10 ideas
13418 | The old problems with the axiom of choice are probably better ascribed to the law of excluded middle [Parsons,C] |
Full Idea: The difficulties historically attributed to the axiom of choice are probably better ascribed to the law of excluded middle. | |
From: Charles Parsons (Review of Tait 'Provenance of Pure Reason' [2009], §2) | |
A reaction: The law of excluded middle was a target for the intuitionists, so presumably the debate went off in that direction. |
13419 | If functions are transfinite objects, finitists can have no conception of them [Parsons,C] |
Full Idea: The finitist may have no conception of function, because functions are transfinite objects. | |
From: Charles Parsons (Review of Tait 'Provenance of Pure Reason' [2009], §4) | |
A reaction: He is offering a view of Tait's. Above my pay scale, but it sounds like a powerful objection to the finitist view. Maybe there is a finitist account of functions that could be given? |
13417 | If a mathematical structure is rejected from a physical theory, it retains its mathematical status [Parsons,C] |
Full Idea: If experience shows that some aspect of the physical world fails to instantiate a certain mathematical structure, one will modify the theory by sustituting a different structure, while the original structure doesn't lose its status as part of mathematics. | |
From: Charles Parsons (Review of Tait 'Provenance of Pure Reason' [2009], §2) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a beautifully simple and powerful objection to the Quinean idea that mathematics somehow only gets its authority from physics. It looked like a daft view to begin with, of course. |
22593 | Our sensation of light may not be the same as what produces the sensation [Descartes] |
Full Idea: There can be a difference between our sensation of light and what is in the objects that produce that sensation in us. | |
From: René Descartes (The World [1631]), quoted by Ian Dunt - How to be a Liberal 1 | |
A reaction: Note only that they 'may' differ, and that he does not assert that they are entirely different. Secondary qualities give information, and are not just mental events. |
23633 | Many truths seem obvious, and point to universal agreement - which is what we find [Reid] |
Full Idea: There are many truths so obvious to the human faculties, that it should be expected that men should universally agree in them. And this is actually found to be the case with regard to many truths, against which we find no dissent. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 1: Preliminary [1785], 2) | |
A reaction: He says that a few sceptical philosophers may disagree. This is a nice statement of his creed of common sense. I agree with him, and Aristotle observes the same fact. |
23630 | Only philosophers treat ideas as objects [Reid] |
Full Idea: The vulgar allow that an 'idea' implies a mind that thinks, an act of mind which we call thinking, and an object about which we think. But the philosopher conceives a fourth - the idea, which is the immediate object. …I believe this to be a mere fiction. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 1: Preliminary [1785], 1) | |
A reaction: Another example, to add to Yablo's list, of abstract objects invented by philosophers to fill holes in their theories. This one is illuminating, because we all say 'I've got an idea'. Cf discussions of the redundancy of truth. Cf propositions. |
23629 | The ambiguity of words impedes the advancement of knowledge [Reid] |
Full Idea: There is no greater impediment to the advancement of knowledge than the ambiguity of words. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 1: Preliminary [1785], 1) | |
A reaction: He means that ambiguity leads to long pointless disagreements. |
16569 | The Hot, Cold, Wet and Dry of the philosophers need themselves to be explained [Descartes] |
Full Idea: If you find it strange that in explaining these elements I do not use the qualities called Hot, Cold, Wet and Dry - as the philosophers do - I shall say to you that these qualities themselves seem to me to need explanation. | |
From: René Descartes (The World [1631], 9:25-6), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 1.3 | |
A reaction: Nice. I take pushing the boundaries of explanation back (or down) to be the basic driving force of all human thought, in metaphysics as well as in physics. |
23632 | Similar effects come from similar causes, and causes are only what are sufficient for the effects [Reid] |
Full Idea: A first principle is that similar effects proceed from the same or similar causes; that we ought to admit of no other causes …but such as are sufficient to account for the effects. | |
From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 1: Preliminary [1785], 2) | |
A reaction: He treats these as a priori axioms of natural philosophy. In evolution similar causes seem to produce startlingly divergent effects, such as the mating needs of male birds. |
20964 | Descartes said there was conservation of 'quantity of motion' [Descartes, by Papineau] |
Full Idea: Descartes incorporated the conservation of what he called 'quantity of motion', by which he meant mass times speed. | |
From: report of René Descartes (The World [1631]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness App 2 | |
A reaction: Mass times velocity is now called 'momentum'. Is this the first ever conservation law? There are now lots of them. |