14802
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Physical and psychical laws of mind are either independent, or derived in one or other direction [Peirce]
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Full Idea:
The question about minds is whether 1) physical and psychical laws are independent (monism, my neutralism), 2) the psychical laws derived and physical laws primordial (materialism), 3) physical law is derived, psychical law primordial (idealism).
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From:
Charles Sanders Peirce (The Architecture of Theories [1891], p.321)
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A reaction:
I think you are already in trouble when you start proposing that there are two quite distinct sets of laws, and then worry about how they are related. Assume unity, and only separate them when the science forces you to (which it won't).
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8404
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Explain single events by general rules, or vice versa, or probability explains both, or they are unconnected [Field,H]
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Full Idea:
Some think singular causal claims should be explained in terms of general causal claims; some think the order should be reversed; some think a third thing (e.g. objective probability) will explain both; and some think they are only loosely connected.
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From:
Hartry Field (Causation in a Physical World [2003], 2)
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A reaction:
I think Ducasse gives the best account, which is the second option, of giving singular causal claims priority. Probability (Mellor) strikes me as a non-starter, and the idea that they are fairly independent seems rather implausible.
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8401
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Physical laws are largely time-symmetric, so they make a poor basis for directional causation [Field,H]
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Full Idea:
It is sometimes pointed out that (perhaps with a few minor exceptions) the fundamental physical laws are completely time-symmetric. If so, then if one is inclined to found causation on fundamental physical law, it isn't evident how directionality gets in.
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From:
Hartry Field (Causation in a Physical World [2003], 1)
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A reaction:
All my instincts tell me that causation is more fundamental than laws, and that directionality is there at the start. That, though, raises the nice question of how, if causation explains laws, the direction eventually gets left OUT!
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8402
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The only reason for adding the notion of 'cause' to fundamental physics is directionality [Field,H]
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Full Idea:
Although it is true that the notion of 'cause' is not needed in fundamental physics, even statistical physics, still directionality considerations don't preclude this notion from being consistently added to fundamental physics.
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From:
Hartry Field (Causation in a Physical World [2003], 1)
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A reaction:
This only makes sense if the notion of cause already has directionality built into it, which I think is correct. The physicist might reply that they don't care about directionality, but the whole idea of an experiment seems to depend on it (Idea 8363).
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13097
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Force in substance makes state follow state, and ensures the very existence of substance [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
By the force I give to substances, I understand a state from which another state follows, if nothing prevents it. ...I dare say that without force, there would be no substance.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Lelong [1712], 1712), quoted by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 7.1
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A reaction:
[the whole quote is interesting] This remark, more than any other I have found, places force at the centre of Leibniz's metaphysics. He is using it to resist Spinoza's one-substance view.
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