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All the ideas for 'Concerning the Author', 'Scientific Thought' and 'Review: Meinong 'Untersuchungen zur..''

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13 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics

14767	The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine [Peirce]
	Full Idea: The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine.
	From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Concerning the Author [1897], p.2)

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis

21546	We can't sharply distinguish variables, domains and values, if symbols frighten us [Russell]
	Full Idea: Whoever is afraid of symbols can hardly hope to acquire exact ideas where it is necessary to distinguish 1) the variable in itself as opposed to its value, 2) any value of the variable, 3) all values, 4) some value.
	From: Bertrand Russell (Review: Meinong 'Untersuchungen zur..' [1905], p.84)
	A reaction: Not the best example, perhaps, of the need for precision, but a nice illustration of the new attitude Russell brought into philosophy.

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism

14764	I am saturated with the spirit of physical science [Peirce]
	Full Idea: I am saturated, through and through, with the spirit of the physical sciences.
	From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Concerning the Author [1897], p.1)

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects

21531	Common sense agrees with Meinong (rather than Russell) that 'Pegasus is a flying horse' is true [Lackey on Russell]
	Full Idea: Meinong's theory says that 'Pegasus is a flying horse' is true, while Russell's says that this assertion is false. The average man, if he knows his mythology, would probably agree with Meinong.
	From: comment on Bertrand Russell (Review: Meinong 'Untersuchungen zur..' [1905]) by Douglas Lackey - Intros to Russell's 'Essays in Analysis' p.19
	A reaction: It seems obvious that some disambiguation is needed here. Assenting to that assertion would be blatantly contextual. No one backs Pegasus at a race track.

21545	I prefer to deny round squares, and deal with the difficulties by the theory of denoting [Russell]
	Full Idea: I should prefer to say that there is no such object as 'the round square'. The difficulties of excluding such objects can, I think, be avoided by the theory of denoting.
	From: Bertrand Russell (Review: Meinong 'Untersuchungen zur..' [1905], p.81)
	A reaction: The 'theory of denoting' is his brand new theory of definite descriptions, which makes implicit claims of existence explicit, so that they can be judged. Why can't we just say that a round square can be an intentional object, but not a real object?

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism

14759	A thing is simply a long event, linked by qualities, and spatio-temporal unity [Broad]
	Full Idea: A thing is simply a long event, throughout the course of which there is either qualitative similarity or continuous qualitative change, together with a characteristic spatio-temporal unity.
	From: C.D. Broad (Scientific Thought [1923], 10 'Duration')
	A reaction: At least he is trying to give some sort of principle that links the stages of the event together.

11842	If short-lived happenings like car crashes are 'events', why not long-lived events like Dover Cliffs? [Broad]
	Full Idea: We call a lightning flash or a motor accident an event, but refuse to apply this to the cliffs of Dover. ...But quantitative differences (of time) give no good grounds for calling one bit of history an event, and refusing the name to another bit.
	From: C.D. Broad (Scientific Thought [1923], p.54), quoted by David Wiggins - Sameness and Substance Renewed 2.3 n13
	A reaction: Wiggins calls this proposal a 'terrible absurdity', but it seems to me to demand attention. There is a case to be made for a 'process' to be the fundamental category of our ontology, with stable physical objects seen in that light.

11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism

14768	Infallibility in science is just a joke [Peirce]
	Full Idea: Infallibility in scientific matters seems to me irresistibly comical.
	From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Concerning the Author [1897], p.3)

12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism

14765	Association of ideas is the best philosophical idea of the prescientific age [Peirce]
	Full Idea: The doctrine of the association of ideas is, to my thinking, the finest piece of philosophical work of the prescientific ages.
	From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Concerning the Author [1897], p.2)

14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory

14766	Duns Scotus offers perhaps the best logic and metaphysics for modern physical science [Peirce]
	Full Idea: The works of Duns Scotus have strongly influenced me. …His logic and metaphysics, torn away from its medievalism, …will go far toward supplying the philosophy which is best to harmonize with physical science.
	From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Concerning the Author [1897], p.2)

27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block

8160	The present and past exist, but the future does not [Broad, by Dummett]
	Full Idea: Not only the present but also the past exist, but the future (so long as it is the future) does not.
	From: report of C.D. Broad (Scientific Thought [1923]) by Michael Dummett - Thought and Reality 1
	A reaction: This is quite appealing, and seems right if you believe that every truth has a truthmaker, and that there are no truths about the future. And yet the whole misery of people dying is that they cease to exist.

14609	We could say present and past exist, but not future, so that each event adds to the total history [Broad]
	Full Idea: One theory accepts the reality of the present and the past, but holds that the future is simply nothing at all. Nothing has happened to the present by becoming past except that fresh slices of existence have been added to the total history of the world.
	From: C.D. Broad (Scientific Thought [1923], II)
	A reaction: This is now known as Broad's 'Growing Block' view of time. It is tempting to say that neither past nor future exist, but it seems undeniable that statements about the past can be wholly true, unlike those about the future.

27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series

22933	We imagine the present as a spotlight, moving across events from past to future [Broad]
	Full Idea: We imagine presentness moving, like the spot of light from a policeman's bulls eye traversing the fronts of houses in a street. What is illuminated is present, what was illuminated is past, and what is not yet illuminated is the future.
	From: C.D. Broad (Scientific Thought [1923], II)
	A reaction: This is the 'moving spotlight' compromise theory, which retains the B-series eternal sequence of ordered events, but adds the A-series privileged present moment. Le Poidevin says Broad represents time twice over.