Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Frege's Theory of Numbers', 'Meaning and Necessity' and 'Political Liberalism'

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4 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure

17447	Parsons says counting is tagging as first, second, third..., and converting the last to a cardinal [Parsons,C, by Heck]
	Full Idea: In Parsons's demonstrative model of counting, '1' means the first, and counting says 'the first, the second, the third', where one is supposed to 'tag' each object exactly once, and report how many by converting the last ordinal into a cardinal.
	From: report of Charles Parsons (Frege's Theory of Numbers [1965]) by Richard G. Heck - Cardinality, Counting and Equinumerosity 3
	A reaction: This sounds good. Counting seems to rely on that fact that numbers can be both ordinals and cardinals. You don't 'convert' at the end, though, because all the way you mean 'this cardinality in this order'.

19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics

11968	The intension of a sentence is the set of all possible worlds in which it is true [Carnap, by Kaplan]
	Full Idea: Carnap's proposal is to understand the category of intensions appropriate to sentences (his 'propositions') as sets of possible worlds. The intension of the sentence is taken as the set of all possible worlds in which the sentence is true.
	From: report of Rudolph Carnap (Meaning and Necessity [1947]) by David Kaplan - Transworld Heir Lines p.90
	A reaction: [reference?] This extension of the truth-conditions view of meaning strikes me as being very attractive. Except that whole worlds hardly seem to be relevant to my remark about how lunch might have been improved.

23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability

21051	Check your rationality by thinking of your opinion pronounced by the supreme court [Rawls]
	Full Idea: To check whether we are following public reason we might ask: how would our argument strike us presented in the form of a supreme court opinion?
	From: John Rawls (Political Liberalism [1993], p.254), quoted by Michael J. Sandel - Justice: What's the right thing to do? 10
	A reaction: A very nice practical implementation of Kantian universalisability. How would your opinion sound if it were written into a constitution?

24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract

21119	Power is only legitimate if it is reasonable for free equal citizens to endorse the constitution [Rawls]
	Full Idea: Exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in light of principles and ideals acceptable to reason.
	From: John Rawls (Political Liberalism [1993], p.217), quoted by Andrew Shorten - Contemporary Political Theory 02
	A reaction: This is not the actual endorsement of Rousseau, or the tacit endorsement of Locke (by living there), but adds a Kantian appeal to a rational consensus, on which rational people should converge. Very Enlightenment. 'Hypothetical consent'.