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11175
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Logical concepts rest on certain inferences, not on facts about implications [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
The nature of the logical concepts is given, not by certain logical truths, but by certain logical inferences. What properly belongs to disjunction is the inference from p to (p or q), rather than the fact that p implies (p or q).
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From:
Kit Fine (Senses of Essence [1995], §3)
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A reaction:
Does this mean that Fine is wickedly starting with the psychology, rather than with the pure truth of the connection? Frege is shuddering. This view seems to imply that the truth table for 'or' is secondary.
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11176
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The property of Property Abstraction says any suitable condition must imply a property [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
According to the principle of Property Abstraction, there is, for any suitable condition, a property that is possessed by an object just in case it conforms to the condition. This is usually taken to be a second-order logical truth.
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From:
Kit Fine (Senses of Essence [1995], §4)
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A reaction:
Fine objects that it is implied that if Socrates is essentially a man, then he essentially has the property of being a man. Like Fine, I think this conclusion is distasteful. A classification is not a property, at least the way most people use 'property'.
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13417
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If a mathematical structure is rejected from a physical theory, it retains its mathematical status [Parsons,C]
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Full Idea:
If experience shows that some aspect of the physical world fails to instantiate a certain mathematical structure, one will modify the theory by sustituting a different structure, while the original structure doesn't lose its status as part of mathematics.
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From:
Charles Parsons (Review of Tait 'Provenance of Pure Reason' [2009], §2)
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A reaction:
This seems to be a beautifully simple and powerful objection to the Quinean idea that mathematics somehow only gets its authority from physics. It looked like a daft view to begin with, of course.
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21342
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A relation is internal if two things possessing the relation could not fail to be related [Moore,GE, by Heil]
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Full Idea:
Moore characterises internal relations modally, as those essential to their relata. If a and b are related R-wise, and R is an internal relation, a and b could not fail to be so related; otherwise R is external.
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From:
report of G.E. Moore (External and Internal Relations [1919]) by John Heil - Relations 'Internal'
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A reaction:
I don't think of Moore as an essentialist, but this fits the essentialist picture nicely, and is probably best paraphrased in terms of powers. Integers are the standard example of internal relations.
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11173
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Being a man is a consequence of his essence, not constitutive of it [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
If we distinguish 'constitutive' from 'consequential' essence, ..then the essence of Socrates will, in part, be constituted by his being a man. But being a man (or a mountain) will merely be consequential upon, and not constitutive of, his essence.
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From:
Kit Fine (Senses of Essence [1995], §3)
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A reaction:
Yes yes yes. I think it is absurd to say that the class to which something belongs is part of its essential nature, given that it presumably can only belong to the class if it already has a certain essential nature. What did Frankenstein construct?
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11179
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If there are alternative definitions, then we have three possibilities for essence [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
If there are alternative definitions for an essence, we must distinguish three notions. There is the essence as the manifold (the combined definitions), or as the range of alternative definitions (with component essences), or there is the common essence.
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From:
Kit Fine (Senses of Essence [1995], §8)
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A reaction:
Fine opts for the third alternative (what the definitions all have in common) as the best account. He says (p.68) 'definitive' properties come from one definition, and 'essential' properties from every possible definition.
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