12 ideas
14759 | A thing is simply a long event, linked by qualities, and spatio-temporal unity [Broad] |
Full Idea: A thing is simply a long event, throughout the course of which there is either qualitative similarity or continuous qualitative change, together with a characteristic spatio-temporal unity. | |
From: C.D. Broad (Scientific Thought [1923], 10 'Duration') | |
A reaction: At least he is trying to give some sort of principle that links the stages of the event together. |
11842 | If short-lived happenings like car crashes are 'events', why not long-lived events like Dover Cliffs? [Broad] |
Full Idea: We call a lightning flash or a motor accident an event, but refuse to apply this to the cliffs of Dover. ...But quantitative differences (of time) give no good grounds for calling one bit of history an event, and refusing the name to another bit. | |
From: C.D. Broad (Scientific Thought [1923], p.54), quoted by David Wiggins - Sameness and Substance Renewed 2.3 n13 | |
A reaction: Wiggins calls this proposal a 'terrible absurdity', but it seems to me to demand attention. There is a case to be made for a 'process' to be the fundamental category of our ontology, with stable physical objects seen in that light. |
6375 | The taste of chocolate is a 'finer-grained' sensation than the taste of sweetness [Polger] |
Full Idea: The taste of chocolate is presumably a 'finer-grained' sensation than the taste of sweetness. | |
From: Thomas W. Polger (Natural Minds [2004], Ch.1.4) | |
A reaction: An interesting distinction when it comes to what they are like, and whether two very different brains can realise them. Sweetness might be the same for most creatures, but the tast of chocolate subtly different. |
7628 | Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund] |
Full Idea: Broad, one of the most important modern defenders of the representative theory of perception, explicitly rejects the inferential component of the theory. | |
From: report of C.D. Broad (Mind and Its Place in Nature [1925]) by Barry Maund - Perception Ch.1 | |
A reaction: Since the supposed inferences happen much too quickly to be conscious, it is hard to see how we could distinguish an inference from an interpretation mechanism. Personally I interpret things long before the question of truth arises. |
6381 | The mind and the self are one, and the mind-self is a biological phenomenon [Polger] |
Full Idea: We should return to the old idea that the mind and the self are one and combine it with the new idea that the mind-self is a biological phenomenon. | |
From: Thomas W. Polger (Natural Minds [2004], §8.3) | |
A reaction: This doesn't make allowance for the fact that some parts of my mind seem like irritating visitors, and other parts seem like the home-owner. Personally I take the self to be the brain's central controller, or the centre (forum) of brain integration. |
6378 | Teleological functions explain why a trait exists; causal-role functions say what it does [Polger] |
Full Idea: Teleological functions help explain why a trait has come to exist; causal-role functions tell what a trait does or is apt to do. | |
From: Thomas W. Polger (Natural Minds [2004], §5.4) | |
A reaction: The teleological view has the merit of nesting nicely with the theory of evolution, and with Aristotelian virtue ethics (which I like). Causal-role functionalism focuses better on what is actually happening inside the head. |
6380 | Identity theory says consciousness is an abstraction: a state, event, process or property [Polger] |
Full Idea: Identity theories locate consciousness at a certain order of abstraction, typically among neurophysiological states, events, processes, or properties. | |
From: Thomas W. Polger (Natural Minds [2004], Ch.7.6) | |
A reaction: I increasingly think that processes are the answer. My new analogy for the mind is a waterfall: its physical ontology is simple, it only exists because there is a sustained process, and it is far too complex to predict individual droplet outcomes. |
6379 | A mummified heart has the teleological function of circulating blood [Polger] |
Full Idea: A preserved heart in a jar of formaldehyde has the teleological function of circulating blood. | |
From: Thomas W. Polger (Natural Minds [2004], §5.4) | |
A reaction: A nice illustration. |
6377 | Teleological notions of function say what a thing is supposed to do [Polger] |
Full Idea: Teleological notions of function specify not just what a thing happens to do, but what it is supposed to do. | |
From: Thomas W. Polger (Natural Minds [2004], Ch.5.3) | |
A reaction: This is the basis of a distinct theory of the mind. It seems to be akin to the 'dispositions' of behaviourism, so that the mind becomes once more a theoretical and abstract entity, rather than a thing of occurrent events and processes. |
8160 | The present and past exist, but the future does not [Broad, by Dummett] |
Full Idea: Not only the present but also the past exist, but the future (so long as it is the future) does not. | |
From: report of C.D. Broad (Scientific Thought [1923]) by Michael Dummett - Thought and Reality 1 | |
A reaction: This is quite appealing, and seems right if you believe that every truth has a truthmaker, and that there are no truths about the future. And yet the whole misery of people dying is that they cease to exist. |
14609 | We could say present and past exist, but not future, so that each event adds to the total history [Broad] |
Full Idea: One theory accepts the reality of the present and the past, but holds that the future is simply nothing at all. Nothing has happened to the present by becoming past except that fresh slices of existence have been added to the total history of the world. | |
From: C.D. Broad (Scientific Thought [1923], II) | |
A reaction: This is now known as Broad's 'Growing Block' view of time. It is tempting to say that neither past nor future exist, but it seems undeniable that statements about the past can be wholly true, unlike those about the future. |
22933 | We imagine the present as a spotlight, moving across events from past to future [Broad] |
Full Idea: We imagine presentness moving, like the spot of light from a policeman's bulls eye traversing the fronts of houses in a street. What is illuminated is present, what was illuminated is past, and what is not yet illuminated is the future. | |
From: C.D. Broad (Scientific Thought [1923], II) | |
A reaction: This is the 'moving spotlight' compromise theory, which retains the B-series eternal sequence of ordered events, but adds the A-series privileged present moment. Le Poidevin says Broad represents time twice over. |