20 ideas
19336 | Wisdom involves the desire to achieve perfection [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The wiser one is, the more one is determined to do that which is most perfect. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.151) | |
A reaction: Debatable. 'Perfectionism' is a well-known vice in many areas of life. Life is short, and the demands on us are many. Skilled shortcuts and compromises are one hallmark of genius, and presumably also of wisdom. |
10147 | The Axiom of Choice is consistent with the other axioms of set theory [Feferman/Feferman] |
Full Idea: In 1938 Gödel proved that the Axiom of Choice is consistent with the other axioms of set theory. | |
From: Feferman / Feferman (Alfred Tarski: life and logic [2004], Int I) | |
A reaction: Hence people now standardly accept ZFC, rather than just ZF. |
10148 | Axiom of Choice: a set exists which chooses just one element each of any set of sets [Feferman/Feferman] |
Full Idea: Zermelo's Axiom of Choice asserts that for any set of non-empty sets that (pairwise) have no elements in common, then there is a set that 'simultaneously chooses' exactly one element from each set. Note that this is an existential claim. | |
From: Feferman / Feferman (Alfred Tarski: life and logic [2004], Int I) | |
A reaction: The Axiom is now widely accepted, after much debate in the early years. Even critics of the Axiom turn out to be relying on it. |
10149 | Platonist will accept the Axiom of Choice, but others want criteria of selection or definition [Feferman/Feferman] |
Full Idea: The Axiom of Choice seems clearly true from the Platonistic point of view, independently of how sets may be defined, but is rejected by those who think such existential claims must show how to pick out or define the object claimed to exist. | |
From: Feferman / Feferman (Alfred Tarski: life and logic [2004], Int I) | |
A reaction: The typical critics are likely to be intuitionists or formalists, who seek for both rigour and a plausible epistemology in our theory. |
10150 | The Trichotomy Principle is equivalent to the Axiom of Choice [Feferman/Feferman] |
Full Idea: The Trichotomy Principle (any number is less, equal to, or greater than, another number) turned out to be equivalent to the Axiom of Choice. | |
From: Feferman / Feferman (Alfred Tarski: life and logic [2004], Int I) | |
A reaction: [He credits Sierpinski (1918) with this discovery] |
10146 | Cantor's theories needed the Axiom of Choice, but it has led to great controversy [Feferman/Feferman] |
Full Idea: The Axiom of Choice is a pure existence statement, without defining conditions. It was necessary to provide a foundation for Cantor's theory of transfinite cardinals and ordinal numbers, but its nonconstructive character engendered heated controversy. | |
From: Feferman / Feferman (Alfred Tarski: life and logic [2004], Int I) |
10158 | A structure is a 'model' when the axioms are true. So which of the structures are models? [Feferman/Feferman] |
Full Idea: A structure is said to be a 'model' of an axiom system if each of its axioms is true in the structure (e.g. Euclidean or non-Euclidean geometry). 'Model theory' concerns which structures are models of a given language and axiom system. | |
From: Feferman / Feferman (Alfred Tarski: life and logic [2004], Int V) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as the most interesting aspect of mathematical logic, since it concerns the ways in which syntactic proof-systems actually connect with reality. Tarski is the central theoretician here, and his theory of truth is the key. |
10162 | Tarski and Vaught established the equivalence relations between first-order structures [Feferman/Feferman] |
Full Idea: In the late 1950s Tarski and Vaught defined and established basic properties of the relation of elementary equivalence between two structures, which holds when they make true exactly the same first-order sentences. This is fundamental to model theory. | |
From: Feferman / Feferman (Alfred Tarski: life and logic [2004], Int V) | |
A reaction: This is isomorphism, which clarifies what a model is by giving identity conditions between two models. Note that it is 'first-order', and presumably founded on classical logic. |
10160 | Löwenheim-Skolem says if the sentences are countable, so is the model [Feferman/Feferman] |
Full Idea: The Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem, the earliest in model theory, states that if a countable set of sentences in a first-order language has a model, then it has a countable model. | |
From: Feferman / Feferman (Alfred Tarski: life and logic [2004], Int V) | |
A reaction: There are 'upward' (sentences-to-model) and 'downward' (model-to-sentences) versions of the theory. |
10159 | Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem, and Gödel's completeness of first-order logic, the earliest model theory [Feferman/Feferman] |
Full Idea: Before Tarski's work in the 1930s, the main results in model theory were the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem, and Gödel's establishment in 1929 of the completeness of the axioms and rules for the classical first-order predicate (or quantificational) calculus. | |
From: Feferman / Feferman (Alfred Tarski: life and logic [2004], Int V) |
10161 | If a sentence holds in every model of a theory, then it is logically derivable from the theory [Feferman/Feferman] |
Full Idea: Completeness is when, if a sentences holds in every model of a theory, then it is logically derivable from that theory. | |
From: Feferman / Feferman (Alfred Tarski: life and logic [2004], Int V) |
10156 | 'Recursion theory' concerns what can be solved by computing machines [Feferman/Feferman] |
Full Idea: 'Recursion theory' is the subject of what can and cannot be solved by computing machines | |
From: Feferman / Feferman (Alfred Tarski: life and logic [2004], Ch.9) | |
A reaction: This because 'recursion' will grind out a result step-by-step, as long as the steps will 'halt' eventually. |
10155 | Both Principia Mathematica and Peano Arithmetic are undecidable [Feferman/Feferman] |
Full Idea: In 1936 Church showed that Principia Mathematica is undecidable if it is ω-consistent, and a year later Rosser showed that Peano Arithmetic is undecidable, and any consistent extension of it. | |
From: Feferman / Feferman (Alfred Tarski: life and logic [2004], Int IV) |
7696 | Leibniz first asked 'why is there something rather than nothing?' [Leibniz, by Jacquette] |
Full Idea: The historical honour of having first raised the question "Why is there something rather than nothing?" belongs to Leibniz. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697]) by Dale Jacquette - Ontology Ch.3 | |
A reaction: I presume that people before Leibniz may well have had the thought, but not bothered to even articulate it, because there seemed nothing to say by way of answer, other than some reference to the inscrutable will of God. |
19341 | There must be a straining towards existence in the essence of all possible things [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Since something rather than nothing exists, there is a certain urge for existence, or (so to speak) a straining toward existence in possible things or in possibility or essence itself; in a word, essence in and of itself strives for existence. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.150) | |
A reaction: Thus 'essence precedes existence'. Not sure I understand this, but at least it places an active power at the root of everything (though Leibniz probably sees that as divine). The Big Bang triggered by a 'quantum fluctuation'? |
19428 | Because something does exist, there must be a drive in possible things towards existence [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: From the very fact that something exists rather than nothing, we recognise that there is in possible things, that is, in the very possibility or essence, a certain exigent need of existence, and, so to speak, some claim to existence. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.347) | |
A reaction: I love the fact that Leibniz tried to explain why there is something rather than nothing. Bede Rundle and Dale Jacquette are similar heroes. As Leibniz tells us, contradictions have no claim to existence, but non-contradictions do. |
5047 | The world is physically necessary, as its contrary would imply imperfection or moral absurdity [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Although the world is not metaphysically necessary, such that its contrary would imply a contradiction or logical absurdity, it is necessary physically, that is, determined in such a way that its contrary would imply imperfection or moral absurdity. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.139) | |
A reaction: How does Leibniz know things like this? The distinction between 'metaphysical' necessity and 'natural' (what he calls 'physical') necessity is a key idea. But natural necessity is controversial. See 'Essentialism'. |
19087 | The meaning or purport of a symbol is all the rational conduct it would lead to [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The entire intellectual purport of any symbol consists in the total of all modes of rational conduct which, conditionally upon all the possible different circumstances and desires, would ensue upon the acceptance of the symbol. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Issues of Pragmaticism [1905], EP ii.246), quoted by Danielle Macbeth - Pragmatism and Objective Truth p.169 n1 | |
A reaction: Macbeth says pragmatism is founded on this theory of meaning, rather than on a theory of truth. I don't see why the causes of a symbol shouldn't be as much a part of its meaning as the consequences are. |
19343 | We follow the practical rule which always seeks maximum effect for minimum cost [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: In practical affairs one always follows the decision rule in accordance with which one ought to seek the maximum or the minimum: namely, one prefers the maximum effect at the minimum cost, so to speak. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.150) | |
A reaction: Animals probably do that too, and even water sort of obeys the rule when it runs downhill. |
19429 | The principle of determination in things obtains the greatest effect with the least effort [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: There is always in things a principle of determination which is based on consideration of maximum and minimum, such that the greatest effect is obtained with the least, so to speak, expenditure. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Ultimate Origination of Things [1697], p.347) | |
A reaction: This is obvious in human endeavours. Leibniz applied it to physics, producing a principle that shortest paths are always employed. It has a different formal name in modern physics, I think. He says if you make an unrestricted triangle, it is equilateral. |