Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Issues of Pragmaticism', 'Merely Possible Propositions' and 'Contributions of Philosophy (On Appropriation)'

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
15586 When philosophy makes itself intelligible, it commits suicide [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: When philosophy makes itself intelligible, it commits suicide.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Contributions of Philosophy (On Appropriation) [1938], §259), quoted by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 5 'Contributions'
     A reaction: Polt describes this remark as 'theatrical', but it seems to speak for itself!
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
14617 Predicates can't apply to what doesn't exist [Stalnaker]
     Full Idea: Nothing can be predicated of something which does not exist.
     From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Merely Possible Propositions [2010], p.28)
     A reaction: [He says he is 'agreeing with Plantinga' on this] This seems very puzzling, as you can obviously say that dragons do not exist, but they breathe fire. Why can't you attach predicates to hypothetical objects?
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
19087 The meaning or purport of a symbol is all the rational conduct it would lead to [Peirce]
     Full Idea: The entire intellectual purport of any symbol consists in the total of all modes of rational conduct which, conditionally upon all the possible different circumstances and desires, would ensue upon the acceptance of the symbol.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Issues of Pragmaticism [1905], EP ii.246), quoted by Danielle Macbeth - Pragmatism and Objective Truth p.169 n1
     A reaction: Macbeth says pragmatism is founded on this theory of meaning, rather than on a theory of truth. I don't see why the causes of a symbol shouldn't be as much a part of its meaning as the consequences are.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
14616 A 'Russellian proposition' is an ordered sequence of individual, properties and relations [Stalnaker]
     Full Idea: A 'Russellian proposition' is an ordered sequence containing the individual, along with properties and relations.
     From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Merely Possible Propositions [2010], p.22)
     A reaction: Since Russell took properties and relations to be features of reality, this made the whole proposition a feature of reality. This is utterly different from what I understand by the word 'proposition', which is a feature of thought, not of the world.