Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Issues of Pragmaticism', 'Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations'' and 'Explanation in Mathematics'

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3 ideas

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
Essences are no use in mathematics, if all mathematical truths are necessary [Mancosu]
     Full Idea: Essences and essential properties do not seem to be useful in mathematical contexts, since all mathematical truths are regarded as necessary (though Kit Fine distinguishes between essential and necessary properties).
     From: Paolo Mancosu (Explanation in Mathematics [2008], §6.1)
     A reaction: I take the proviso in brackets to be crucial. This represents a distortion of notion of an essence. There is a world of difference between the central facts about the nature of a square and the peripheral inferences derivable from it.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
If my conception of pain derives from me, it is a contradiction to speak of another's pain [Malcolm]
     Full Idea: If I obtain my conception of pain from pain that I experience, then it will be a part of my conception of pain that I am the only being that can experience it. For me it will be contradiction to speak of another's pain.
     From: Norman Malcolm (Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations' [1954]), quoted by Alvin Plantinga - De Re and De Dicto p.44
     A reaction: This obviously has the private language argument in the background. It seems to point towards a behaviourist view, that I derive pain from external behaviour in the first instance. So how do I connect the behaviour to the feeling?
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
The meaning or purport of a symbol is all the rational conduct it would lead to [Peirce]
     Full Idea: The entire intellectual purport of any symbol consists in the total of all modes of rational conduct which, conditionally upon all the possible different circumstances and desires, would ensue upon the acceptance of the symbol.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Issues of Pragmaticism [1905], EP ii.246), quoted by Danielle Macbeth - Pragmatism and Objective Truth p.169 n1
     A reaction: Macbeth says pragmatism is founded on this theory of meaning, rather than on a theory of truth. I don't see why the causes of a symbol shouldn't be as much a part of its meaning as the consequences are.