Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mind and Its Place in Nature', 'Moral Relativism' and 'Letter Seven'

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5 ideas

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation

22449	When we say 'is red' we don't mean 'seems red to most people' [Foot]
	Full Idea: One might think that 'is red' means the same as 'seems red to most people', forgetting that when asked if an object is red we look at it to see if it is red, and not in order to estimate the reaction that others will have to it.
	From: Philippa Foot (Moral Relativism [1979], p.23)
	A reaction: True, but we are conscious of our own reliability as observers (e.g. if colourblind, or with poor hearing or eyesight). I don't take my glasses off, have a look, and pronounce that the object is blurred. Ordinary language philosophy in action.

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception

7628	Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund]
	Full Idea: Broad, one of the most important modern defenders of the representative theory of perception, explicitly rejects the inferential component of the theory.
	From: report of C.D. Broad (Mind and Its Place in Nature [1925]) by Barry Maund - Perception Ch.1
	A reaction: Since the supposed inferences happen much too quickly to be conscious, it is hard to see how we could distinguish an inference from an interpretation mechanism. Personally I interpret things long before the question of truth arises.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics

168	To understand morality requires a soul [Plato]
	Full Idea: Good and evil are meaningless to things that have no soul.
	From: Plato (Letter Seven [c.352 BCE], 334)
	A reaction: That is presumably psuché, and hence includes plants. Soulless things can still function well, but obviously that is not 'meaningful' to them.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / e. Ethical cognitivism

22451	All people need affection, cooperation, community and help in trouble [Foot]
	Full Idea: There is a great deal that all men have in common; all need affection, the cooperation of others, a place in a community, and help in trouble.
	From: Philippa Foot (Moral Relativism [1979], p.33)
	A reaction: There seem to be some people who don't need affection or a place in a community, though it is hard to imagine them being happy. These kind of facts are the basis for any sensible cognitivist view of ethics. They are basic to Foot's view.

22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value

22452	Do we have a concept of value, other than wanting something, or making an effort to get it? [Foot]
	Full Idea: Do we know what we mean by saying that anything has value, or even that we value it, as opposed to wanting it or being prepared to go to trouble to get it?
	From: Philippa Foot (Moral Relativism [1979], p.35)
	A reaction: Well, I value Rembrandt paintings, but have no aspiration to own one (and would refuse it if offered, because I couldn't look after it properly). And 'we' don't want to move the Taj Mahal to London. She has not expressed this good point very well.