Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Issues of Pragmaticism', 'Realism' and 'On the Nature of Acquaintance'

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3 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
6410 The only real proper names are 'this' and 'that'; the rest are really definite descriptions. [Russell, by Grayling]
     Full Idea: Russell argued that the only 'logically proper' names are those which denote particular entities with which one can be acquainted. The best examples are 'this' and 'that'; other apparent names turn out, when analysed, to be definite descriptions.
     From: report of Bertrand Russell (On the Nature of Acquaintance [1914]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2
     A reaction: This view is firm countered by the causal theory of reference, proposed by Kripke and others, in which not only people like Aristotle are 'baptised' with a name, but also natural kinds such as water. It is hard to disagree with Kripke on this.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
22297 Dummett saw realism as acceptance of bivalence, rather than of mind-independent entities [Dummett, by Potter]
     Full Idea: Dummett aimed to characterise realism in terms not of the mind-independence of the entities but of the validity of bivalence for sentences referring to them.
     From: report of Michael Dummett (Realism [1982]) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 21 'Lang'
     A reaction: Hence he called himself a 'philosopher of language', rather than a 'philosopher of thought'. Philosophers of language are more likely to end up as anti-realists, I suspect.
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
19087 The meaning or purport of a symbol is all the rational conduct it would lead to [Peirce]
     Full Idea: The entire intellectual purport of any symbol consists in the total of all modes of rational conduct which, conditionally upon all the possible different circumstances and desires, would ensue upon the acceptance of the symbol.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Issues of Pragmaticism [1905], EP ii.246), quoted by Danielle Macbeth - Pragmatism and Objective Truth p.169 n1
     A reaction: Macbeth says pragmatism is founded on this theory of meaning, rather than on a theory of truth. I don't see why the causes of a symbol shouldn't be as much a part of its meaning as the consequences are.