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17447
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Parsons says counting is tagging as first, second, third..., and converting the last to a cardinal [Parsons,C, by Heck]
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Full Idea:
In Parsons's demonstrative model of counting, '1' means the first, and counting says 'the first, the second, the third', where one is supposed to 'tag' each object exactly once, and report how many by converting the last ordinal into a cardinal.
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From:
report of Charles Parsons (Frege's Theory of Numbers [1965]) by Richard G. Heck - Cardinality, Counting and Equinumerosity 3
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A reaction:
This sounds good. Counting seems to rely on that fact that numbers can be both ordinals and cardinals. You don't 'convert' at the end, though, because all the way you mean 'this cardinality in this order'.
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16703
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God could make a successive thing so that previous parts cease to exist [Albert of Saxony]
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Full Idea:
Something can be conceived of as successive simpliciter, with respect to both its substance and its state. For example, if Socrates were continually made and made again by the First Cause, as the Seine flow, so nothing of what preexists remains.
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From:
Albert of Saxony (On 'Physics' [1357], III.3), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.4
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A reaction:
This is precisely the problem that modern stage theory faces, of knowing how to connect the stages together.
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16699
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Successive entities just need parts to succeed one another, without their existence [Albert of Saxony]
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Full Idea:
For existence to hold of completely successive entities it is not required that their parts exist, but that one part succeed another, as a future part succeeds a past part.
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From:
Albert of Saxony (On 'Physics' [1357], III.3 ad 2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.3
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A reaction:
A nice move, but it doesn't quite solve it. How can non-existent things 'succeed one another'? It is worrying for metaphysics that some things have entirely different concepts of persistence from other things.
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14802
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Physical and psychical laws of mind are either independent, or derived in one or other direction [Peirce]
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Full Idea:
The question about minds is whether 1) physical and psychical laws are independent (monism, my neutralism), 2) the psychical laws derived and physical laws primordial (materialism), 3) physical law is derived, psychical law primordial (idealism).
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From:
Charles Sanders Peirce (The Architecture of Theories [1891], p.321)
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A reaction:
I think you are already in trouble when you start proposing that there are two quite distinct sets of laws, and then worry about how they are related. Assume unity, and only separate them when the science forces you to (which it won't).
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