Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Frege's Theory of Numbers', 'Philosophy of Logics' and 'Process Metaphysics'

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4 ideas

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique

2572	Logical truth seems much less likely to 'correspond to the facts' than factual truth does [Haack]
	Full Idea: It is surely less plausible to suppose that logical truth consists in correspondence to the facts than that 'factual' truth does.
	From: Susan Haack (Philosophy of Logics [1978], 7.6)

3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition

2570	The same sentence could be true in one language and meaningless in another, so truth is language-relative [Haack]
	Full Idea: The definition of truth will have to be, Tarski argues, relative to a language, for one and the same sentence may be true in one language, and false or meaningless in another.
	From: Susan Haack (Philosophy of Logics [1978], 7.5)

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure

17447	Parsons says counting is tagging as first, second, third..., and converting the last to a cardinal [Parsons,C, by Heck]
	Full Idea: In Parsons's demonstrative model of counting, '1' means the first, and counting says 'the first, the second, the third', where one is supposed to 'tag' each object exactly once, and report how many by converting the last ordinal into a cardinal.
	From: report of Charles Parsons (Frege's Theory of Numbers [1965]) by Richard G. Heck - Cardinality, Counting and Equinumerosity 3
	A reaction: This sounds good. Counting seems to rely on that fact that numbers can be both ordinals and cardinals. You don't 'convert' at the end, though, because all the way you mean 'this cardinality in this order'.

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes

22626	Process philosophy insists that processes are not inferior in being to substances [Rescher]
	Full Idea: Process philosophy diametrically opposes the view that denies processes or downgrades them in the order of being or of understanding by subordinating them to substantial things.
	From: Nicholas Rescher (Process Metaphysics [1996]), quoted by R.D. Ingthorsson - A Powerful Particulars View of Causation 7
	A reaction: [No page cited - nr start?] Ingthorsson quotes this in order to challenge it, and says that substances are also processes, because change is essential to them.