9 ideas
14767 | The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Concerning the Author [1897], p.2) |
14764 | I am saturated with the spirit of physical science [Peirce] |
Full Idea: I am saturated, through and through, with the spirit of the physical sciences. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Concerning the Author [1897], p.1) |
14768 | Infallibility in science is just a joke [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Infallibility in scientific matters seems to me irresistibly comical. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Concerning the Author [1897], p.3) |
2602 | What experience could prove 'If a=c and b=c then a=b'? [Descartes] |
Full Idea: Please tell me what the corporeal motion is that is capable of forming some common notion to the effect that 'things which are equal to a third thing are equal to each other'. | |
From: René Descartes (Comments on a Certain Broadsheet [1644], p.366) |
14765 | Association of ideas is the best philosophical idea of the prescientific age [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The doctrine of the association of ideas is, to my thinking, the finest piece of philosophical work of the prescientific ages. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Concerning the Author [1897], p.2) |
14766 | Duns Scotus offers perhaps the best logic and metaphysics for modern physical science [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The works of Duns Scotus have strongly influenced me. …His logic and metaphysics, torn away from its medievalism, …will go far toward supplying the philosophy which is best to harmonize with physical science. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Concerning the Author [1897], p.2) |
2600 | The mind's innate ideas are part of its capacity for thought [Descartes] |
Full Idea: I have never written or taken the view that the mind requires innate ideas which are something distinct from its own faculty of thinking. | |
From: René Descartes (Comments on a Certain Broadsheet [1644], p.365) |
2601 | Qualia must be innate, because physical motions do not contain them [Descartes] |
Full Idea: The ideas of pains, colours, sounds etc. must be all the more innate if, on the occasion of certain corporeal motions, our mind is to be capable of representing them to itself, for there is no similarity between these ideas and the corporeal motions. | |
From: René Descartes (Comments on a Certain Broadsheet [1644], p.365) | |
A reaction: Simple and brilliant! We know perfectly well that there is no redness zooming through the air from a tomato (or the air would be pink!). Redness occurs when the light arrives, so we add the redness, so it is innate. |
6649 | Chomsky now says concepts are basically innate, as well as syntax [Chomsky, by Lowe] |
Full Idea: Chomsky now contends that not only the syntax of natural language but also the concepts expressible in it have an innate basis. | |
From: report of Noam Chomsky (Chomsky on himself [1994]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.7 n25 | |
A reaction: This seems to follow Fodor, who has been mocked for implying that we have an innate idea of a screwdriver etc. Note that Chomsky says concepts have an innate 'basis'. This fits well with modern (cautious) rationalism, with which I am happy. |