12 ideas
| 14767 | The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine [Peirce] |
| Full Idea: The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine. | |
| From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Concerning the Author [1897], p.2) |
| 14764 | I am saturated with the spirit of physical science [Peirce] |
| Full Idea: I am saturated, through and through, with the spirit of the physical sciences. | |
| From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Concerning the Author [1897], p.1) |
| 18528 | The single imagined 'interval' between things only exists in the intellect [Auriol] |
| Full Idea: It appears that a single thing, which must be imagined as some sort of interval [intervallum] existing between two things, cannot exist in extramental reality, but only in the intellect. | |
| From: Peter Auriol (Sentences [1316], I fols318 v a-b), quoted by John Heil - The Universe as We Find It 7 | |
| A reaction: This is the standard medieval denial of the existence of real relations. It contrasts with post-Russell ontology, which seems to admit relations as entities. Heil and Auriol and right. |
| 14768 | Infallibility in science is just a joke [Peirce] |
| Full Idea: Infallibility in scientific matters seems to me irresistibly comical. | |
| From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Concerning the Author [1897], p.3) |
| 14765 | Association of ideas is the best philosophical idea of the prescientific age [Peirce] |
| Full Idea: The doctrine of the association of ideas is, to my thinking, the finest piece of philosophical work of the prescientific ages. | |
| From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Concerning the Author [1897], p.2) |
| 14766 | Duns Scotus offers perhaps the best logic and metaphysics for modern physical science [Peirce] |
| Full Idea: The works of Duns Scotus have strongly influenced me. …His logic and metaphysics, torn away from its medievalism, …will go far toward supplying the philosophy which is best to harmonize with physical science. | |
| From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Concerning the Author [1897], p.2) |
| 22330 | Grice said patterns of use are often semantically irrelevant, because it is a pragmatic matter [Grice, by Glock] |
| Full Idea: The slogan that meaning is use came under scrutiny by Grice's theory of conversational implicature. He said patterns of use shown in analysis were often semantically irrelevant, snce they are due not meanings of expressions but to pragmatic principles. | |
| From: report of H. Paul Grice (Some Models for Implicature [1967]) by Hans-Johann Glock - What is Analytic Philosophy? 2.8 | |
| A reaction: I think the simplest objection is that words only have use because they have a meaning; The most interesting part of pragmatics is what you DON'T say in conversation. |
| 18045 | Grice's maxim of quality says do not assert what you believe to be false [Grice, by Magidor] |
| Full Idea: Grice's maxim of quality says one ought not to assert what one believes to be false. | |
| From: report of H. Paul Grice (Some Models for Implicature [1967]) by Ofra Magidor - Category Mistakes 5.2 | |
| A reaction: The obvious exception is irony, where are truth is asserted, but the listener is supposed to spot that you are not really asserting it. |
| 18046 | Grice's maxim of quantity says be sufficiently informative [Grice, by Magidor] |
| Full Idea: Grice's maxim of quantity says 'make your contributions as informative as required'. | |
| From: report of H. Paul Grice (Some Models for Implicature [1967]) by Ofra Magidor - Category Mistakes 5.2 | |
| A reaction: Is the 'requirement' of informative for the speaker or for the listener? It is easy to image situations where, one way or the other, the two people don't agree about informativenss. |
| 18044 | Grice's maxim of manner requires one to be as brief as possible [Grice, by Magidor] |
| Full Idea: Grice's maxim of manner requires one to be as brief as possible. | |
| From: report of H. Paul Grice (Some Models for Implicature [1967]) by Ofra Magidor - Category Mistakes 5.2 | |
| A reaction: An alternative maxim of conversation is that there should not be long silences between contributions - which would probably result if the contributions are all curtly abbreviated. |
| 16589 | Prime matter lacks essence, but is only potentially and indeterminately a physical thing [Auriol] |
| Full Idea: Prime matter has no essence, nor a nature that is determinate, distinct, and actual. Instead, it is pure potential, and determinable, so that it is indeterminately and indistinctly a material thing. | |
| From: Peter Auriol (Sentences [1316], II.12.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 03.1 | |
| A reaction: Pasnau thinks Auriol has the best shot at explaining the vague idea of 'prime matter', with the thought that it exists, but indeterminateness is what gives it a lesser mode of existence. It strikes me as best to treat 'exist' as univocal. |
| 16651 | God can do anything non-contradictory, as making straightness with no line, or lightness with no parts [Auriol] |
| Full Idea: If someone says 'God could make straightness without a line, and roughness and lightness in weight without parts', …then show me the reason why God can do whatever does not imply a contradiction, yet cannot do these things. | |
| From: Peter Auriol (Sentences [1316], IV.12.2.2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 11.4 | |
| A reaction: How engagingly bonkers. The key idea preceding this is that God can do all sorts of things that are beyond our understanding. He is then obliged to offer some examples. |