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All the ideas for 'Frege's Theory of Numbers', 'What do powers do when they are not manifested?' and 'Ambitious, yet modest, Metaphysics'

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5 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science

16415	Esoteric metaphysics aims to be top science, investigating ultimate reality [Hofweber]
	Full Idea: Esoteric metaphysics appeals to those, I conjecture, who deep down hold that philosophy is the queen of sciences after all, since it investigates what the world is REALLY like.
	From: Thomas Hofweber (Ambitious, yet modest, Metaphysics [2009], 2)
	A reaction: He mentions Kit Fine and Jonathan Schaffer as esoteric metaphysicians. I see a pyramid of increasing generality and abstraction, with metaphysics at the top. This doesn't make it 'queen', though, because uncertainties multiply higher up.

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics

16413	Science has discovered properties of things, so there are properties - so who needs metaphysics? [Hofweber]
	Full Idea: Material science has found that some features of metals make them more susceptible to corrosion but more resistant to fracture. Thus this immediately implies that there are features, i.e. properties. What is left for metaphysics to do?
	From: Thomas Hofweber (Ambitious, yet modest, Metaphysics [2009], 1.1)
	A reaction: Presumably economists have discovered 'features' of economies that cause unemployment, and literary critics have discovered 'features' of novels that make them good.

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification

16416	The quantifier in logic is not like the ordinary English one (which has empty names, non-denoting terms etc) [Hofweber]
	Full Idea: The inferential role of the existential quantifier in first order logic does not carry over to the existential quantifier in English (we have empty names, singular terms that are not even in the business of denoting, and so on).
	From: Thomas Hofweber (Ambitious, yet modest, Metaphysics [2009], 2)

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure

17447	Parsons says counting is tagging as first, second, third..., and converting the last to a cardinal [Parsons,C, by Heck]
	Full Idea: In Parsons's demonstrative model of counting, '1' means the first, and counting says 'the first, the second, the third', where one is supposed to 'tag' each object exactly once, and report how many by converting the last ordinal into a cardinal.
	From: report of Charles Parsons (Frege's Theory of Numbers [1965]) by Richard G. Heck - Cardinality, Counting and Equinumerosity 3
	A reaction: This sounds good. Counting seems to rely on that fact that numbers can be both ordinals and cardinals. You don't 'convert' at the end, though, because all the way you mean 'this cardinality in this order'.

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic

17996	Powers are claimed to be basic because fundamental particles lack internal structure [Psillos]
	Full Idea: The argument for fundamental powers is that fundamental particles are simple, without internal structure. Hence they have no parts which can be the bearers of further properties (powers or non-powers) which in turn ground the properties of the particles.
	From: Stathis Psillos (What do powers do when they are not manifested? [2006], p.151), quoted by Anna Marmodoro - Do powers need powers to make them powerful? 'The Problem'
	A reaction: If a power is basic, what has the power? I think the best answer is that at the fundamental level this is a false dichotomy. If you could zoom in, you would say that basic substance is active in a way that everyday stuff doesn't appear to be.