22070
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Irony is consciousness of abundant chaos [Schlegel,F]
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Full Idea:
Irony is the clear conscousness of eternal agility, of an infinitely abundant chaos.
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From:
Friedrich Schlegel (works [1798], Vol 2 p.263), quoted by Ernst Behler - Early German Romanticism p.81
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A reaction:
[1800, in Athenaum] The interest here is irony as a reaction to chaos, which has made systematic thought impossible. Do romantics necessarily see reality as beyond our grasp, even if not chaotic? This must be situational, not verbal irony.
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22069
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Plato has no system. Philosophy is the progression of a mind and development of thoughts [Schlegel,F]
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Full Idea:
Plato had no system, but only a philosophy. The philosophy of a human being is the history, the becoming, the progression of his mind, the gradual formation and development of his thoughts.
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From:
Friedrich Schlegel (works [1798], Vol.11 p.118), quoted by Ernst Behler - Early German Romanticism
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A reaction:
[1804] Looks like the first sign of rebellion against the idea of having a 'system' in philosophy, making it a key idea of romanticism. Systems are classical? This looks like an early opposition of a historical dimension to static systems. Big idea.
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17447
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Parsons says counting is tagging as first, second, third..., and converting the last to a cardinal [Parsons,C, by Heck]
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Full Idea:
In Parsons's demonstrative model of counting, '1' means the first, and counting says 'the first, the second, the third', where one is supposed to 'tag' each object exactly once, and report how many by converting the last ordinal into a cardinal.
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From:
report of Charles Parsons (Frege's Theory of Numbers [1965]) by Richard G. Heck - Cardinality, Counting and Equinumerosity 3
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A reaction:
This sounds good. Counting seems to rely on that fact that numbers can be both ordinals and cardinals. You don't 'convert' at the end, though, because all the way you mean 'this cardinality in this order'.
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8249
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Class membership is not transitive, unlike being part of a part of the whole [Lesniewski, by George/Van Evra]
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Full Idea:
Lesniewski distinguished the part-whole relationship from class membership. Membership is not transitive: if s is an element of t, and t of u, then s is not an element of u, whereas a part of a part is a part of the whole.
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From:
report of Stanislaw Lesniewski (works [1916]) by George / Van Evra - The Rise of Modern Logic 7
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A reaction:
If I am a member of a sports club, and my club is a member of the league, I am not thereby a member of the league (so clubs are classes, not wholes). This distinction is clearly fairly crucial in ontology.
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22068
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Poetry is transcendental when it connects the ideal to the real [Schlegel,F]
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Full Idea:
There is a kind of poetry whose essence lies in the relation between the ideal and the real, and which therefore, by analogy with philosophical jargon, should be called transcendental poetry.
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From:
Friedrich Schlegel (works [1798], Vol 2 p.204), quoted by Ernst Behler - Early German Romanticism p.78
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A reaction:
I think the basic idea is that the imaginative creation of poetry has the power to bridge the gap between the transcendental (presupposed) ideal in Fichte, and nature (which Fichte seems to have excluded from his system).
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