Key conversational maxims are 'quality' (assert truth) and 'quantity' (leave nothing out) [Grice, by Read]
	Full Idea: Grice particularly identified two maxims as guiding conversation: the maxim of 'quality' (that one should assert only what one believes to be true and justified), and of 'quantity' (one should not assert less than one can).
	From: report of H. Paul Grice (Presupposition and Conversational Implicature [1977]) by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch.3
	A reaction: I think it would be very foolish to boldly embrace the second maxim when talking to strangers. If white lies are occasionally acceptable, then what is the status of the first 'maxim'? Is it a moral maxim?