7 ideas
| 20100 | Classical liberalism seeks freedom of opinion, of private life, of expression, and of property [Micklethwait/Wooldridge] |
| Full Idea: The classical liberals agreed on a basic list of freedoms: of opinion (including religion), of private life, of expression, and of property | |
| From: Micklethwait,J/Wooldridge,A (The Fourth Revolution [2014], 9) | |
| A reaction: Mill is main articulator of this. Modern neo-liberals focus on economic freedom. Neither of them seem to make freedom of opportunity central, though I suspect our modern Liberal Party would. |
| 19087 | The meaning or purport of a symbol is all the rational conduct it would lead to [Peirce] |
| Full Idea: The entire intellectual purport of any symbol consists in the total of all modes of rational conduct which, conditionally upon all the possible different circumstances and desires, would ensue upon the acceptance of the symbol. | |
| From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Issues of Pragmaticism [1905], EP ii.246), quoted by Danielle Macbeth - Pragmatism and Objective Truth p.169 n1 | |
| A reaction: Macbeth says pragmatism is founded on this theory of meaning, rather than on a theory of truth. I don't see why the causes of a symbol shouldn't be as much a part of its meaning as the consequences are. |
| 22454 | We tolerate inconsistency in ethics but not in other beliefs (which reflect an independent order) [Williams,B, by Foot] |
| Full Idea: Williams argued that we can tolerate inconsistency in moral principles though not in assertions, and that this is explained by the fact that it is the concern of the latter but not of the former to reflect an 'independent order of things'. | |
| From: report of Bernard Williams (Consistency and realism (with 1972 note) [1966]) by Philippa Foot - Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma p.37 | |
| A reaction: Put like this, Williams seems to beg the question, which is whether there is an independent moral order to things. There seems to be an easy answer, which is that we are only intolerant of inconsistency when we are confident about it. |
| 20097 | The welfare state aims at freedom from want, and equality of opportunity [Micklethwait/Wooldridge] |
| Full Idea: In the classical liberal tradition freedom meant freedom from external control, and equality meant equality before the law. In the welfare state (of Beatrice Webb) freedom was reinterpreted as freedom from want, and equality as equality of opportunity. | |
| From: Micklethwait,J/Wooldridge,A (The Fourth Revolution [2014], 3) | |
| A reaction: The authors call this the 'third revolution' in government, after 17th century centralisation and early 19th century accountability. Tawney 1931 is the key text. |
| 20099 | For communists history is driven by the proletariat [Micklethwait/Wooldridge] |
| Full Idea: For the communists the proletariat rather than the state was the locomotive of history. | |
| From: Micklethwait,J/Wooldridge,A (The Fourth Revolution [2014], 3) | |
| A reaction: I feel increasingly reluctant to support any party which appears to mainly represent the interests of a single social class, no matter how large that class may be. An attraction of liberalism is that it makes no reference to class. |
| 20098 | Fans of economic freedom claim that capitalism is self-correcting [Micklethwait/Wooldridge] |
| Full Idea: The central laissez-faire conceit is that capitalism is a self-correcting mechanism. | |
| From: Micklethwait,J/Wooldridge,A (The Fourth Revolution [2014], 3) | |
| A reaction: This was Keynes's rather left-wing criticism of standard capitalist views. These resurfaced in the 1980s with mantras about the virtues of 'market forces'. |
| 20096 | Roman law entrenched property rights [Micklethwait/Wooldridge] |
| Full Idea: Roman law entrenched property rights. | |
| From: Micklethwait,J/Wooldridge,A (The Fourth Revolution [2014], 1 Intro) | |
| A reaction: Normally attributed to Locke, so this is a good corrective. Was the principle gradually forgotten before Locke? |