Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Frege's Theory of Numbers', 'Resemblance Nominalism and Russell's Regress' and 'Languages of Art (2nd edn)'

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6 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure

17447	Parsons says counting is tagging as first, second, third..., and converting the last to a cardinal [Parsons,C, by Heck]
	Full Idea: In Parsons's demonstrative model of counting, '1' means the first, and counting says 'the first, the second, the third', where one is supposed to 'tag' each object exactly once, and report how many by converting the last ordinal into a cardinal.
	From: report of Charles Parsons (Frege's Theory of Numbers [1965]) by Richard G. Heck - Cardinality, Counting and Equinumerosity 3
	A reaction: This sounds good. Counting seems to rely on that fact that numbers can be both ordinals and cardinals. You don't 'convert' at the end, though, because all the way you mean 'this cardinality in this order'.

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism

18435	Resemblance Nominalists say that resemblance explains properties (not the other way round) [Rodriquez-Pereyra]
	Full Idea: Resemblance Nominalists cannot explain the resemblance between particulars in terms of their properties, because they explain particulars' properties in terms of their resemblances.
	From: Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (Resemblance Nominalism and Russell's Regress [2001], p.397), quoted by Douglas Edwards - Properties 5.5.1
	A reaction: While resemblance does seem to be a primitive fact of experience, and it points us towards the properties, to say that resemblance explains properties is obviously (as so often...) getting things the wrong way round. Properties ARE resemblances??

21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 1. Defining Art

20440	Art is a referential activity, hence indefinable, but it has a set of symptoms [Goodman]
	Full Idea: No definition of art is possible (since it is a referential activity), …but the symptoms of art are syntactic density, semantic density, syntactic repleteness, exemplificationality, and multiple and complex reference.
	From: Nelson Goodman (Languages of Art (2nd edn) [1968], p.22-255), quoted by Alessandro Giovannelli - Nelson Goodman (aesthetics) 4
	A reaction: I wish these labels were more self-explanatory. Goodman seems to want to assimilate art to his earlier interests in linguistic anti-realism and mereology. I wouldn't have thought he now had many followers.

21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 5. Art as Language

20439	Artistic symbols are judged by the fruitfulness of their classifications [Goodman, by Giovannelli]
	Full Idea: Artistic symbols are to be judged for the classifications they bring about, for how novel and insightful those classifications are, for how they change our world perceptions and relations.
	From: report of Nelson Goodman (Languages of Art (2nd edn) [1968]) by Alessandro Giovannelli - Nelson Goodman (aesthetics) 4
	A reaction: This seems to be an awfully long way from our normal experience of art. I understand 'symbols' in early Flemish art, but not in Mondriaan, or even Rembrandt.

21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 7. Ontology of Art

20438	A performance is only an instance of a work if there is not a single error [Goodman]
	Full Idea: The most miserable performance without actual mistakes does count as an instance of a work, …but the most brilliant performance with a single wrong note does not.
	From: Nelson Goodman (Languages of Art (2nd edn) [1968], p.186), quoted by Alessandro Giovannelli - Nelson Goodman (aesthetics)
	A reaction: Mereological essentialism applied to art! You need to be a highly theoretical and technical philosopher (which Goodman was) to maintain such a weird and contrary-usage proposal.

21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 2. Copies of Art

20437	A copy only becomes an 'instance' of an artwork if there is a system of notation [Goodman]
	Full Idea: Paintings and sculptures do not work within a notation; hence, there is no copying of an original that would preserve its originality. A copy of a painting is a copy, not an instance of the original.
	From: Nelson Goodman (Languages of Art (2nd edn) [1968], p.212), quoted by Alessandro Giovannelli - Nelson Goodman (aesthetics) 2
	A reaction: Sounds conclusive, but isn't. Is a poetry manuscript a 'notation' or an original? Why is an etching plate a notation, but painting on canvas is an original? Can I create a painting specifically so that it can be copied (by my students)? Intention matters.