13 ideas
17447 | Parsons says counting is tagging as first, second, third..., and converting the last to a cardinal [Parsons,C, by Heck] |
Full Idea: In Parsons's demonstrative model of counting, '1' means the first, and counting says 'the first, the second, the third', where one is supposed to 'tag' each object exactly once, and report how many by converting the last ordinal into a cardinal. | |
From: report of Charles Parsons (Frege's Theory of Numbers [1965]) by Richard G. Heck - Cardinality, Counting and Equinumerosity 3 | |
A reaction: This sounds good. Counting seems to rely on that fact that numbers can be both ordinals and cardinals. You don't 'convert' at the end, though, because all the way you mean 'this cardinality in this order'. |
14217 | The 'standard' view of relations is that they hold of several objects in a given order [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: The 'standard' view of relations, held by philosophers and logicians alike, is that we may meaningfully talk of a relation holding of several objects in a given order (which works for examples like 'loves' and 'between'). | |
From: Kit Fine (Neutral Relations [2000], Intro) | |
A reaction: The point of Fine's paper is that there are many relations for which this model seems to fail. |
14216 | The 'positionalist' view of relations says the number of places is fixed, but not the order [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: The 'positionalist' view of relations is that each relation is taken to be endowed with a given number of argument places, or positions, in no specified order. [...The argument-places are specific entities, such as 'lover' and 'beloved'] | |
From: Kit Fine (Neutral Relations [2000], Intro) | |
A reaction: Fine offers this as an alternative to the 'standard' view of relations, in which the order of the objects matters. He then adds, and favours, the 'anti-positionalist' view, where there are not even a fixed number of places. |
14218 | A block on top of another contains one relation, not both 'on top of' and 'beneath' [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: If block a is on block b, it is hard to see how this state of affairs might consist of both 'on top of' and 'beneath'. Surely if the state is a genuine relational complex, there must be a single relation for these relata? | |
From: Kit Fine (Neutral Relations [2000], 1) | |
A reaction: He has already shown that if such relations imply their converses, then that gives you two separate relations. He goes on to observe that you cannot pick one of the two as correct, because of symmetry. He later offers the 'vertical placement' relation. |
14219 | Language imposes a direction on a road which is not really part of the road [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Roads in the directional sense (A-to-B or B-to-A) are merely roads in the adirectional sense up which a direction has been imposed. | |
From: Kit Fine (Neutral Relations [2000], 1) | |
A reaction: This is Fine's linguistic objection to the standard view of relations. It is undeniable that language imposes an order where it may not exist ('Bob and Jane play tennis'), and this fact is very significant in discussing relations. |
14220 | Explain biased relations as orderings of the unbiased, or the unbiased as permutation classes of the biased? [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: A 'biased' relation can be taken to be the result of imposing ordering on the argument-places of an unbiased relation, ..or we can take an unbiased relation to be a 'permutation class' of biased relations. This is a familiar metaphysic predicament. | |
From: Kit Fine (Neutral Relations [2000], 3) | |
A reaction: 'Biased' relations such as 'on top of' have an ordering to their places, but 'unbiased' relations such as 'vertical placement' do not. This is a nice question in the metaphysics of grounding relations between key concepts. |
3978 | Associations are held to connect Ideas together in the way the world is connected together [Fodor] |
Full Idea: The laws of associations were held to explicate the semantic coherence of intentional processes, which adjust the causal relations among Ideas to reflect corresponding relations among the things that they're ideas of. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Jerry A. Fodor on himself [1994], p.296) | |
A reaction: With the support of evolution, and the backing of a correspondence theory of truth, plus more sophistication in the associations, this might work. |
3976 | Intentional science needs objects with semantic and causal properties, and which obey laws [Fodor] |
Full Idea: If there is to be an intentional science, there must be semantically evaluable things which have causal powers, and there must be laws relating beliefs and desires to one another, and to actions. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Jerry A. Fodor on himself [1994], p.293) | |
A reaction: The semantics and causation sound fair enough, but the prospect of finding laws looks bleak (though, contrary to Davidson, I don't see why they can't exist). |
3980 | Intentional states and processes may be causal relations among mental symbols [Fodor] |
Full Idea: It may be that intentional states are relations to mental symbols, and mental processes are implemented by causal relations among these symbols. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Jerry A. Fodor on himself [1994], p.296) | |
A reaction: It is hard to see how something could have causal powers just by being a symbol. The theory needs something else to drive the causation. |
3981 | Most psychological properties seem to be multiply realisable [Fodor] |
Full Idea: These days most philosophers of mind suppose that most psychological properties are multiply realisable. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Jerry A. Fodor on himself [1994], p.298) | |
A reaction: This is just speculation. The physical part may seem very different, but turn out to be identical in the ways that matter (like a knife made of two different metals). |
3975 | Folk psychology explains behaviour by reference to intentional states like belief and desire [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Folk psychology is primarily intentional explanation; it's the idea that people's behaviour can be explained by reference to the contents of their beliefs and desires. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Jerry A. Fodor on himself [1994], p.292) | |
A reaction: Sounds good. To reject folk psychology (as reductivists tend to) is to reject the existence of significant intentional states which have causal properties |
3982 | How could the extrinsic properties of thoughts supervene on their intrinsic properties? [Fodor] |
Full Idea: It is hard to see how the extrinsic properties of thoughts could supervene on their intrinsic properties. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Jerry A. Fodor on himself [1994], p.299) | |
A reaction: This doesn't seem a big problem. Sometimes represented experiences establish the match; sometimes the match is not very good, or even wrong. |
3977 | Laws are true generalisations which support counterfactuals and are confirmed by instances [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Laws are true generalisations that support counterfactuals and are confirmed by their instances. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Jerry A. Fodor on himself [1994], p.293) | |
A reaction: This seems correct, but it doesn't disentangle laws as mental states from laws as features of nature |