9 ideas
| 12295 | 3-D says things are stretched in space but not in time, and entire at a time but not at a location [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: Three-dimensionalist think a thing is somehow 'stretched out' through its location at a given time though not through the period during which it exists, and it is present in its entirety at a moment when it exists though not at a position of its location. | |
| From: Kit Fine (In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism [2006], p.1) | |
| A reaction: This definition is designed to set up Fine's defence of the 3-D view, by showing that various dubious asymmetries show up if you do not respect the distinctions offered by the 3-D view. |
| 12298 | Genuine motion, rather than variation of position, requires the 'entire presence' of the object [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: In order to have genuine motion, rather than mere variation in position, it is necessary that the object should be 'entirely present' at each moment of the change. Thus without entire presence, or existence, genuine motion will not be possible. | |
| From: Kit Fine (In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism [2006], p.6) | |
| A reaction: See Idea 4786 for a rival view of motion. Of course, who says we have to have Kit Fine's 'genuine' motion, if some sort of ersatz motion still gets you to work in the morning? |
| 12296 | 4-D says things are stretched in space and in time, and not entire at a time or at a location [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: Four-dimensionalists have thought that a material thing is as equally 'stretched out' in time as it is in space, and that there is no special way in which it is entirely present at a moment rather than at a position. | |
| From: Kit Fine (In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism [2006], p.1) | |
| A reaction: Compare his definition of 3-D in Idea 12295. The 4-D is contrary to our normal way of thinking. Since I don't think the future exists, I presume that if I am a 4-D object then I have to say that I don't yet exist, and I disapprove of such talk. |
| 18882 | You can ask when the wedding was, but not (usually) when the bride was [Fine,K, by Simons] |
| Full Idea: Fine says it is acceptable to ask when a wedding was and where it was, and it is acceptable to ask or state where the bride was (at a certain time), but not when she was. | |
| From: report of Kit Fine (In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism [2006], p.18) by Peter Simons - Modes of Extension: comment on Fine p.18 | |
| A reaction: This is aimed at three-dimensionalists who seem to think that a bride is a prolonged event, just as a wedding is. Fine is, interestingly, invoking ordinary language. When did the wedding start and end? When was the bride's birth and death? |
| 12297 | Three-dimensionalist can accept temporal parts, as things enduring only for an instant [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: Even if one is a three-dimensionalist, one might affirm the existence of temporal parts, on the grounds that everything merely endures for an instant. | |
| From: Kit Fine (In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism [2006], p.2) | |
| A reaction: This seems an important point, as belief in temporal parts is normally equated with four-dimensionalism (see Idea 12296). The idea is that a thing might be 'entirely present' at each instant, only to be replaced by a simulacrum. |
| 19355 | The soul doesn't understand many of its own actions, if perceptions are confused and desires buried [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: The soul does many things without knowing how it does them - when it does them by means of confused perceptions and unconscious inclinations or appetites. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Note L to Bayle's 'Rorarius' [1705], [L]) | |
| A reaction: This increasingly strikes me as a wonderful and important insight for its time. He's really paid attention to his own mind, and given up the simplistic view that derives from Descartes. Are birds conscious? Yes or no! Silly. |
| 19350 | We should say that body is mechanism and soul is immaterial, asserting their independence [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: I think we should keep both sides: we should be more Democritean and make all actions of bodies mechanical and independent of souls, and we should also be more than Platonic and hold that all actions of souls are immaterial and independent of mechanism. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Note L to Bayle's 'Rorarius' [1705], [C]) | |
| A reaction: This is about as dualist as it is possible to get. It certainly looks as if many of Leibniz's doctrines are rebellions against Spinoza (in this case his 'dual aspect monism'). I take Leibniz to be utterly but heroically wrong. |
| 19087 | The meaning or purport of a symbol is all the rational conduct it would lead to [Peirce] |
| Full Idea: The entire intellectual purport of any symbol consists in the total of all modes of rational conduct which, conditionally upon all the possible different circumstances and desires, would ensue upon the acceptance of the symbol. | |
| From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Issues of Pragmaticism [1905], EP ii.246), quoted by Danielle Macbeth - Pragmatism and Objective Truth p.169 n1 | |
| A reaction: Macbeth says pragmatism is founded on this theory of meaning, rather than on a theory of truth. I don't see why the causes of a symbol shouldn't be as much a part of its meaning as the consequences are. |
| 19356 | Minds unconsciously count vibration beats in music, and enjoy it when they coincide [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: In music, the soul counts the beats of the vibrating object which makes the sound, and when these beats regularly coincide at short intervals, it finds them pleasing. Thus it counts without knowing it. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Note L to Bayle's 'Rorarius' [1705], [L]) | |
| A reaction: Only a mathematician would see music this way! He is defending his account of the unconscious mind. The proposal that we unconsciously count sounds highly implausible. He needs to recognise the patterns that ground mathematics. |