19456
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Philosophy is distinguished from other sciences by its complete lack of presuppositions [Feuerbach]
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Full Idea:
Philosophy does not presuppose anything. It is precisely in this fact of non-presupposition that its beginning lies - a beginning by virtue of which it is set apart from all the other sciences.
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From:
Ludwig Feuerbach (On 'The Beginning of Philosophy' [1841], p.135)
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A reaction:
Most modern philosophers seem to laugh at such an idea, because everything is theory-laden, culture-laden, language-laden etc. As an aspiration I love it, and think good philosophers get quite close to the goal (which, I admit, is not fully attainable).
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17447
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Parsons says counting is tagging as first, second, third..., and converting the last to a cardinal [Parsons,C, by Heck]
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Full Idea:
In Parsons's demonstrative model of counting, '1' means the first, and counting says 'the first, the second, the third', where one is supposed to 'tag' each object exactly once, and report how many by converting the last ordinal into a cardinal.
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From:
report of Charles Parsons (Frege's Theory of Numbers [1965]) by Richard G. Heck - Cardinality, Counting and Equinumerosity 3
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A reaction:
This sounds good. Counting seems to rely on that fact that numbers can be both ordinals and cardinals. You don't 'convert' at the end, though, because all the way you mean 'this cardinality in this order'.
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7558
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Substances mirror God or the universe, each from its own viewpoint [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
Each substance is like a whole world, and like a mirror of God, or indeed of the whole universe, which each one expresses in its own fashion.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Discourse on Metaphysics [1686]), quoted by Nicholas Jolley - Leibniz Intro
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A reaction:
Leibniz isn't a pantheist, so he does not identify God with the universe, so it is a bit revealing that substance could reflect either one or the other, and he doesn't seem to care which. In the end, for all the sophistication, he just made it up.
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13088
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Subjects include predicates, so full understanding of subjects reveals all the predicates [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
The subject-term must always include the predicate-term, in such a way that the man who understood the notion of the subject perfectly would also judge that the predicate belongs to it.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Discourse on Metaphysics [1686], §8)
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A reaction:
Sounds as if every sentence is analytic, but he doesn't mean that. He does, oddly, mean that if we fully understand the name 'Alexander', we understand his complete history, which is a bit silly, I'm afraid. Even God doesn't learn things just from names.
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5024
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Knowledge doesn't just come from the senses; we know the self, substance, identity, being etc. [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
It is always false to say that all our notions come from the so-called external senses, for the notion I have of myself and of my thoughts, and consequently of being, substance, action, identity, and many others, come from an internal experience.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Discourse on Metaphysics [1686], §27)
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A reaction:
Of course, an empiricist like Hume would not deny this, as he bases his views on 'experience' (including anger, for example), not just 'sense experience'. But Hume, famously, said he has no experience of a Self, so can't get started on Leibniz's journey.
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5027
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If a person's memories became totally those of the King of China, he would be the King of China [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
If someone were suddenly to become the King of China, forgetting what he has been, as if born anew, is this not as if he were annihilated, and a King of China created in his place at the same moment?
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Discourse on Metaphysics [1686], §34)
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A reaction:
Strikingly, this clearly endorse the view of the empiricist Locke. It is a view about the continuity of the self, not its essence, but Descartes must have turned in his grave when he read this. When this 'King of China' introspects his self, what is it?
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5023
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Future contingent events are certain, because God foresees them, but that doesn't make them necessary [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
We must distinguish between what is certain and what is necessary; everyone agrees that future contingents are certain, since God foresees them, but it is not thereby admitted that they are necessary.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Discourse on Metaphysics [1686], §13)
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A reaction:
An interesting point, since there is presumably a difference between God foreseeing that future squares will have four corners, and His foreseeing the next war. It seems to me, though, that 'certainty' is bad enough news for free will, without necessity.
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