Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mind and Its Place in Nature', ''Objectivity' in Social Sciences and Social Policy' and 'Psychophysical and theoretical identifications'

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6 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
There is no objectivity in social sciences - only viewpoints for selecting and organising data [Weber]
     Full Idea: There is no absolutely objective scientific analysis of 'social phenomena' independent of special and 'one-sided' viewpoints according to which expressly or tacitly, consciously or unconsciously they are selected and organised for expository purposes.
     From: Max Weber ('Objectivity' in Social Sciences and Social Policy [1904], p.72), quoted by Reiss,J/Spreger,J - Scientific Objectivity 5.1
     A reaction: Weber urged some objectivity by not judging agents' goals. Also see Idea 22367
The results of social research can be true, and not just subjectively valid for one person [Weber]
     Full Idea: Cultural sciences do not have results which are 'subjective' and only valid for one person and not others. ...For scientific truth is precisely what is valid for all who seek the truth.
     From: Max Weber ('Objectivity' in Social Sciences and Social Policy [1904], p.84), quoted by Reiss,J/Spreger,J - Scientific Objectivity 5.1
     A reaction: Weber said that although research interests are subjective, the social causes discovered can be objective.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund]
     Full Idea: Broad, one of the most important modern defenders of the representative theory of perception, explicitly rejects the inferential component of the theory.
     From: report of C.D. Broad (Mind and Its Place in Nature [1925]) by Barry Maund - Perception Ch.1
     A reaction: Since the supposed inferences happen much too quickly to be conscious, it is hard to see how we could distinguish an inference from an interpretation mechanism. Personally I interpret things long before the question of truth arises.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
Laws are the best axiomatization of the total history of world events or facts [Lewis, by Mumford]
     Full Idea: The Mill-Ramsey-Lewis theory takes laws to be axioms (or theorems) of the best possible systematizations of the world's total history, where such a history is a history of events or facts.
     From: report of David Lewis (Psychophysical and theoretical identifications [1972]) by Stephen Mumford - Laws in Nature 1.3
If simplicity and strength are criteria for laws of nature, that introduces a subjective element [Mumford on Lewis]
     Full Idea: Lewis's simplicity and strength criteria introduce an element of subjectivity into the laws, because the best system seems to be determined by what we take to be simple and strong in a system.
     From: comment on David Lewis (Psychophysical and theoretical identifications [1972]) by Stephen Mumford - Laws in Nature 3.5
     A reaction: [Mumford cites Armstrong 1983:67 for this]
A number of systematizations might tie as the best and most coherent system [Mumford on Lewis]
     Full Idea: Since the best system view is a coherence theory, the possibility could not be ruled out that a number of different systematizations of the same history might be tied for first place as equally best.
     From: comment on David Lewis (Psychophysical and theoretical identifications [1972]) by Stephen Mumford - Laws in Nature 3.5
     A reaction: [Mumord cites Armstrong 1983:70] Personally I am a fan of coherence theories, and this problem doesn't bother me.