27 ideas
6947 | Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Metaphysical systems have not usually rested upon any observed facts, or not in any great degree. They are chiefly adopted because their fundamental propositions seem 'agreeable to reason', which means that which we find ourselves inclined to believe. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.15) | |
A reaction: This leads to Peirce's key claim - that we should allow our beliefs to be formed by something outside of ourselves. I don't share Peirce's contempt for metaphysics, which I take to be about the most abstract presuppositions of our ordinary beliefs. |
6937 | Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The object of reasoning is to find out, from the consideration of what we already know, something else which we do not know. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p. 7) | |
A reaction: I defy anyone to come up with a better definition of reasoning than that. The emphasis is on knowledge rather than truth, which you would expect from a pragmatist. …Actually the definition doesn't cover conditional reasoning terribly well. |
21492 | Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The fundamental hypothesis of the method of science is this: There are real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinion of them. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877]), quoted by Albert Atkin - Peirce 3 'method' | |
A reaction: He admits later that this is only a commitment and not a fact. It seems to me that when you combine this idea with the huge success of science, the denial of realism is crazy. Philosophy has a lot to answer for. |
6949 | If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Nobody can really doubt that there are Reals, for, if he did, doubt would not be a source of dissatisfaction. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.19) | |
A reaction: This rests on Peirce's view that all that really matters is a sense of genuine dissatisfaction, rather than a theoretical idea. So even at the end of Meditation One, Descartes isn't actually worried about whether his furniture exists. |
18431 | Internal relations combine some tropes into a nucleus, which bears the non-essential tropes [Simons, by Edwards] |
Full Idea: Simons's 'nuclear' option blends features of the substratum and bundle theories. First we have tropes collected by virtue of their internal relations, forming the essential kernel or nucleus. This nucleus then bears the non-essential tropes. | |
From: report of Peter Simons (Particulars in Particular Clothing [1994], p.567) by Douglas Edwards - Properties 3.5 | |
A reaction: [compression of Edwards's summary] This strikes me as being a remarkably good theory. I am not sure of the ontological status of properties, such that they can (unaided) combine to make part of an object. What binds the non-essentials? |
6940 | The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The feeling of believing is a more or less sure indication of there being established in our nature some habit which will determine our actions. Doubt never has such an effect. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.10) | |
A reaction: It is one thing to assert this fairly accurate observation, and another to assert that this is the essence or definition of a belief. Perhaps it is the purpose of belief, without being the phenomenological essence of it. We act in states of uncertainty. |
6943 | A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The mere putting of a proposition into the interrogative form does not stimulate the mind to any struggle after belief; there must be a real and living doubt. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.11) | |
A reaction: This the attractive aspect of Peirce's pragmatism, that he is always focusing on real life rather than abstract theory or pure logic. |
6941 | We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce] |
Full Idea: As soon as a firm belief is reached we are entirely satisfied, whether the belief be true or false. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.10) | |
A reaction: This does not deny that the truth or falsehood of a belief is independent of whether we are satisfied with it. It is making a fair point, though, about why we believe things, and it can't be because of truth, because we don't know how to ensure that. |
6942 | We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce] |
Full Idea: We seek for a belief that we shall think to be true; but we think each one of our beliefs to be true, and, indeed, it is mere tautology to say so. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.11) | |
A reaction: If, as I do, you like to define belief as 'commitment to truth', Peirce makes a rather startling observation. You are rendered unable to ask whether your beliefs are true, because you have defined them as true. Nice point… |
6598 | We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce] |
Full Idea: It is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs be determined by nothing human, but by some external permanency - by something upon which our thinking has no effect. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.5 | |
A reaction: This very sensible and interesting remark hovers somewhere between empiricism and pragmatism. Fogelin very persuasively builds his account of knowledge on it. The key point is that we hardly ever choose what to believe. See Idea 2454. |
6944 | Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce] |
Full Idea: It is a common idea that demonstration must rest on indubitable propositions, either first principles of a general nature, or first sensations; but actual demonstration is completely satisfactory if it starts from propositions free from all actual doubt. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.11) | |
A reaction: Another nice example of Peirce focusing on the practical business of thinking, rather than abstract theory. I agree with this approach, that explanation and proof do not aim at perfection and indubitability, but at what satisfies a critical mind. |
6948 | Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce] |
Full Idea: To satisfy our doubts it is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs may be determined by nothing human, but by some external permanency - by something upon which our thinking has no effect. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.18) | |
A reaction: This may be the single most important idea in pragmatism and in the philosophy of science. See Fodor on experiments (Idea 2455). Put the question to nature. The essential aim is to be passive in our beliefs - just let reality form them. |
6945 | Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Some people seem to love to argue a point after all the world is fully convinced of it. But no further advance can be made. When doubt ceases, mental action on the subject comes to an end; and, if it did go on, it would be without purpose. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.11) | |
A reaction: This is the way Peirce's pragmatism, which deals with how real thinking actually works (rather than abstract logic), deals with scepticism. However, there is a borderline where almost everyone is satisfied, but the very wise person remains sceptical. |
23874 | Armies and businesses create moralities in which their activity can do no wrong [Marx, by Weil] |
Full Idea: Marx saw that social groups manufacture moralities for their own use, so their activity is placed outside the reach of evil. Thus the first articles of soldiers and businessmen is to deny that it is possible to do evil while waging war or doing business. | |
From: report of Karl Marx (works [1860]) by Simone Weil - Fragments: London 1943 p.146 | |
A reaction: This is especially true of the modern reverence for 'market forces'. It is a key debate in the ethics of warfare - compare Walzer and McMahon. A striking thought, obviously containing a lot of truth. |
18662 | Liberal freedom is the right to be separate, and ignores the union of man with man [Marx] |
Full Idea: The liberal right of man to freedom is not based on the union of man with man, but on the separation of man from man; it is the right to this separation. | |
From: Karl Marx (works [1860]), quoted by Will Kymlicka - Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) 7.2.a | |
A reaction: [quoted from an anthology] It is interesting that liberal freedom is the right NOT to be involved in politics, and even not to vote in elections. Home counties England (high hedges etc) is the embodiment of the freedom not to be involved in society. |
23372 | Liberals want the right to be separate, rather than for people to be united [Marx] |
Full Idea: The [liberal] right of man to freedom is not based on the union of man with man, but on the separation of man from man. It is the right to this separation. | |
From: Karl Marx (works [1860], p.53), quoted by Will Kymlicka - Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) 7 | |
A reaction: [in collection ed.McLelland p.53] That nicely encapsulates the debate. Modern liberal thinkers regret the loss of community, but people in authoritarian communities yearn for separation. You can have too much 'union'! |
20576 | Early Marx anticipates communitarian objections to liberalism [Marx, by Oksala] |
Full Idea: The early writings of Marx anticipate the communitarian critique of liberalism. | |
From: report of Karl Marx (works [1860]) by Johanna Oksala - Political Philosophy: all that matters Ch.8 | |
A reaction: [Oksala says modern writers seem to prefer this to the hardcore later Marx, which is presumably too 'scientific'. He says 'Capital Vol 1' is Marx's most important work] |
23862 | By saying the material dialectic of history aspires to the best, Marx agreed with capitalism [Weil on Marx] |
Full Idea: When Marx inverted Hegel's dialectic of history, by substituting matter for mind as the motive, he attributed to matter the essence of mind, an unceasing aspiration towards the best - which was in keeping with the general current of capitalist thought. | |
From: comment on Karl Marx (works [1860]) by Simone Weil - Reflections on Liberty and Social Oppression p.43 | |
A reaction: [compressed] A rather nice debating point! Marx seems to share the universal nineteenth century belief in unremitting progress. Without that, it is impossible to believe that a revolution will necessarily improve anything. |
21999 | False consciousness results from concealment by the superstructure [Marx, by Singer] |
Full Idea: False consciousness involves failing to see things as they really are. It comes about because a society's superstructure can conceal the real basis of the society. | |
From: report of Karl Marx (works [1860]) by Peter Singer - Marx 9 | |
A reaction: That seems a poor label, probably revealing a Hegelian background. It seems a matter of knowledge rather than consciousness. Can a whole mind be in a state of error? |
23875 | Marx says force is everything, and that the weak will become strong, while remaining the weak [Weil on Marx] |
Full Idea: Marx posits on the one hand that force alone governs social relations to the exclusion of anything else, and on the other hand that one day the weak, while remaining weak, will nevertheless be stronger. He believed in miracles. | |
From: comment on Karl Marx (works [1860]) by Simone Weil - Fragments: London 1943 p.149 | |
A reaction: This is close to the obvious contradiction if the working classes despise the middle classes (the dreaded 'bourgeoisie') while their only aspiration is to be like them. It is hard to custom design a new class to which they could both aspire. |
18653 | Marx rejected equal rights because they never actually treat people as equals [Marx, by Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Marx rejected the idea of equal rights, not because he was not a friend to the idea of treating people as equals, but precisely because he thought rights failed to live up to that ideal. | |
From: report of Karl Marx (works [1860]) by Will Kymlicka - Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) 5.1 | |
A reaction: Presumably because the power to award 'rights' goes to the highest bidder. If equality is to be enshrined in law, it is a bit difficult to see how else to manage it. |
23876 | The essence of capitalism is the subordination of people to things [Marx, by Weil] |
Full Idea: Marx discovered a formula impossible to surpass when he said that the essence of capitalism lies in the subordination of subject to object, of man to thing. | |
From: report of Karl Marx (works [1860]) by Simone Weil - Fragments: London 1943 p,155 | |
A reaction: I find this rather too vague to be a penetrating observation. I would suggest the obliteration of cooperation and community, in favour of competition. Winners and losers. |
20958 | Capitalism changes the world, by socialising the idea of a commodity [Marx, by Bowie] |
Full Idea: In Marx's view the essential factor in capitalism is that the encroachment of the commodity form into society fundamentally changes the world. | |
From: report of Karl Marx (works [1860]) by Andrew Bowie - Introduction to German Philosophy 6 'Historical' | |
A reaction: The main point is that people and their labour become commodities. Haven't animals always been treated as commodities? Clearly slave were commodities, long before capitalism. Capitalism universalises it? |
20960 | Marx thought capitalism was partly liberating, and could make labour and ownership more humane [Marx, by Bowie] |
Full Idea: Marx did not disapprove per se of capitalism. New divisions of labour and forms of ownership could transform individuals in modern societies, creating a more humane world with the means capitalism had liberated from feudalism. | |
From: report of Karl Marx (works [1860]) by Andrew Bowie - Introduction to German Philosophy 11 'Metaphysics' | |
A reaction: I'm guessing this might be early Marx, which has less to say about the 'scientific' inevitably of deep change, and the necessity for revolution. Nowadays we tinker with humane changes at the poorer end, while the rich run rampant. |
6939 | What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The guiding principle is that what is true of one piece of copper is true of another; such a guiding principle with regard to copper would be much safer than with regard to many other substances - brass, for example. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p. 8) | |
A reaction: Peirce is so beautifully simple and sensible. This gives the essential notion of a natural kind, and is a key notion in our whole understanding of physical reality. |
6938 | Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce] |
Full Idea: It is probably of more advantage to an animal to have his mind filled with pleasing and encouraging visions, independently of their truth; and thus, upon unpractical subjects, natural selection might occasion a fallacious tendency of thought. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p. 8) | |
A reaction: Note that this is a pragmatist saying that a set of beliefs might work fine but be untrue. So Peirce does not have the highly relativistic notion of truth of some later pragmatists. Good for him. Note the early date to be thinking about Darwin. |
6946 | If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce] |
Full Idea: If death is annihilation, then the man who believes that he will certainly go straight to heaven when he dies, provided he have fulfilled certain simple observances in this life, has a cheap pleasure which will not be followed by the least disappointment. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.12) | |
A reaction: This is a nicely wicked summary of one side of Pascal's options. All the problems of the argument are built into Peirce's word "cheap". Peirce goes on to talk about ostriches burying their heads. |