28 ideas
7990 | Serene wisdom is freedom from ties, and indifference to fortune [Anon (Bhag)] |
Full Idea: Who everywhere is free from all ties, who neither rejoices nor sorrows if fortune is good or is ill, his is a serene wisdom. | |
From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 2.57) | |
A reaction: This is very similar to the 'apatheia' of the Stoics, though they are always more committed to rationality. This is quite a good strategy when times are hard, but as a general rule it offers a bogus state of 'wisdom' which is really half way to death. |
6947 | Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Metaphysical systems have not usually rested upon any observed facts, or not in any great degree. They are chiefly adopted because their fundamental propositions seem 'agreeable to reason', which means that which we find ourselves inclined to believe. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.15) | |
A reaction: This leads to Peirce's key claim - that we should allow our beliefs to be formed by something outside of ourselves. I don't share Peirce's contempt for metaphysics, which I take to be about the most abstract presuppositions of our ordinary beliefs. |
6937 | Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The object of reasoning is to find out, from the consideration of what we already know, something else which we do not know. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p. 7) | |
A reaction: I defy anyone to come up with a better definition of reasoning than that. The emphasis is on knowledge rather than truth, which you would expect from a pragmatist. …Actually the definition doesn't cover conditional reasoning terribly well. |
7989 | Seek salvation in the wisdom of reason [Anon (Bhag)] |
Full Idea: Seek salvation in the wisdom of reason. | |
From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 2.49) | |
A reaction: Quotations like this can usually be counterbalanced in eastern philosophy by wild irrationality, but they certainly felt to tug of reason. Only the Dhaoists seem really opposed to reason (e.g. Idea 7289). |
21492 | Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The fundamental hypothesis of the method of science is this: There are real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinion of them. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877]), quoted by Albert Atkin - Peirce 3 'method' | |
A reaction: He admits later that this is only a commitment and not a fact. It seems to me that when you combine this idea with the huge success of science, the denial of realism is crazy. Philosophy has a lot to answer for. |
6949 | If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Nobody can really doubt that there are Reals, for, if he did, doubt would not be a source of dissatisfaction. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.19) | |
A reaction: This rests on Peirce's view that all that really matters is a sense of genuine dissatisfaction, rather than a theoretical idea. So even at the end of Meditation One, Descartes isn't actually worried about whether his furniture exists. |
7996 | I am all the beauty and goodness of things, says Krishna [Anon (Bhag)] |
Full Idea: I am the beauty of all things beautiful; ...I am the goodness of those who are good, says Krishna. | |
From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 10.36) | |
A reaction: Another attempt to annexe everything which is admirable to the nature of God. This sounds strikingly Platonic (c.f. Idea 7992, which seems Aristotelian). One scholar dates the text to 150 BCE. I think there is influence, one way or the other. |
6940 | The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The feeling of believing is a more or less sure indication of there being established in our nature some habit which will determine our actions. Doubt never has such an effect. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.10) | |
A reaction: It is one thing to assert this fairly accurate observation, and another to assert that this is the essence or definition of a belief. Perhaps it is the purpose of belief, without being the phenomenological essence of it. We act in states of uncertainty. |
6941 | We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce] |
Full Idea: As soon as a firm belief is reached we are entirely satisfied, whether the belief be true or false. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.10) | |
A reaction: This does not deny that the truth or falsehood of a belief is independent of whether we are satisfied with it. It is making a fair point, though, about why we believe things, and it can't be because of truth, because we don't know how to ensure that. |
6942 | We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce] |
Full Idea: We seek for a belief that we shall think to be true; but we think each one of our beliefs to be true, and, indeed, it is mere tautology to say so. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.11) | |
A reaction: If, as I do, you like to define belief as 'commitment to truth', Peirce makes a rather startling observation. You are rendered unable to ask whether your beliefs are true, because you have defined them as true. Nice point… |
6943 | A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The mere putting of a proposition into the interrogative form does not stimulate the mind to any struggle after belief; there must be a real and living doubt. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.11) | |
A reaction: This the attractive aspect of Peirce's pragmatism, that he is always focusing on real life rather than abstract theory or pure logic. |
6598 | We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce] |
Full Idea: It is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs be determined by nothing human, but by some external permanency - by something upon which our thinking has no effect. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.5 | |
A reaction: This very sensible and interesting remark hovers somewhere between empiricism and pragmatism. Fogelin very persuasively builds his account of knowledge on it. The key point is that we hardly ever choose what to believe. See Idea 2454. |
6944 | Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce] |
Full Idea: It is a common idea that demonstration must rest on indubitable propositions, either first principles of a general nature, or first sensations; but actual demonstration is completely satisfactory if it starts from propositions free from all actual doubt. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.11) | |
A reaction: Another nice example of Peirce focusing on the practical business of thinking, rather than abstract theory. I agree with this approach, that explanation and proof do not aim at perfection and indubitability, but at what satisfies a critical mind. |
6948 | Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce] |
Full Idea: To satisfy our doubts it is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs may be determined by nothing human, but by some external permanency - by something upon which our thinking has no effect. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.18) | |
A reaction: This may be the single most important idea in pragmatism and in the philosophy of science. See Fodor on experiments (Idea 2455). Put the question to nature. The essential aim is to be passive in our beliefs - just let reality form them. |
6945 | Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Some people seem to love to argue a point after all the world is fully convinced of it. But no further advance can be made. When doubt ceases, mental action on the subject comes to an end; and, if it did go on, it would be without purpose. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.11) | |
A reaction: This is the way Peirce's pragmatism, which deals with how real thinking actually works (rather than abstract logic), deals with scepticism. However, there is a borderline where almost everyone is satisfied, but the very wise person remains sceptical. |
7995 | In all living beings I am the light of consciousness, says Krishna [Anon (Bhag)] |
Full Idea: In all living beings I am the light of consciousness, says Krishna. | |
From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 10.22) | |
A reaction: Everything grand seems to be claimed for God at this stage of culture, but I am not sure how coherent this view is, unless this is pantheism. In what sense could we possibly be Krishna, when none of us (except Arjuna) is aware of it? |
22306 | To explain false belief we should take belief as relating to a proposition's parts, not to the whole thing [Russell] |
Full Idea: To explain belief in what is false we shall have to regard what is called belief in a proposition as not a thought related to the proposition, but rather as a thought related to the constituents of the proposition. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Papers of 1906 [1906], V.321), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 40 '1906' | |
A reaction: Russell proposed a new theory of judgement, in order to explain erroneous judgements, given that true propositions are identical with facts. Of course there might be errors about the constituents, as well as about their structure. Othello is his example. |
7999 | All actions come from: body, lower self, perception, means of action, or Fate [Anon (Bhag)] |
Full Idea: Whatever a man does, good or bad, in thought, word or deed, has these five sources of action: the body, the lower 'I am', the means of perception, the means of action, and Fate. | |
From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 18.14/15) | |
A reaction: The 'means of action' will presumably take care of anything we haven't thought of! Nothing quite matches the idea of 'the will' here. A twitch from the first, eating from the second, a startled jump from the third, struck by lightning from the fifth. |
7991 | Hate and lust have their roots in man's lower nature [Anon (Bhag)] |
Full Idea: Hate and lust for things of nature have their roots in man's lower nature. | |
From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 3.34) | |
A reaction: It seems outmoded now (since Freud) to label parts of human nature as 'higher' and 'lower'. I would defend the distinction, but it is not self-evident. The basis of morality is good citizenship, and parts of our nature are detrimental to that. |
7988 | There is no greater good for a warrior than to fight in a just war [Anon (Bhag)] |
Full Idea: There is no greater good for a warrior than to fight in righteous war. | |
From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 2.31) | |
A reaction: What worries me now is not the urging to fight, as long as a good cause can be found, but the idea that someone should see his social role as 'warrior'. The modern 'soldier' is ready to fight, but a traditional 'warrior' is obliged to fight. |
7992 | The visible forms of nature are earth, water, fire, air, ether; mind, reason, and the sense of 'I' [Anon (Bhag)] |
Full Idea: The visible forms of nature are eight: earth, water, fire, air, ether; the mind, reason, and the sense of 'I'. | |
From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 7.4) | |
A reaction: Presumably there is an implication that there are also invisible forms. The Bhuddists launched an attack on 'I' as one of the categories. The first five appear to be Aristotle's, which must be of scholarly (and chronological) interest. |
6939 | What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The guiding principle is that what is true of one piece of copper is true of another; such a guiding principle with regard to copper would be much safer than with regard to many other substances - brass, for example. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p. 8) | |
A reaction: Peirce is so beautifully simple and sensible. This gives the essential notion of a natural kind, and is a key notion in our whole understanding of physical reality. |
6938 | Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce] |
Full Idea: It is probably of more advantage to an animal to have his mind filled with pleasing and encouraging visions, independently of their truth; and thus, upon unpractical subjects, natural selection might occasion a fallacious tendency of thought. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p. 8) | |
A reaction: Note that this is a pragmatist saying that a set of beliefs might work fine but be untrue. So Peirce does not have the highly relativistic notion of truth of some later pragmatists. Good for him. Note the early date to be thinking about Darwin. |
7994 | Everything, including the gods, comes from me, says Krishna [Anon (Bhag)] |
Full Idea: All the gods come from me, says Krishna. ...I am the one source of all | |
From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 10.2/8) | |
A reaction: This seems very close to monotheism, and sounds very similar to the position that Zeus seems to occupy in later Greek religion, where he is shading off into a supreme and spiritual entity. |
6946 | If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce] |
Full Idea: If death is annihilation, then the man who believes that he will certainly go straight to heaven when he dies, provided he have fulfilled certain simple observances in this life, has a cheap pleasure which will not be followed by the least disappointment. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.12) | |
A reaction: This is a nicely wicked summary of one side of Pascal's options. All the problems of the argument are built into Peirce's word "cheap". Peirce goes on to talk about ostriches burying their heads. |
7993 | Brahman is supreme, Atman his spirit in man, and Karma is the force of creation [Anon (Bhag)] |
Full Idea: Brahman is supreme, the Eternal. Atman is his Spirit in man. Karma is the force of creation, wherefrom all things have their life. | |
From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 8.3) | |
A reaction: I can't help wondering how they know all this stuff, but then I'm just a typical product of my culture. We seem to have a trinity here. Who's in charge? Is Atman just a servant? Is Karma totally under the control of Brahman? |
7997 | Only by love can men see me, know me, and come to me, says Krishna [Anon (Bhag)] |
Full Idea: Only by love can men see me, and know me, and come unto me, says Krishna | |
From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 11.54) | |
A reaction: There seems to be a paradox here, as it is unclear how you can love Krishna, if you have not already seen him in some way. This is another paradox of fideism - that faith cannot possibly be the first step in a religion, as faith needs a target. |
7998 | The three gates of hell are lust, anger and greed [Anon (Bhag)] |
Full Idea: Three are the gates of this hell, the death of the soul: the gate of lust, the gate of wrath, and the gate of greed. Let a man shun the three. | |
From: Anon (Bhag) (The Bhagavad Gita [c.500 BCE], 16.21) | |
A reaction: Anyone who wishes to procreate, champion justice, and make a living, has to pursue all three. Wisdom consists of pursuing the three appropriately, not in shunning them. How did this bizarre puritanism ever come to grip the human race? |