3 ideas
| 7628 | Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund] |
| Full Idea: Broad, one of the most important modern defenders of the representative theory of perception, explicitly rejects the inferential component of the theory. | |
| From: report of C.D. Broad (Mind and Its Place in Nature [1925]) by Barry Maund - Perception Ch.1 | |
| A reaction: Since the supposed inferences happen much too quickly to be conscious, it is hard to see how we could distinguish an inference from an interpretation mechanism. Personally I interpret things long before the question of truth arises. |
| 17503 | Theories can never represent accurately, because their components are abstract [Cartwright,N, by Portides] |
| Full Idea: Cartwright objects that the claim that theories represent what happens in actual situations is to overlook that the concepts used in them (such as 'force functions' and 'Hamiltonians') are abstract. | |
| From: report of Nancy Cartwright (The Dappled World [1999]) by Demetris Portides - Models 'Current' | |
| A reaction: I'm not convinced by this. The term 'abstract' is too loose. In a sense most words are abstract because they are universals. If I say 'that's a cat', that is a very accurate remark, despite the generality of 'cat'. |
| 5210 | We could know what a lion thinks by mapping both its brain patterns and its experiences [Douglas,A] |
| Full Idea: In principle, it seems possible to monitor both the brain activity and the external experiences of a lion cub from birth, and by extensive mapping of one against the other to work out fairly accurately what a lion is thinking. | |
| From: Andy Douglas (talk [2003]) | |
| A reaction: This has limitations (e.g. we could monitor the external events, but not the way the lion experiences them), but it seems to me to offer a real theoretical possibility of breaching the mental privacy of an inarticulate creature. |