Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Issues of Pragmaticism', 'Freedom of the Will and concept of a person' and 'How to Define Theoretical Terms'

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14 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
Defining terms either enables elimination, or shows that they don't require elimination [Lewis]
     Full Idea: To define theoretical terms might be to show how to do without them, but it is better to say that it shows there is no good reason to want to do without them.
     From: David Lewis (How to Define Theoretical Terms [1970], Intro)
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world [Lewis]
     Full Idea: A logically determinate name is one which names the same thing in every possible world.
     From: David Lewis (How to Define Theoretical Terms [1970], III)
     A reaction: This appears to be rigid designation, before Kripke introduced the new word.
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 8. Ramsey Sentences
The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation [Lewis]
     Full Idea: The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation.
     From: David Lewis (How to Define Theoretical Terms [1970], V)
A Ramsey sentence just asserts that a theory can be realised, without saying by what [Lewis]
     Full Idea: If we specify a theory with all of its terms, and then replace all of those terms with variables, we can then say that some n-tuples of entities can satisfy this formula. This Ramsey sentence then says the theory is realised, without specifying by what.
     From: David Lewis (How to Define Theoretical Terms [1970], II)
     A reaction: [I have compressed Lewis, and cut out the symbolism]
There is a method for defining new scientific terms just using the terms we already understand [Lewis]
     Full Idea: I contend that there is a general method for defining newly introduced terms in a scientific theory, one which uses only the old terms we understood beforehand.
     From: David Lewis (How to Define Theoretical Terms [1970], Intro)
     A reaction: Lewis is game is to provide bridge laws for a reductive account of nature, without having to introduce something entirely new to achieve it. The idea of bridge laws in scientific theory is less in favour these days.
It is better to have one realisation of a theory than many - but it may not always be possible [Lewis]
     Full Idea: A uniquely realised theory is, other things being equal, certainly more satisfactory than a multiply realised theory. We should insist on unique realisation as a standard of correctness unless it is a standard too high to be met.
     From: David Lewis (How to Define Theoretical Terms [1970], III)
     A reaction: The point is that rewriting a theory as Ramsey sentences just says there is at least one realisation, and so it doesn't meet the highest standards for scientific theories. The influence of set-theoretic model theory is obvious in this approach.
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt]
     Full Idea: The essential difference between persons and other creatures is in the structure of the will, with their peculiar characteristic of being able to form 'second-order desires'.
     From: Harry G. Frankfurt (Freedom of the Will and concept of a person [1971], Intro)
     A reaction: There are problems with this - notably that all strategies of this kind just shift the problem up to the next order, without solving it - but this still strikes me as a very promising line of thinking when trying to understand ourselves. See Idea 9266.
A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt]
     Full Idea: It is having second-order volitions, and not having second-order desires generally, that I regard as essential to being a person.
     From: Harry G. Frankfurt (Freedom of the Will and concept of a person [1971], §II)
     A reaction: Watson criticises Frankfurt for just pushing the problem up to the the next level, but Frankfurt is not offering to explain the will. He merely notes that this structure produces the sort of behaviour which is characteristic of persons, and he is right.
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt]
     Full Idea: The statement that a person enjoys freedom of the will means that he is free to want what he wants to want. More precisely, he is free to will what he wants to will, or to have the will he wants.
     From: Harry G. Frankfurt (Freedom of the Will and concept of a person [1971], §III)
     A reaction: A good proposal. It covers kleptomaniacs and drug addicts quite well. Thieves have second-order desires (to steal) of which kleptomaniacs are incapable. There is actually no such thing as free will, but this sort of thing will do.
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
The meaning or purport of a symbol is all the rational conduct it would lead to [Peirce]
     Full Idea: The entire intellectual purport of any symbol consists in the total of all modes of rational conduct which, conditionally upon all the possible different circumstances and desires, would ensue upon the acceptance of the symbol.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Issues of Pragmaticism [1905], EP ii.246), quoted by Danielle Macbeth - Pragmatism and Objective Truth p.169 n1
     A reaction: Macbeth says pragmatism is founded on this theory of meaning, rather than on a theory of truth. I don't see why the causes of a symbol shouldn't be as much a part of its meaning as the consequences are.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action [Frankfurt]
     Full Idea: A person's will is the effective desire which moves (or will or would move) a person all the way to action. The will is not coextensive with what an agent intends to do, since he may do something else instead.
     From: Harry G. Frankfurt (Freedom of the Will and concept of a person [1971], §I)
     A reaction: Essentially Hobbes's view, but with an arbitrary distinction added. If the desire is only definitely a 'will' if it really does lead to action, then it only becomes the will after the action starts. The error is thinking that will is all-or-nothing.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall]
     Full Idea: Frankfurt says that basic issues concerning freedom of action presuppose and give weight to a concept of 'acting on a desire with which the agent identifies'.
     From: report of Harry G. Frankfurt (Freedom of the Will and concept of a person [1971]) by Wilson,G/Schpall,S - Action 1
     A reaction: [the cite Frankfurt 1988 and 1999] I'm not sure how that works when performing a grim duty, but it sounds quite plausible.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions [Frankfurt]
     Full Idea: I use the term 'wanton' to refer to agents who have first-order desires but who are not persons because, whether or not they have desires of the second-order, they have no second-order volitions.
     From: Harry G. Frankfurt (Freedom of the Will and concept of a person [1971], §II)
     A reaction: He seems to be describing someone who behaves like an animal, performing actions without ever stopping to think about them. Presumably some persons occasionally become wantons, if, for example, they have an anger problem.
A person may be morally responsible without free will [Frankfurt]
     Full Idea: It is not true that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if his will was free when he did it. He may be morally responsible for having done it even though his will was not free at all.
     From: Harry G. Frankfurt (Freedom of the Will and concept of a person [1971], §IV)
     A reaction: Frankfurt seems to be one of the first to assert this break with the traditional view. Good for him. I take moral responsibility to hinge on an action being caused by a person, but not with a mystical view of what a person is.