Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mind and Its Place in Nature', 'Physiologia' and 'De rebus naturalibus'

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4 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived

16740	A power is not a cause, but an aptitude for a cause [Zabarella]
	Full Idea: A power is not the cause of an operation, but only the cause's aptitude for operating.
	From: Jacob Zabarella (De rebus naturalibus [1590], De fac anim 4:col 692), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 23.5
	A reaction: His example is the power of running, which is actually caused by the soul (or whatever), which generates the power. A power is a very superficial thing.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object

16674	The quantity is just the matter, in that it has extended parts and is diffuse [Charleton]
	Full Idea: The extension or quantity of a thing is merely modus materiae, or (rather) the matter itself composing that thing; insomuch as it consists not in a point, but has parts posited without parts, in respect whereof it is diffuse.
	From: Walter Charleton (Physiologia [1654], III.10.1.4), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 14.2

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception

7628	Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund]
	Full Idea: Broad, one of the most important modern defenders of the representative theory of perception, explicitly rejects the inferential component of the theory.
	From: report of C.D. Broad (Mind and Its Place in Nature [1925]) by Barry Maund - Perception Ch.1
	A reaction: Since the supposed inferences happen much too quickly to be conscious, it is hard to see how we could distinguish an inference from an interpretation mechanism. Personally I interpret things long before the question of truth arises.

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / b. Prime matter

16571	Prime matter is exceptionally obscure [Zabarella]
	Full Idea: Nothing in the natural world seems to be more obscure and difficult to grasp than the prime matter of things.
	From: Jacob Zabarella (De rebus naturalibus [1590], I.1 col 133), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 2.1
	A reaction: This spells the beginning of the end for 'prime matter', since a late scholastic is doubting it, even before the scientists got to work. Most modern Aristotelians slide quietly past prime matter, as unhelpful.