Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Frege's Theory of Numbers', 'An Axiomatization of Set Theory' and 'Mechanism, purpose and explan. exclusion'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


4 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / f. Limitation of Size
Limitation of Size is not self-evident, and seems too strong [Lavine on Neumann]
     Full Idea: Von Neumann's Limitation of Size axiom is not self-evident, and he himself admitted that it seemed too strong.
     From: comment on John von Neumann (An Axiomatization of Set Theory [1925]) by Shaughan Lavine - Understanding the Infinite VII.1
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Parsons says counting is tagging as first, second, third..., and converting the last to a cardinal [Parsons,C, by Heck]
     Full Idea: In Parsons's demonstrative model of counting, '1' means the first, and counting says 'the first, the second, the third', where one is supposed to 'tag' each object exactly once, and report how many by converting the last ordinal into a cardinal.
     From: report of Charles Parsons (Frege's Theory of Numbers [1965]) by Richard G. Heck - Cardinality, Counting and Equinumerosity 3
     A reaction: This sounds good. Counting seems to rely on that fact that numbers can be both ordinals and cardinals. You don't 'convert' at the end, though, because all the way you mean 'this cardinality in this order'.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
All the axioms for mathematics presuppose set theory [Neumann]
     Full Idea: There is no axiom system for mathematics, geometry, and so forth that does not presuppose set theory.
     From: John von Neumann (An Axiomatization of Set Theory [1925]), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Foundations without Foundationalism 8.2
     A reaction: Von Neumann was doubting whether set theory could have axioms, and hence the whole project is doomed, and we face relativism about such things. His ally was Skolem in this.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Explanatory exclusion: there cannot be two separate complete explanations of a single event [Kim]
     Full Idea: The general principle of explanatory exclusion states that two or more complete and independent explanations of the same event or phenomenon cannot coexist.
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Mechanism, purpose and explan. exclusion [1989], 3)
     A reaction: This is a rather optimistic view of explanations, with a strong element of reality involved. I would have thought there were complete explanations at different 'levels', which were complementary to one another.