Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Frege's Theory of Numbers', 'De rebus naturalibus' and 'Response to David Armstrong'

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4 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure

17447	Parsons says counting is tagging as first, second, third..., and converting the last to a cardinal [Parsons,C, by Heck]
	Full Idea: In Parsons's demonstrative model of counting, '1' means the first, and counting says 'the first, the second, the third', where one is supposed to 'tag' each object exactly once, and report how many by converting the last ordinal into a cardinal.
	From: report of Charles Parsons (Frege's Theory of Numbers [1965]) by Richard G. Heck - Cardinality, Counting and Equinumerosity 3
	A reaction: This sounds good. Counting seems to rely on that fact that numbers can be both ordinals and cardinals. You don't 'convert' at the end, though, because all the way you mean 'this cardinality in this order'.

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers

18398	Space, time, and some other basics, are not causal powers [Ellis]
	Full Idea: Spatial, temporal, and other primary properties and relationships are not causal powers.
	From: Brian Ellis (Response to David Armstrong [1999], p.42), quoted by David M. Armstrong - Truth and Truthmakers 10.4
	A reaction: It is hard to see how time and space could actually be powers, but future results in physics (or even current results about 'fields') might change that.

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived

16740	A power is not a cause, but an aptitude for a cause [Zabarella]
	Full Idea: A power is not the cause of an operation, but only the cause's aptitude for operating.
	From: Jacob Zabarella (De rebus naturalibus [1590], De fac anim 4:col 692), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 23.5
	A reaction: His example is the power of running, which is actually caused by the soul (or whatever), which generates the power. A power is a very superficial thing.

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / b. Prime matter

16571	Prime matter is exceptionally obscure [Zabarella]
	Full Idea: Nothing in the natural world seems to be more obscure and difficult to grasp than the prime matter of things.
	From: Jacob Zabarella (De rebus naturalibus [1590], I.1 col 133), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 2.1
	A reaction: This spells the beginning of the end for 'prime matter', since a late scholastic is doubting it, even before the scientists got to work. Most modern Aristotelians slide quietly past prime matter, as unhelpful.