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All the ideas for 'Issues of Pragmaticism', 'works' and 'English as a Formal Language'

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3 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Philosophy is not separate from or above empirical science [Neurath]
     Full Idea: There is no such thing as philosophy as a basic or universal science alongside or above the various fields of the one empirical science.
     From: Otto Neurath (works [1930]), quoted by Simon Critchley - Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro Ch.6
     A reaction: This is what you get for becoming an empiricist. If philosophy is the quest for human wisdom, it seems to me highly unlikely that physical sciences will provide it. Human interests and values and understanding play absolutely no role in physics.
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
'The' is a quantifier, like 'every' and 'a', and does not result in denotation [Montague]
     Full Idea: The expression 'The' turns out to play the role of a quantifier, in complete analogy with 'every' and 'a', and does not generate (in common with common noun phrases) denoting expressions
     From: Richard Montague (English as a Formal Language [1970], p.216), quoted by Bernard Linsky - Quantification and Descriptions 4
     A reaction: Linsky says that it is now standard to interpret definite descriptions as quantifiers
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
The meaning or purport of a symbol is all the rational conduct it would lead to [Peirce]
     Full Idea: The entire intellectual purport of any symbol consists in the total of all modes of rational conduct which, conditionally upon all the possible different circumstances and desires, would ensue upon the acceptance of the symbol.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Issues of Pragmaticism [1905], EP ii.246), quoted by Danielle Macbeth - Pragmatism and Objective Truth p.169 n1
     A reaction: Macbeth says pragmatism is founded on this theory of meaning, rather than on a theory of truth. I don't see why the causes of a symbol shouldn't be as much a part of its meaning as the consequences are.