7 ideas
14767 | The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Concerning the Author [1897], p.2) |
14764 | I am saturated with the spirit of physical science [Peirce] |
Full Idea: I am saturated, through and through, with the spirit of the physical sciences. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Concerning the Author [1897], p.1) |
22312 | Facts can be both positive and negative [Wittgenstein, by Potter] |
Full Idea: In 1913 Wittgenstein was explicit that there are both positive and negative facts. | |
From: report of Ludwig Wittgenstein (Notes on Logic [1913], B7) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 47 'Mole' | |
A reaction: This is a prelude to the Tractatus, in which negative facts are denied in T1.11 (and in a 1919 letter), but then affirmed in T2.06. |
14768 | Infallibility in science is just a joke [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Infallibility in scientific matters seems to me irresistibly comical. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Concerning the Author [1897], p.3) |
14765 | Association of ideas is the best philosophical idea of the prescientific age [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The doctrine of the association of ideas is, to my thinking, the finest piece of philosophical work of the prescientific ages. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Concerning the Author [1897], p.2) |
14766 | Duns Scotus offers perhaps the best logic and metaphysics for modern physical science [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The works of Duns Scotus have strongly influenced me. …His logic and metaphysics, torn away from its medievalism, …will go far toward supplying the philosophy which is best to harmonize with physical science. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Concerning the Author [1897], p.2) |
20363 | Leaves are unequal, but we form the concept 'leaf' by discarding their individual differences [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Every concept arises through the setting equal of the unequal. Just as it is certain that one leaf is never wholly equal to another, so it is certain that the concept leaf is formed by arbitrarily discarding these individual differences. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense [1872]), quoted by John Richardson - Nietzsche's System 2.1.1 n28 | |
A reaction: Nietzsche adds an interesting aspect to psychological abstraction, of abstracting away the differences between things, which we might label as the (further) capacity for Equalisation. If two cars differ only in a blemish, we abstract away the blemish. |