Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mind and Its Place in Nature', ''Objectivity' in Social Sciences and Social Policy' and 'Schopenhauer'

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4 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
We become objective when we detach ourselves from the world [Janaway]
     Full Idea: We apprehend the world purely objectively, only when we no longer know that we belong to it.
     From: Christopher Janaway (Schopenhauer [1994], II:368), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 6 'Objectivity'
     A reaction: Since we are not actually detached from the world, that makes objective thought an act of imagination. And none the worse for that, I would say, since philosophers don't seem to understand the central epistemological importance of imagination.
There is no objectivity in social sciences - only viewpoints for selecting and organising data [Weber]
     Full Idea: There is no absolutely objective scientific analysis of 'social phenomena' independent of special and 'one-sided' viewpoints according to which expressly or tacitly, consciously or unconsciously they are selected and organised for expository purposes.
     From: Max Weber ('Objectivity' in Social Sciences and Social Policy [1904], p.72), quoted by Reiss,J/Spreger,J - Scientific Objectivity 5.1
     A reaction: Weber urged some objectivity by not judging agents' goals. Also see Idea 22367
The results of social research can be true, and not just subjectively valid for one person [Weber]
     Full Idea: Cultural sciences do not have results which are 'subjective' and only valid for one person and not others. ...For scientific truth is precisely what is valid for all who seek the truth.
     From: Max Weber ('Objectivity' in Social Sciences and Social Policy [1904], p.84), quoted by Reiss,J/Spreger,J - Scientific Objectivity 5.1
     A reaction: Weber said that although research interests are subjective, the social causes discovered can be objective.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund]
     Full Idea: Broad, one of the most important modern defenders of the representative theory of perception, explicitly rejects the inferential component of the theory.
     From: report of C.D. Broad (Mind and Its Place in Nature [1925]) by Barry Maund - Perception Ch.1
     A reaction: Since the supposed inferences happen much too quickly to be conscious, it is hard to see how we could distinguish an inference from an interpretation mechanism. Personally I interpret things long before the question of truth arises.