Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Concerning the Author', 'Summa' and 'Against the Ethicists (one book)'

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11 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics

14767	The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine [Peirce]
	Full Idea: The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine.
	From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Concerning the Author [1897], p.2)

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism

14764	I am saturated with the spirit of physical science [Peirce]
	Full Idea: I am saturated, through and through, with the spirit of the physical sciences.
	From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Concerning the Author [1897], p.1)

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason

22752	Reasoning is impossible without a preconception [Sext.Empiricus]
	Full Idea: It is not possible either to seek or to doubt without a preconception.
	From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Ethicists (one book) [c.180], II.22)
	A reaction: [Sextus quotes this from 'the sapient Epicurus'] I think this may be a message across the centuries to Hegel, who attempted this impossible feat. My picture of philosophy is a continual shift of the preconceptions, to explore thoroughly.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance

16616	Substances 'substand' (beneath accidents), or 'subsist' (independently) [Eustachius]
	Full Idea: It is proper to substance both to stretch out or exist beneath accidents, which is to substand, and to exist per se and not in another, which is to subsist.
	From: Eustachius a Sancto Paulo (Summa [1609], I.1.3b.1.2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 06.2
	A reaction: This reflects Aristotle wavering between 'ousia' being the whole of a thing, or the substrate of a thing. In current discussion, 'substance' still wavers between a thing which 'is' a substance, and substance being the essence.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism

16585	Prime matter is free of all forms, but has the potential for all forms [Eustachius]
	Full Idea: Everyone says that prime matter, considered in itself, is free of all forms and at the same time is open to all forms - or, that matter is in potentiality to all forms.
	From: Eustachius a Sancto Paulo (Summa [1609], III.1.1.2.3), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 03.1
	A reaction: This is the notorious doctrine developed to support the hylomorphic picture derived from Aristotle. No one could quite figure out what prime matter was, so it faded away.

11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism

14768	Infallibility in science is just a joke [Peirce]
	Full Idea: Infallibility in scientific matters seems to me irresistibly comical.
	From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Concerning the Author [1897], p.3)

12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism

14765	Association of ideas is the best philosophical idea of the prescientific age [Peirce]
	Full Idea: The doctrine of the association of ideas is, to my thinking, the finest piece of philosophical work of the prescientific ages.
	From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Concerning the Author [1897], p.2)

14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory

14766	Duns Scotus offers perhaps the best logic and metaphysics for modern physical science [Peirce]
	Full Idea: The works of Duns Scotus have strongly influenced me. …His logic and metaphysics, torn away from its medievalism, …will go far toward supplying the philosophy which is best to harmonize with physical science.
	From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Concerning the Author [1897], p.2)

22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good

22754	Saying the good is useful or choiceworth or happiness-creating is not the good, but a feature of it [Sext.Empiricus]
	Full Idea: Asserting that the good is 'the useful', or 'what is choiceworthy for its own sake', or 'that which contributes to happiness', does not teach us what good is but states its accidental property.
	From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Ethicists (one book) [c.180], II.35)
	A reaction: This seems to be a pretty accurate statement of Moore's famous Open Question argument. I read it in an Aristotelian way - that that quest is always for the essential nature of the thing itself, not for its role or function or use.

22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good

22755	Like a warming fire, what is good by nature should be good for everyone [Sext.Empiricus]
	Full Idea: Just as fire which is warmth-giving by nature warms all men, and does not chill some of them, so what is good by nature ought to be good for all, and not good for some but not good for others.
	From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Ethicists (one book) [c.180], II.69)
	A reaction: This is going to confine the naturally good to the basics of life, which we all share. Is a love of chess a natural good? It seems to capture an aspect of human nature, without appealing to everyone. Sextus says nothing is good for everyone.

22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness

22756	If a desire is itself desirable, then we shouldn't desire it, as achieving it destroys it [Sext.Empiricus]
	Full Idea: If the desire for wealth or health is desirable, we ought not to purse wealth or health, lest by acquiring them we cease to desire them any longer.
	From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Ethicists (one book) [c.180], II.81)
	A reaction: He is investigating whether desires can be desirable, and if so which ones. Roots of this are in Plato's 'Gorgias' on drinking water. Similar to 'if compassion is the highest good then we need lots of suffering'. Desire must be a means, not an end.