Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mind and Its Place in Nature', 'The Basing Relation' and 'In a Different Voice'

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4 ideas

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs

19696	There are reasons 'for which' a belief is held, reasons 'why' it is believed, and reasons 'to' believe it [Neta]
	Full Idea: We must distinguish between something's being a 'reason for which' a creature believes something, and its being a 'reason why' a creature believes something. ...We must also distinguish a 'reason for which' from a 'reason to' believe something.
	From: Ram Neta (The Basing Relation [2011], Intro)
	A reaction: He doesn't spell the distinctions out clearly. I take it that 'for which' is my personal justification, 'why' is the dodgy prejudices that cause my belief. and 'to' is some actual good reasons, of which I may be unaware.

19697	The basing relation of a reason to a belief should both support and explain the belief [Neta]
	Full Idea: A reason has a 'basing relation' with a belief if it (i) rationally supports holding the belief, and (ii) explains why the belief is held.
	From: Ram Neta (The Basing Relation [2011], Intro)
	A reaction: Presumably a false reason would fit this account. Why not talk of 'grounding', or is that word now reserved for metaphysics? If I hypnotise you into a belief, would my hypnotic power be the basing reason? Fits (ii), but not (i).

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception

7628	Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund]
	Full Idea: Broad, one of the most important modern defenders of the representative theory of perception, explicitly rejects the inferential component of the theory.
	From: report of C.D. Broad (Mind and Its Place in Nature [1925]) by Barry Maund - Perception Ch.1
	A reaction: Since the supposed inferences happen much too quickly to be conscious, it is hard to see how we could distinguish an inference from an interpretation mechanism. Personally I interpret things long before the question of truth arises.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics

18665	Moral problems are responsibility conflicts, needing contextual and narrative attention to relationships [Gilligan]
	Full Idea: The moral problem arises from conflicting responsibilities rather than competing rights, and its resolution needs contextual and narrative thinking. This morality as care centers around the understanding of responsibility and relationships.
	From: Carol Gilligan (In a Different Voice [1982], p.19), quoted by Will Kymlicka - Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn)
	A reaction: [Kymlicka cites her as a key voice in feminist moral philosophy] I like all of this, especially the very original thought (to me, anyway) that moral thinking should be 'narrative' in character.