4 ideas
3583 | External objects are permanent possibilities of sensation [Mill] |
Full Idea: External objects are permanent possibilities of sensation. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Examination of Sir Wm Hamilton's Philosophy [1865]), quoted by Michael Williams - Problems of Knowledge Ch.9 |
3537 | I judge others' feeling by analogy with my body and behaviour [Mill] |
Full Idea: I conclude other humans have feelings like me because they have bodies like mine (which I know in my case to be antecedent to feelings), and because they exhibit acts and outwards signs which I know in my own case to be caused by feelings. | |
From: John Stuart Mill (Examination of Sir Wm Hamilton's Philosophy [1865], p.243), quoted by Keith T. Maslin - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind 8.2 | |
A reaction: It is hard to see anything further that can be added to the 'other minds' question. Behaviour is highly relevant (imagine meeting a human who talked like a robot), but so are bodies (imagine a tin box that talked like Marilyn Monroe). |
19087 | The meaning or purport of a symbol is all the rational conduct it would lead to [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The entire intellectual purport of any symbol consists in the total of all modes of rational conduct which, conditionally upon all the possible different circumstances and desires, would ensue upon the acceptance of the symbol. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Issues of Pragmaticism [1905], EP ii.246), quoted by Danielle Macbeth - Pragmatism and Objective Truth p.169 n1 | |
A reaction: Macbeth says pragmatism is founded on this theory of meaning, rather than on a theory of truth. I don't see why the causes of a symbol shouldn't be as much a part of its meaning as the consequences are. |
23282 | If all that matters in morality is motive and intention, that makes moral luck irrelevant [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: The idea that one's whole life can be immune to luck has not prevailed (e.g. in Christianity), …but its place has been taken by the idea that moral value can be immune, …if it is motive that counts, and in actions it is not worldly changes but intention. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Moral Luck [1976], p.20) | |
A reaction: [compressed] That is, that Kant offers a way to make luck irrelevant to morality. Williams disagrees, but says at least Kant offers 'solace to a sense of the world's unfairness'. |