13 ideas
15163 | The interest of quantified modal logic is its metaphysical necessity and essentialism [Soames] |
Full Idea: The chief philosophical interest in quantified modal logic lies with metaphysical necessity, essentialism, and the nontrivial modal de re. | |
From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], 3.1) |
15158 | Indefinite descriptions are quantificational in subject position, but not in predicate position [Soames] |
Full Idea: The indefinite description in 'A man will meet you' is naturally treated as quantificational, but an occurrence in predicative position, in 'Jones is not a philosopher', doesn't have a natural quantificational counterpart. | |
From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], 1.23) |
15157 | Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, not a singular term, is a real insight [Soames] |
Full Idea: Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, rather than a singular term, is a real insight. | |
From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], 1.22) | |
A reaction: 'Would the man who threw the stone come forward' seems like a different usage from 'would the man in the black hat come forward'. |
15156 | The universal and existential quantifiers were chosen to suit mathematics [Soames] |
Full Idea: Since Frege and Russell were mainly interested in formalizing mathematics, the only quantifiers they needed were the universal and existential one. | |
From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], 1.22) |
6007 | If you know your father, but don't recognise your father veiled, you know and don't know the same person [Eubulides, by Dancy,R] |
Full Idea: The 'undetected' or 'veiled' paradox of Eubulides says: if you know your father, and don't know the veiled person before you, but that person is your father, you both know and don't know the same person. | |
From: report of Eubulides (fragments/reports [c.390 BCE]) by R.M. Dancy - Megarian School | |
A reaction: Essentially an uninteresting equivocation on two senses of "know", but this paradox comes into its own when we try to give an account of how linguistic reference works. Frege's distinction of sense and reference tried to sort it out (Idea 4976). |
6006 | If you say truly that you are lying, you are lying [Eubulides, by Dancy,R] |
Full Idea: The liar paradox of Eubulides says 'if you state that you are lying, and state the truth, then you are lying'. | |
From: report of Eubulides (fragments/reports [c.390 BCE]) by R.M. Dancy - Megarian School | |
A reaction: (also Cic. Acad. 2.95) Don't say it, then. These kind of paradoxes of self-reference eventually lead to Russell's 'barber' paradox and his Theory of Types. |
6008 | Removing one grain doesn't destroy a heap, so a heap can't be destroyed [Eubulides, by Dancy,R] |
Full Idea: The 'sorites' paradox of Eubulides says: if you take one grain of sand from a heap (soros), what is left is still a heap; so no matter how many grains of sand you take one by one, the result is always a heap. | |
From: report of Eubulides (fragments/reports [c.390 BCE]) by R.M. Dancy - Megarian School | |
A reaction: (also Cic. Acad. 2.49) This is a very nice paradox, which goes to the heart of our bewilderment when we try to fully understand reality. It homes in on problems of identity, as best exemplified in the Ship of Theseus (Ideas 1212 + 1213). |
15162 | We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life [Soames] |
Full Idea: Our understanding of metaphysical necessity is intuitive - drawn from our ordinary thought and talk. | |
From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], 3.1) | |
A reaction: This, of course, is a good reason for analytic philosophers to dislike metaphysical necessity. |
15161 | There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths [Soames] |
Full Idea: The set of metaphysically necessary truths is larger than the set of logically necessary truths. | |
From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], 3.1) | |
A reaction: Likewise, the set of logically possible truths is much larger than the set of metaphysically possible truths. If a truth is logically necessary, it will clearly be metaphysically necessary. Er, unless it is necessitated by daft logic... |
19087 | The meaning or purport of a symbol is all the rational conduct it would lead to [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The entire intellectual purport of any symbol consists in the total of all modes of rational conduct which, conditionally upon all the possible different circumstances and desires, would ensue upon the acceptance of the symbol. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Issues of Pragmaticism [1905], EP ii.246), quoted by Danielle Macbeth - Pragmatism and Objective Truth p.169 n1 | |
A reaction: Macbeth says pragmatism is founded on this theory of meaning, rather than on a theory of truth. I don't see why the causes of a symbol shouldn't be as much a part of its meaning as the consequences are. |
15152 | To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts [Soames] |
Full Idea: The systematic study of meaning requires a framework for specifying the truth conditions of sentences on the basis of their syntactic structure, and the representational contents of their parts. | |
From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], Intro) | |
A reaction: Soames presents this as common sense, on the first page of his book, and it is hard to disagree. Representation will shade off into studying the workings of the mind. Fodor seems a good person to start with. |
15153 | Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings [Soames] |
Full Idea: The truth conditions provided by Tarski's theories (based on references of subsentential constituents) are too weak to determine meanings, because they lacked context-sensitivity and various forms of intensionality. | |
From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], Intro) | |
A reaction: Interesting. This suggests that stronger modern axiomatic theories of truth might give a sufficient basis for a truth conditions theory of meaning. Soames says possible worlds semantics was an attempt to improve things. |
15154 | We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa [Soames] |
Full Idea: Instead of explaining the representationality of sentences and cognitive states in terms of propositions, we must explain the representationality of propositions in terms of the representationality of the relevant cognitive states. | |
From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], Intro) | |
A reaction: Music to my ears. I am bewildered by this Russellian notion of a 'proposition' as some abstract entity floating around in the world waiting to be expressed. The vaguer word 'facts' (and false facts?) will cover that. It's Frege's fault. |