8 ideas
| 17447 | Parsons says counting is tagging as first, second, third..., and converting the last to a cardinal [Parsons,C, by Heck] |
| Full Idea: In Parsons's demonstrative model of counting, '1' means the first, and counting says 'the first, the second, the third', where one is supposed to 'tag' each object exactly once, and report how many by converting the last ordinal into a cardinal. | |
| From: report of Charles Parsons (Frege's Theory of Numbers [1965]) by Richard G. Heck - Cardinality, Counting and Equinumerosity 3 | |
| A reaction: This sounds good. Counting seems to rely on that fact that numbers can be both ordinals and cardinals. You don't 'convert' at the end, though, because all the way you mean 'this cardinality in this order'. |
| 3539 | Personal identity is just causally related mental states [Parfit, by Maslin] |
| Full Idea: For Parfit all personal identity really amounts to is a chain of experiences and other psychological features causally related to each other in 'direct' sorts of ways. | |
| From: report of Derek Parfit (Personal Identity [1971]) by Keith T. Maslin - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind 10.5 | |
| A reaction: When summarised like this, it strikes me that Parfit is just false to our experience, whatever Hume may say. I suspect that Parfit (and those like him) concentrate too much on rather passive perceptual experience, and neglect the will. |
| 1393 | One of my future selves will not necessarily be me [Parfit] |
| Full Idea: If I say 'It will not be me, but one of my future selves', I do not imply that I will be that future self. He is one of my later selves, and I am one of his earlier selves. There is no underlying person we both are. | |
| From: Derek Parfit (Personal Identity [1971], §5) | |
| A reaction: The problem here seems to be explaining why I should care about my later self, if it isn't me. If the answer is only that it will be psychologically very similar to me, then I would care more about my current identical twin than about my future self. |
| 1392 | If we split like amoeba, we would be two people, neither of them being us [Parfit] |
| Full Idea: In the case of the man who, like an amoeba, divides….we can suggest that he survives as two different people without implying that he is those people. | |
| From: Derek Parfit (Personal Identity [1971], §1) | |
| A reaction: Maybe an amoeba is a homogeneous substance for which splitting is insignificant, but when a person has certain parts that are totally crucial, splitting them is catastrophic, and quite different. I'm not sure that splitting a self would leave persons. |
| 1391 | Concern for our own lives isn't the source of belief in identity, it is the result of it [Parfit] |
| Full Idea: Egoism, and the fear not of near but of distant death, and the regret that so much of one's life should have gone by - these are not, I think, wholly natural or instinctive. They are strengthened by a false belief in stable identity. | |
| From: Derek Parfit (Personal Identity [1971], §6) | |
| A reaction: This raises some very nice questions, about the extent to which various aspects of self-concern are instinctive and natural, or culturally induced, and even totally misguided and false. I can worry about the distant death of my guinea pig, or my grandson. |
| 22370 | Big central government only exists as a focus for anger - not to act [Fisher] |
| Full Idea: The specter of big government is there to be blamed precisely for its failure to act as a centralising power, the anger directed at it much like the fury Thomas Hardy supposedly spat at God for not existing. | |
| From: Mark Fisher (Capitalist Realism [2009], 8) | |
| A reaction: The point is that the power resides with the leaders of capitalism, and central government is largely a side-show. Sounds somewhat true, and the politicians are largely unaware of their role. |
| 22368 | It is hard to imagine the end of capitalism [Fisher] |
| Full Idea: It is easier to imagine the end of the world than it is to imagine the end of capitalism. | |
| From: Mark Fisher (Capitalist Realism [2009], 1) | |
| A reaction: His book addresses the question of whether complacently accepting capitalism is the right attitude. I read it because I am complacently resigned to living with capitalism. If we started again, would capitalism be a rational choice? |
| 22369 | Are students consumers or products of education? [Fisher] |
| Full Idea: Are students the consumers of education, or its product? | |
| From: Mark Fisher (Capitalist Realism [2009], 6) | |
| A reaction: As a teacher I have been increasingly obliged to treat pupils as customers, meaning that my main task is to keep them happy. Admittedly, pupils who are interested are usually happy pupils, but as a main objective happiness seems wrong. |