Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Frege's Theory of Numbers', 'Brain Bisection and Unity of Consciousness' and 'Between Facts and Norms'

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4 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure

17447	Parsons says counting is tagging as first, second, third..., and converting the last to a cardinal [Parsons,C, by Heck]
	Full Idea: In Parsons's demonstrative model of counting, '1' means the first, and counting says 'the first, the second, the third', where one is supposed to 'tag' each object exactly once, and report how many by converting the last ordinal into a cardinal.
	From: report of Charles Parsons (Frege's Theory of Numbers [1965]) by Richard G. Heck - Cardinality, Counting and Equinumerosity 3
	A reaction: This sounds good. Counting seems to rely on that fact that numbers can be both ordinals and cardinals. You don't 'convert' at the end, though, because all the way you mean 'this cardinality in this order'.

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind

2957	Brain bisection suggests unity of mind isn't all-or-nothing [Nagel, by Lockwood]
	Full Idea: Nagel argues (because of brain bisection experiments) that we should jettison our commonsense assumption that the unity of consciousness is an all-or-nothing affair.
	From: report of Thomas Nagel (Brain Bisection and Unity of Consciousness [1971]) by Michael Lockwood - Mind, Brain and the Quantum p.84
	A reaction: It seems wrong to call it 'commonsense'. It is an assumption that precedes any judgement, but if you rapidly grasp that your mind is in your brain, it becomes common sense that you can cut lumps out of your mind.

16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self

3285	We may be unable to abandon personal identity, even when split-brains have undermined it [Nagel]
	Full Idea: As a result of the evidence of split-brains, it is possible that the ordinary, simple idea of a single person will come to seem quaint some day, …but we may be unable to abandon the idea, no matter what we discover.
	From: Thomas Nagel (Brain Bisection and Unity of Consciousness [1971], p.164)
	A reaction: I'm not sure what grounds you can have for a claim that we can't abandon our current view of selves, even when the new reality will be utterly different. Rather conservative? I would expect future concepts to roughly match future reality.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention

15672	Actions norms are only valid if everyone possibly affected is involved in the discourse [Habermas]
	Full Idea: Only those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons could agree as participants in rational discourse.
	From: Jürgen Habermas (Between Facts and Norms [1996], p.107), quoted by James Gordon Finlayson - Habermas Ch.6:79
	A reaction: This remark stands somewhere between Kant and Rawls. The Holocaust stands behind Habermas's philosophy. The thought, I suppose, is that it would never have happened if everybody had been fully involved in the original discourse about it.