65 ideas
18330 | Judging by the positive forces, the Renaissance was the last great age [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Ages are to be assessed by their positive forces - and by this assessment the age of the Renaissance, so prodigal and so fateful, appears as the last great age. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 8.37) | |
A reaction: I suspect that Nietzsche places art very high among the positive forces. Science and technology showed barely a glimmer during the Renaissance. Mathematics moved very little, Copernicus was ignored, and logic was static. |
2900 | I revere Heraclitus [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: I set apart with high reverence the name of Heraclitus. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 2.2) |
2913 | Thucydides was the perfect anti-platonist sophist [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: My recreation, my preference, my cure from all Platonism has always been Thucydides. …Sophist culture, by which I mean realist culture, attains in him its perfect expression. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 9.2) |
2909 | Thinking has to be learned in the way dancing has to be learned [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Thinking has to be learned in the way dancing has to be learned. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 7.7) | |
A reaction: Nice. At its deepest level thinking isn't a rational process? |
6947 | Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Metaphysical systems have not usually rested upon any observed facts, or not in any great degree. They are chiefly adopted because their fundamental propositions seem 'agreeable to reason', which means that which we find ourselves inclined to believe. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.15) | |
A reaction: This leads to Peirce's key claim - that we should allow our beliefs to be formed by something outside of ourselves. I don't share Peirce's contempt for metaphysics, which I take to be about the most abstract presuppositions of our ordinary beliefs. |
2892 | Wanting a system in philosophy is a lack of integrity [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them. The will to system is a lack of integrity. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], Maxim 26) |
23123 | Basic to human culture are binary oppositions, such as eating raw or cooked [Levi-Strauss, by Green,TH] |
Full Idea: Lévi-Strauss made canonic to French structuralism the idea that human culture could be understood through a series of binary oppositionsn - the difference between what could be eaten raw and what cooked being one of the most fundamental. | |
From: report of Claude Lévi-Strauss (works [1950]) by T.H. Green - Prolegomena to Ethics 1 | |
A reaction: My guess is that such oppositions can often be illuminating, but will always be eventually judged as too simplistic. |
6937 | Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The object of reasoning is to find out, from the consideration of what we already know, something else which we do not know. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p. 7) | |
A reaction: I defy anyone to come up with a better definition of reasoning than that. The emphasis is on knowledge rather than truth, which you would expect from a pragmatist. …Actually the definition doesn't cover conditional reasoning terribly well. |
2896 | I want to understand the Socratic idea that 'reason equals virtue equals happiness' [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: I seek to understand out of what idiosyncrasy that Socratic equation 'reason equals virtue equals happiness' derives. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 1.04) |
2897 | With dialectics the rabble gets on top [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: With dialectics the rabble gets on top. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 1.05) |
2898 | Anything which must first be proved is of little value [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: What has first to have itself proved is of little value. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 1.05) |
18317 | The 'real being' of things is a nothingness constructed from contradictions in the actual world [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The characteristics which have been assigned to the 'real being' of things are the characteristics of non-being, of nothingness - the 'real world has been constructed out of the contradiction of the actual world. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 2.6) | |
A reaction: I take this to be a critique of Hegel, in particular. Could we describe the metaphysics of Nietzsche as 'constructivist'? I certainly think he is underrated as a metaphysician, because the ideas are so fragmentary. |
18315 | We get the concept of 'being' from the concept of the 'ego' [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Being is everywhere thought in, foisted on, as cause; it is only from the conception 'ego' that there follows, derivatively, the concept 'being'. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 2.5) | |
A reaction: 'Being' is such a remote abstraction that I doubt whether we can say anything at all meaningful about where it 'comes from'. |
21492 | Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The fundamental hypothesis of the method of science is this: There are real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinion of them. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877]), quoted by Albert Atkin - Peirce 3 'method' | |
A reaction: He admits later that this is only a commitment and not a fact. It seems to me that when you combine this idea with the huge success of science, the denial of realism is crazy. Philosophy has a lot to answer for. |
6949 | If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Nobody can really doubt that there are Reals, for, if he did, doubt would not be a source of dissatisfaction. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.19) | |
A reaction: This rests on Peirce's view that all that really matters is a sense of genuine dissatisfaction, rather than a theoretical idea. So even at the end of Meditation One, Descartes isn't actually worried about whether his furniture exists. |
18316 | The grounds for an assertion that the world is only apparent actually establish its reality [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The grounds upon which 'this' world has been designated as apparent establish rather its reality - another kind of reality is absolutely undemonstrable. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 2.6) |
18314 | In language we treat 'ego' as a substance, and it is thus that we create the concept 'thing' [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: It is the metaphysics of language (that is, of reason) ....which believes in the 'ego', in the ego as being, in the ego as substance, and which projects its belief in the ego-substance on to all things - only thus does it create the concept 'thing'. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 2.5) |
6941 | We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce] |
Full Idea: As soon as a firm belief is reached we are entirely satisfied, whether the belief be true or false. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.10) | |
A reaction: This does not deny that the truth or falsehood of a belief is independent of whether we are satisfied with it. It is making a fair point, though, about why we believe things, and it can't be because of truth, because we don't know how to ensure that. |
6940 | The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The feeling of believing is a more or less sure indication of there being established in our nature some habit which will determine our actions. Doubt never has such an effect. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.10) | |
A reaction: It is one thing to assert this fairly accurate observation, and another to assert that this is the essence or definition of a belief. Perhaps it is the purpose of belief, without being the phenomenological essence of it. We act in states of uncertainty. |
6942 | We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce] |
Full Idea: We seek for a belief that we shall think to be true; but we think each one of our beliefs to be true, and, indeed, it is mere tautology to say so. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.11) | |
A reaction: If, as I do, you like to define belief as 'commitment to truth', Peirce makes a rather startling observation. You are rendered unable to ask whether your beliefs are true, because you have defined them as true. Nice point… |
6943 | A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The mere putting of a proposition into the interrogative form does not stimulate the mind to any struggle after belief; there must be a real and living doubt. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.11) | |
A reaction: This the attractive aspect of Peirce's pragmatism, that he is always focusing on real life rather than abstract theory or pure logic. |
18309 | The evidence of the senses is falsified by reason [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: 'Reason' is the cause of our falsification of the evidence of the senses. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 2.1) | |
A reaction: One for McDowell. |
6598 | We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce] |
Full Idea: It is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs be determined by nothing human, but by some external permanency - by something upon which our thinking has no effect. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.5 | |
A reaction: This very sensible and interesting remark hovers somewhere between empiricism and pragmatism. Fogelin very persuasively builds his account of knowledge on it. The key point is that we hardly ever choose what to believe. See Idea 2454. |
6944 | Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce] |
Full Idea: It is a common idea that demonstration must rest on indubitable propositions, either first principles of a general nature, or first sensations; but actual demonstration is completely satisfactory if it starts from propositions free from all actual doubt. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.11) | |
A reaction: Another nice example of Peirce focusing on the practical business of thinking, rather than abstract theory. I agree with this approach, that explanation and proof do not aim at perfection and indubitability, but at what satisfies a critical mind. |
6948 | Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce] |
Full Idea: To satisfy our doubts it is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs may be determined by nothing human, but by some external permanency - by something upon which our thinking has no effect. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.18) | |
A reaction: This may be the single most important idea in pragmatism and in the philosophy of science. See Fodor on experiments (Idea 2455). Put the question to nature. The essential aim is to be passive in our beliefs - just let reality form them. |
6945 | Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Some people seem to love to argue a point after all the world is fully convinced of it. But no further advance can be made. When doubt ceases, mental action on the subject comes to an end; and, if it did go on, it would be without purpose. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.11) | |
A reaction: This is the way Peirce's pragmatism, which deals with how real thinking actually works (rather than abstract logic), deals with scepticism. However, there is a borderline where almost everyone is satisfied, but the very wise person remains sceptical. |
18323 | Any explanation will be accepted as true if it gives pleasure and a feeling of power [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: To trace something unknown back to something known is alleviating, soothing, gratifying and gives moreover a feeling of power. ...First principle: any explanation is better than none. ...Proof by pleasure ('by potency') as criterion of truth. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 5.5) | |
A reaction: By 'proof by pleasure' he means that we find an explanation so satisfying that we cling to it. I assume it is a criterion of rationality (an epistemic virtue) to reject the principle 'any explanation is better than none'. Negative capability. |
18310 | The 'highest' concepts are the most general and empty concepts [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The 'highest concepts' ...are the most general, the emptiest concepts, the last fumes of evaporating reality. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 2.4) | |
A reaction: This could be seen as an attack on the aspirations of all of philosophy, which seeks general truths out of the chaos of experience. Should we shut up, then, and just be and do? |
20368 | There are no 'individual' persons; we are each the sum of humanity up to this moment [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The 'individual' ...is an error: he does not constitute a separate entity, an atom, a 'link in the chain', something merely inherited from the past - he constitutes the entire single line 'man' up to and including himself. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 8.33) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure I understand this, but you can sort of imagine yourself as a culmination of something, rather than as an isolated entity. I'm not sure how that is supposed to affect my behaviour. |
2899 | The fanatical rationality of Greek philosophy shows that they were in a state of emergency [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The fanaticism with which the whole of Greek thought throws itself at rationality betrays itself as a state of emergency: one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish or- be absurdly rational. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 1.10) |
18313 | The big error is to think the will is a faculty producing effects; in fact, it is just a word [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: At the beginning stands the great fateful error that the will is something which produces an effect - that will is a faculty.... Today we know it is merely a word. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 2.5) | |
A reaction: This is despite Nietzsche's insistence that 'will to power' is the central fact of active existence. The misreading of Nietzsche is to think that this refers to the conscious exercising of a mental faculty. |
20133 | The 'motive' is superficial, and may even hide the antecedents of a deed [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The so-called 'motive' is another error. Merely a surface phenomenon of consciousness - something alongside the deed which is more likely to cover up the antecedents of the deed than to represent them. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 6.3) | |
A reaction: [Leiter gives 'VI.3', but I can't find it] As far as you can get from intellectualism about action, and is more in accord with the picture found in modern neuro-science. No one knows why they are 'interested' in something, and that's the start of it. |
18326 | The beautiful never stands alone; it derives from man's pleasure in man [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Anyone who tried to divorce the beautiful from man's pleasure in man would at once feel the ground give way beneath him. The 'beautiful in itself' is not even a concept, merely a phrase. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 8.19) | |
A reaction: I love the insult 'not even a concept'! It's like Pauli's 'not even wrong'! |
20101 | Without music life would be a mistake [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Without music life would be a mistake. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], Maxim 33) | |
A reaction: Cf Schopenhauer in Idea 21469. If you, dear reader, don't love music, then I sincerely hope that there is something in your life which can match it. |
2902 | Healthy morality is dominated by an instinct for life [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: All naturalism in morality, that is all healthy morality, is dominated by an instinct for life. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 4.4) | |
A reaction: Sounds right. There is no reasoning against a moral nihilist, because they seem to have no instinct in favour of life. It is the given of morality. |
18311 | Philosophers hate values having an origin, and want values to be self-sufficient [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: For philosophers, the higher must not be allowed to grow out of the lower, must not be allowed to have grown at all ...Moral: everything of the first rank must be causa sui. Origin in something else counts as an objection, as casting a doubt on value. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 2.4) | |
A reaction: This is so deep and central that I wrote a paper on it, advocating that the theory of values should focus of value-makers. |
18324 | There are no moral facts, and moralists believe in realities which do not exist [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: An insight formulated by me: that there are no moral facts whatever. Moral judgement has this in common with religious judgement that it believes in realities which do not exist. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 6.1) | |
A reaction: Not only a slogan for non-cognitivism, but also a clear statement of the error theory about morality, a century before John Mackie. |
2904 | The doctrine of free will has been invented essentially in order to blame and punish people [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The doctrine of will has been invented essentially for the purpose of punishment, that is of finding guilty. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 5.7) | |
A reaction: Michael Frede says free will was invented to feel wholly in charge of our own actions. I doubt whether punishment was the first motive. The will just gives a simple explanation of actions. |
18308 | A philosopher fails in wisdom if he thinks the value of life is a problem [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: For a philosopher to see a problem in the value of life thus even constitutes an objection to him, a question-mark as to his wisdom, a piece of unwisdom. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 1.02) | |
A reaction: I take his point to be neither that life is unquestionably valuable nor that it is valueless, but that the very question is ridiculous. If we live, we value living. Sounds right. |
18322 | When we establish values, that is life itself establishing them, through us [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: When we speak of values we do so under the inspiration and from the perspective of life: life itself evaluates through us when we establish values | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 4.5) | |
A reaction: I love Nietzsche's ideas about the source of values, and his remarks about the value of life. Other thinkers sound so simplistic in comparison. |
18321 | To evaluate life one must know it, but also be situated outside of it [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: One would have to be situated outside life ....[and yet know it thoroughly] ....to be permitted to touch on the problem of the value of life at all. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 4.5) | |
A reaction: Can practising artists question the value of their art? The whole point of objectivity is that we can mentally step 'outside' of something, without actually withdrawing from it. |
2894 | Value judgements about life can never be true [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Judgements, value judgements concerning life, for or against it, can in the last resort never be true. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 1.02) | |
A reaction: I suppose this is in the same spirit as judging whether celery tastes nice. Are you for or against the Moon? |
2893 | In every age the wisest people have judged life to be worthless [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: In every age the wisest have passed the identical judgement on life: it is worthless. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 1.01) | |
A reaction: I guess he was having a bad day. Since the whole universe is clearly 'worthless', this judgement must in some sense be correct. But I love my books. |
2895 | The value of life cannot be estimated [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The value of life cannot be estimated. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 1.02) | |
A reaction: Military leaders apparently judge that the death of one of their own soldiers is worth between 12 and 20 enemy deaths (so history suggests). How about ransom money? |
18319 | Love is the spiritualisation of sensuality [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The spiritualization of sensuality is called 'love': it is a great triumph over Christianity. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 4.3) | |
A reaction: I'm not quite clear what 'spiritualization' means, particularly when it comes from Nietzsche. |
2903 | A good human will be virtuous because they are happy [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: A well-constituted human being, a 'happy one', must perform certain actions and shrink from other actions. In a formula: his virtue is the consequence of his happiness. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 5.2) | |
A reaction: A nice reversal of basic Aristotle, though Aristotle does say that the truly virtuous person is happy in their actions. Treat unhappy people with caution! |
2891 | Only the English actually strive after happiness [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Man does not strive after happiness; only the Englishman does that. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], Maxim 12) | |
A reaction: The Danes keeping being voted the happiest nation, so presumably that results from some sort of effort on their part. The easiest is happiness is to achieve security, then do nothing. |
18327 | A wholly altruistic morality, with no egoism, is a thoroughly bad thing [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: An 'altruistic' morality, a morality under which egoism languishes - is under all circumstances a bad sign. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 8.35) |
15606 | Military idea: what does not kill me makes me stronger [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: From the military school of life. - What does not kill me makes me stronger. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], Maxim 08) | |
A reaction: The published version! Perhaps the most famous remark in all of Nietzsche, and no one realises it is ironic! It is a sarcastic remark about the battering ram mentality of the Prussian militarist! He had served in the army. |
18328 | Invalids are parasites [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The invalid is a parasite on society. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 8.36) | |
A reaction: I'll skip the rest, but you get the idea. The point (with which I sympathise) is that life is primarily about what healthy people do. Something has gone wrong if all we do is worry about the sick and the suffering. |
18331 | Democracy is organisational power in decline [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Democracy has always been the declining form of the power to organise. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 8.39) | |
A reaction: Even when Nietzsche is wrong (and who knows, here?) he always challenges you to think! |
18332 | The creation of institutions needs a determination which is necessarily anti-liberal [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: For institutions to exist there must exist the kind of will, instinct, imperative which is anti-liberal to the point of malice: the will to tradition, to authority, to centuries-long responsibility, to solidarity between succeeding generations. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 8.39) | |
A reaction: This sounds like a lovely challenge to Popper, who seems to have been a liberal who pinned his faith on institutions. |
2911 | True justice is equality for equals and inequality for unequals [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: 'Equality for equals, inequality for unequals' - that would be the true voice of justice. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 8.48) |
18320 | To renounce war is to renounce the grand life [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: One has renounced grand life when one renounces war. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 4.3) | |
A reaction: Nietzsche was a medical orderly in the 1870 Franco-Prussian war, so he had seen it at first hand. I think the machine gun and the heavy bomber would have changed his attitude to warfare. He sounds a bit silly now. Nostalgia for the Iliad. |
2908 | There is a need for educators who are themselves educated [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: There is a need for educators who are themselves educated. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 7.5) |
18329 | Sometimes it is an error to have been born - but we can rectify it [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: We have no power to prevent ourselves being born: but we can rectify this error - for sometimes it is an error. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 8.36) |
2905 | 'Purpose' is just a human fiction [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: We invented the concept 'purpose': in reality purpose is lacking. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 5.8) |
6939 | What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The guiding principle is that what is true of one piece of copper is true of another; such a guiding principle with regard to copper would be much safer than with regard to many other substances - brass, for example. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p. 8) | |
A reaction: Peirce is so beautifully simple and sensible. This gives the essential notion of a natural kind, and is a key notion in our whole understanding of physical reality. |
6938 | Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce] |
Full Idea: It is probably of more advantage to an animal to have his mind filled with pleasing and encouraging visions, independently of their truth; and thus, upon unpractical subjects, natural selection might occasion a fallacious tendency of thought. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p. 8) | |
A reaction: Note that this is a pragmatist saying that a set of beliefs might work fine but be untrue. So Peirce does not have the highly relativistic notion of truth of some later pragmatists. Good for him. Note the early date to be thinking about Darwin. |
18312 | The supreme general but empty concepts must be compatible, and hence we get 'God' [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The supreme concepts of philosophers cannot be incommensurate with one another, be incompatible with one another... Thus they acquired their stupendous concept 'God'.... The last, thinnest, emptiest is placed as the first, as cause in itself. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 2.4) |
6946 | If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce] |
Full Idea: If death is annihilation, then the man who believes that he will certainly go straight to heaven when he dies, provided he have fulfilled certain simple observances in this life, has a cheap pleasure which will not be followed by the least disappointment. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.12) | |
A reaction: This is a nicely wicked summary of one side of Pascal's options. All the problems of the argument are built into Peirce's word "cheap". Peirce goes on to talk about ostriches burying their heads. |
2906 | By denying God we deny human accountability, and thus we redeem the world [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: We deny God; in denying God we deny accountability; only by doing that do we redeem the world. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 5.8) |
2901 | How could the Church intelligently fight against passion if it preferred poorness of spirit to intelligence? [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The primitive church fought against the 'intelligent' in favour of the 'poor in spirit': how could one expect from it an intelligent war against passion? | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 4.1) |
18325 | Christians believe that only God can know what is good for man [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Christianity presupposes that man does not know, cannot know what is good for him and what evil: he believes in God, who alone knows. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 8.05) |
18318 | People who disparage actual life avenge themselves by imagining a better one [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: If there is a strong instinct for slandering, disparaging and accusing life within us, then we revenge ourselves on life by means of the phantasmagoria of 'another', a 'better' life. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 2.6) |