Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Concerning the Author', 'Aristotle on Substance' and 'Phenomenology of Perception'

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10 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine [Peirce]
     Full Idea: The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Concerning the Author [1897], p.2)
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
I am saturated with the spirit of physical science [Peirce]
     Full Idea: I am saturated, through and through, with the spirit of the physical sciences.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Concerning the Author [1897], p.1)
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
Aristotelian matter seriously threatens the intrinsic unity and substantiality of its object [Gill,ML]
     Full Idea: On the interpretation of Aristotelian matter that I shall propose, matter seriously threatens the intrinsic unity, and hence the substantiality, of the object to which it contributes.
     From: Mary Louise Gill (Aristotle on Substance [1989], Intro)
     A reaction: Presumably the thought is that if an object is form+matter (hylomorphism), then forms are essentially unified, but matter is essentially unified and sloppy.
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
Infallibility in science is just a joke [Peirce]
     Full Idea: Infallibility in scientific matters seems to me irresistibly comical.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Concerning the Author [1897], p.3)
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
Consciousness is based on 'I can', not on 'I think' [Merleau-Ponty]
     Full Idea: Consciousness is in the first place not a matter of 'I think' but of 'I can'.
     From: Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Phenomenology of Perception [1945], p.159), quoted by Beth Lord - Spinoza's Ethics 2 'Sensation'
     A reaction: The point here (quoted during a discussion of Spinoza) is that you can't leave out the role of the body, which seems correct.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
The mind does not unite perceptions, because they flow into one another [Merleau-Ponty]
     Full Idea: I do not have one perception, then another, and between them a link brought about by the mind. Rather, each perspective merges into the other [against a unified background].
     From: Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Phenomenology of Perception [1945], p.329-30), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 3 'Perceptual'
     A reaction: I take this to be another piece of evidence pointing to realism as the best explanation of experience. A problem for Descartes is what unites the sequence of thoughts.
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
Association of ideas is the best philosophical idea of the prescientific age [Peirce]
     Full Idea: The doctrine of the association of ideas is, to my thinking, the finest piece of philosophical work of the prescientific ages.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Concerning the Author [1897], p.2)
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Duns Scotus offers perhaps the best logic and metaphysics for modern physical science [Peirce]
     Full Idea: The works of Duns Scotus have strongly influenced me. …His logic and metaphysics, torn away from its medievalism, …will go far toward supplying the philosophy which is best to harmonize with physical science.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Concerning the Author [1897], p.2)
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / b. Prime matter
Prime matter has no place in Aristotle's theories, and passages claiming it are misread [Gill,ML]
     Full Idea: I argue that prime matter has no place in Aristotle's elemental theory. ..References to prime matter are found in Aristotle's work because his theory was thought to need the doctrine. If I am right, these passages will all admit of another interpretation.
     From: Mary Louise Gill (Aristotle on Substance [1989], App)
     A reaction: If correct, this strikes me as important for the history of ideas, because scholastics got themselves in a right tangle over prime matter. See Pasnau on it. It pushed the 17th century into corpuscularianism.
Prime matter is actually nothing and potentially everything (or potentially an element) [Gill,ML]
     Full Idea: Prime matter is supposed to be actually nothing and potentially everything or, at any rate, potentially the simplest bodies - earth, water, air and fire.
     From: Mary Louise Gill (Aristotle on Substance [1989], Ch.1)
     A reaction: The view that the four elements turn out to be prime matter is distinctive of Gill's approach. Prime matter sounds like quark soup in the early universe.