108 ideas
6947 | Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Metaphysical systems have not usually rested upon any observed facts, or not in any great degree. They are chiefly adopted because their fundamental propositions seem 'agreeable to reason', which means that which we find ourselves inclined to believe. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.15) | |
A reaction: This leads to Peirce's key claim - that we should allow our beliefs to be formed by something outside of ourselves. I don't share Peirce's contempt for metaphysics, which I take to be about the most abstract presuppositions of our ordinary beliefs. |
14122 | Analysis gives us nothing but the truth - but never the whole truth [Russell] |
Full Idea: Though analysis gives us the truth, and nothing but the truth, yet it can never give us the whole truth | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §138) |
14109 | The study of grammar is underestimated in philosophy [Russell] |
Full Idea: The study of grammar, in my opinion, is capable of throwing far more light on philosophical questions than is commonly supposed by philosophers. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §046) | |
A reaction: This is a dangerous tendency, which has led to some daft linguistic philosophy, but Russell himself was never guilty of losing the correct perspective on the matter. |
14165 | Analysis falsifies, if when the parts are broken down they are not equivalent to their sum [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is said that analysis is falsification, that the complex is not equivalent to the sum of its constituents and is changed when analysed into these. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §439) | |
A reaction: Not quite Moore's Paradox of Analysis, but close. Russell is articulating the view we now call 'holism' - that the whole is more than the sum of its parts - which I can never quite believe. |
6937 | Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The object of reasoning is to find out, from the consideration of what we already know, something else which we do not know. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p. 7) | |
A reaction: I defy anyone to come up with a better definition of reasoning than that. The emphasis is on knowledge rather than truth, which you would expect from a pragmatist. …Actually the definition doesn't cover conditional reasoning terribly well. |
14115 | Definition by analysis into constituents is useless, because it neglects the whole [Russell] |
Full Idea: A definition as an analysis of an idea into its constituents is inconvenient and, I think, useless; it overlooks the fact that wholes are not, as a rule, determinate when their constituents are given. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §108) | |
A reaction: The influence of Leibniz seems rather strong here, since he was obsessed with explaining what creates true unities. |
14159 | In mathematics definitions are superfluous, as they name classes, and it all reduces to primitives [Russell] |
Full Idea: The statement that a class is to be represented by a symbol is a definition in mathematics, and says nothing about mathematical entities. Any formula can be stated in terms of primitive ideas, so the definitions are superfluous. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §412) | |
A reaction: [compressed wording] I'm not sure that everyone would agree with this (e.g. Kit Fine), as certain types of numbers seem to be introduced by stipulative definitions. |
14148 | Infinite regresses have propositions made of propositions etc, with the key term reappearing [Russell] |
Full Idea: In the objectionable kind of infinite regress, some propositions join to constitute the meaning of some proposition, but one of them is similarly compounded, and so ad infinitum. This comes from circular definitions, where the term defined reappears. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §329) |
18002 | As well as a truth value, propositions have a range of significance for their variables [Russell] |
Full Idea: Every proposition function …has, in addition to its range of truth, a range of significance, i.e. a range within which x must lie if φ(x) is to be a proposition at all, whether true or false. This is the first point of the theory of types. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], App B:523), quoted by Ofra Magidor - Category Mistakes 1.2 | |
A reaction: Magidor quotes this as the origin of the idea of a 'category mistake'. It is the basis of the formal theory of types, but is highly influential in philosophy generally, especially as a criterion for ruling many propositions as 'meaningless'. |
14102 | What is true or false is not mental, and is best called 'propositions' [Russell] |
Full Idea: I hold that what is true or false is not in general mental, and requiring a name for the true or false as such, this name can scarcely be other than 'propositions'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], Pref) | |
A reaction: This is the Fregean and logicians' dream that that there is some fixed eternal realm of the true and the false. I think true and false concern the mental. We can talk about the 'facts' which are independent of minds, but not the 'truth'. |
14176 | "The death of Caesar is true" is not the same proposition as "Caesar died" [Russell] |
Full Idea: "The death of Caesar is true" is not, I think, the same proposition as "Caesar died". | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §478) | |
A reaction: I suspect that it was this remark which provoked Ramsey into rebellion, because he couldn't see the difference. Nowadays we must talk first of conversational implicature, and then of language and metalanguage. |
14113 | The null class is a fiction [Russell] |
Full Idea: The null class is a fiction. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §079) | |
A reaction: This does not commit him to regarding all classes as fictions - though he seems to have eventually come to believe that. The null class seems to have a role something like 'Once upon a time...' in story-telling. You can then tell truth or fiction. |
15894 | Russell invented the naïve set theory usually attributed to Cantor [Russell, by Lavine] |
Full Idea: Russell was the inventor of the naïve set theory so often attributed to Cantor. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903]) by Shaughan Lavine - Understanding the Infinite I |
14126 | Order rests on 'between' and 'separation' [Russell] |
Full Idea: The two sources of order are 'between' and 'separation'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §204) |
14127 | Order depends on transitive asymmetrical relations [Russell] |
Full Idea: All order depends upon transitive asymmetrical relations. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §208) |
14121 | The part-whole relation is ultimate and indefinable [Russell] |
Full Idea: The relation of whole and part is, it would seem, an indefinable and ultimate relation, or rather several relations, often confounded, of which one at least is indefinable. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §135) | |
A reaction: This is before anyone had produced a mathematical account of mereology (qv). |
14106 | Implication cannot be defined [Russell] |
Full Idea: A definition of implication is quite impossible. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §016) |
14108 | It would be circular to use 'if' and 'then' to define material implication [Russell] |
Full Idea: It would be a vicious circle to define material implication as meaning that if one proposition is true, then another is true, for 'if' and 'then' already involve implication. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §037) | |
A reaction: Hence the preference for defining it by the truth table, or as 'not-p or q'. |
14167 | The only classes are things, predicates and relations [Russell] |
Full Idea: The only classes appear to be things, predicates and relations. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §440) | |
A reaction: This is the first-order logic view of reality, which has begun to look incredibly impoverished in modern times. Processes certainly demand a hearing, as do modal facts. |
14105 | There seem to be eight or nine logical constants [Russell] |
Full Idea: The number of logical constants is not great: it appears, in fact, to be eight or nine. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §012) | |
A reaction: There is, of course, lots of scope for interdefinability. No one is going to disagree greatly with his claim, so it is an interesting fact, which invites some sort of (non-platonic) explanation. |
18722 | Negations are not just reversals of truth-value, since that can happen without negation [Wittgenstein on Russell] |
Full Idea: Russell explained ¬p by saying that ¬p is true if p is false and false if p is true. But this is not an explanation of negation, for it might apply to propositions other than the negative. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903]) by Ludwig Wittgenstein - Lectures 1930-32 (student notes) B XI.3 | |
A reaction: Presumably he is thinking of 'the light is on' and 'the light is off'. A very astute criticism, which seems to be correct. What would Russell say? Perhaps we add that negation is an 'operation' which achieves flipping of the truth-value? |
14104 | Constants are absolutely definite and unambiguous [Russell] |
Full Idea: A constant is something absolutely definite, concerning which there is no ambiguity whatever. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §006) |
14114 | Variables don't stand alone, but exist as parts of propositional functions [Russell] |
Full Idea: A variable is not any term simply, but any term as entering into a propositional function. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §093) | |
A reaction: So we should think of variables entirely by their role, rather than as having a semantics of their own (pace Kit Fine? - though see Russell §106, p.107). |
14137 | 'Any' is better than 'all' where infinite classes are concerned [Russell] |
Full Idea: The word 'any' is preferable to the word 'all' where infinite classes are concerned. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §284) | |
A reaction: The reason must be that it is hard to quantify over 'all' of the infinite members, but it is easier to say what is true of any one of them. |
14149 | The Achilles Paradox concerns the one-one correlation of infinite classes [Russell] |
Full Idea: When the Achilles Paradox is translated into arithmetical language, it is seen to be concerned with the one-one correlation of two infinite classes. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §321) | |
A reaction: Dedekind's view of infinity (Idea 9826) shows why this results in a horrible tangle. |
15895 | Russell discovered the paradox suggested by Burali-Forti's work [Russell, by Lavine] |
Full Idea: Burali-Forti didn't discover any paradoxes, though his work suggested a paradox to Russell. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903]) by Shaughan Lavine - Understanding the Infinite I |
14152 | In geometry, Kant and idealists aimed at the certainty of the premisses [Russell] |
Full Idea: The approach to practical geometry of the idealists, and especially of Kant, was that we must be certain of the premisses on their own account. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §353) |
14154 | Geometry throws no light on the nature of actual space [Russell] |
Full Idea: Geometry no longer throws any direct light on the nature of actual space. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §353) | |
A reaction: This was 1903. Minkowski then contributed a geometry of space which was used in Einstein's General Theory. It looks to me as if geometry reveals the possibilities for actual space. |
14151 | Pure geometry is deductive, and neutral over what exists [Russell] |
Full Idea: As a branch of pure mathematics, geometry is strictly deductive, indifferent to the choice of its premises, and to the question of whether there strictly exist such entities. It just deals with series of more than one dimension. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §352) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the culmination of the seventeenth century reduction of geometry to algebra. Russell admits that there is also the 'study of actual space'. |
14153 | In geometry, empiricists aimed at premisses consistent with experience [Russell] |
Full Idea: The approach to practical geometry of the empiricists, notably Mill, was to show that no other set of premisses would give results consistent with experience. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §353) | |
A reaction: The modern phrase might be that geometry just needs to be 'empirically adequate'. The empiricists are faced with the possibility of more than one successful set of premisses, and the idealist don't know how to demonstrate truth. |
14155 | Two points have a line joining them (descriptive), a distance (metrical), and a whole line (projective) [Russell, by PG] |
Full Idea: Two points will define the line that joins them ('descriptive' geometry), the distance between them ('metrical' geometry), and the whole of the extended line ('projective' geometry). | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §362) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: [a summary of Russell's §362] Projective Geometry clearly has the highest generality, and the modern view seems to make it the master subject of geometry. |
18254 | Russell's approach had to treat real 5/8 as different from rational 5/8 [Russell, by Dummett] |
Full Idea: Russell defined the rationals as ratios of integers, and was therefore forced to treat the real number 5/8 as an object distinct from the rational 5/8. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903]) by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics 21 'Frege's' |
14144 | Ordinals result from likeness among relations, as cardinals from similarity among classes [Russell] |
Full Idea: Ordinal numbers result from likeness among relations, as cardinals from similarity among classes. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §293) |
14128 | Some claim priority for the ordinals over cardinals, but there is no logical priority between them [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is claimed that ordinals are prior to cardinals, because they form the progression which is relevant to mathematics, but they both form progressions and have the same ordinal properties. There is nothing to choose in logical priority between them. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §230) | |
A reaction: We have an intuitive notion of the size of a set without number, but you can't actually start counting without number, so the ordering seems to be the key to the business, which (I would have thought) points to ordinals as prior. |
14129 | Ordinals presuppose two relations, where cardinals only presuppose one [Russell] |
Full Idea: Ordinals presuppose serial and one-one relations, whereas cardinals only presuppose one-one relations. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §232) | |
A reaction: This seems to award the palm to the cardinals, for their greater logical simplicity, but I have already given the award to the ordinals in the previous idea, and I am not going back on that. |
14132 | Properties of numbers don't rely on progressions, so cardinals may be more basic [Russell] |
Full Idea: The properties of number must be capable of proof without appeal to the general properties of progressions, since cardinals can be independently defined, and must be seen in a progression before theories of progression are applied to them. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §243) | |
A reaction: Russell says there is no logical priority between ordinals and cardinals, but it is simpler to start an account with cardinals. |
14141 | Ordinals are defined through mathematical induction [Russell] |
Full Idea: The ordinal numbers are defined by some relation to mathematical induction. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §290) |
14142 | Ordinals are types of series of terms in a row, rather than the 'nth' instance [Russell] |
Full Idea: The finite ordinals may be conceived as types of series; ..the ordinal number may be taken as 'n terms in a row'; this is distinct from the 'nth', and logically prior to it. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §290) | |
A reaction: Worth nothing, because the popular and traditional use of 'ordinal' (as in learning a foreign language) is to mean the nth instance of something, rather than a whole series. |
14139 | Transfinite ordinals don't obey commutativity, so their arithmetic is quite different from basic arithmetic [Russell] |
Full Idea: Unlike the transfinite cardinals, the transfinite ordinals do not obey the commutative law, and their arithmetic is therefore quite different from elementary arithmetic. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §290) |
14145 | For Cantor ordinals are types of order, not numbers [Russell] |
Full Idea: In his most recent article Cantor speaks of ordinals as types of order, not as numbers. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §298) | |
A reaction: Russell likes this because it supports his own view of ordinals as classes of serial relations. It has become orthodoxy to refer to heaps of things as 'numbers' when the people who introduced them may not have seen them that way. |
14146 | We aren't sure if one cardinal number is always bigger than another [Russell] |
Full Idea: We do not know that of any two different cardinal numbers one must be the greater. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §300) | |
A reaction: This was 1903, and I don't know whether the situation has changed. I find this thought extremely mind-boggling, given that cardinals are supposed to answer the question 'how many?' Presumably they can't be identical either. See Burali-Forti. |
14135 | Real numbers are a class of rational numbers (and so not really numbers at all) [Russell] |
Full Idea: Real numbers are not really numbers at all, but something quite different; ...a real number, so I shall contend, is nothing but a certain class of rational numbers. ...A segment of rationals is a real number. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §258) |
14123 | Some quantities can't be measured, and some non-quantities are measurable [Russell] |
Full Idea: Some quantities cannot be measured (such as pain), and some things which are not quantities can be measured (such as certain series). | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §150) |
14158 | Quantity is not part of mathematics, where it is replaced by order [Russell] |
Full Idea: Quantity, though philosophers seem to think it essential to mathematics, does not occur in pure mathematics, and does occur in many cases not amenable to mathematical treatment. The place of quantity is taken by order. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §405) | |
A reaction: He gives pain as an example of a quantity which cannot be treated mathematically. |
14120 | Counting explains none of the real problems about the foundations of arithmetic [Russell] |
Full Idea: The process of counting gives us no indication as to what the numbers are, as to why they form a series, or as to how it is to be proved that there are n numbers from 1 to n. Hence counting is irrelevant to the foundations of arithmetic. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §129) | |
A reaction: I take it to be the first truth in the philosophy of mathematics that if there is a system of numbers which won't do the job of counting, then that system is irrelevant. Counting always comes first. |
14118 | We can define one-to-one without mentioning unity [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is possible, without the notion of unity, to define what is meant by one-to-one. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §109) | |
A reaction: This is the trick which enables the Greek account of numbers, based on units, to be abandoned. But when you have arranged the boys and the girls one-to-one, you have not yet got a concept of number. |
14119 | We do not currently know whether, of two infinite numbers, one must be greater than the other [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is not at present known whether, of two different infinite numbers, one must be greater and the other less. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §118) | |
A reaction: This must refer to cardinal numbers, as ordinal numbers have an order. The point is that the proper subset is equal to the set (according to Dedekind). |
14133 | There are cardinal and ordinal theories of infinity (while continuity is entirely ordinal) [Russell] |
Full Idea: The theory of infinity has two forms, cardinal and ordinal, of which the former springs from the logical theory of numbers; the theory of continuity is purely ordinal. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §249) |
14134 | Infinite numbers are distinguished by disobeying induction, and the part equalling the whole [Russell] |
Full Idea: There are two differences of infinite numbers from finite: that they do not obey mathematical induction (both cardinals and ordinals), and that the whole contains a part consisting of the same number of terms (applying only to ordinals). | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §250) |
14143 | ω names the whole series, or the generating relation of the series of ordinal numbers [Russell] |
Full Idea: The ordinal representing the whole series must be different from what represents a segment of itself, with no immediate predecessor, since the series has no last term. ω names the class progression, or generating relation of series of this class. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §291) | |
A reaction: He is paraphrasing Cantor's original account of ω. |
14138 | You can't get a new transfinite cardinal from an old one just by adding finite numbers to it [Russell] |
Full Idea: It must not be supposed that we can obtain a new transfinite cardinal by merely adding one to it, or even by adding any finite number, or aleph-0. On the contrary, such puny weapons cannot disturb the transfinite cardinals. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §288) | |
A reaction: If you add one, the original cardinal would be a subset of the new one, and infinite numbers have their subsets equal to the whole, so you have gone nowhere. You begin to wonder whether transfinite cardinals are numbers at all. |
14140 | For every transfinite cardinal there is an infinite collection of transfinite ordinals [Russell] |
Full Idea: For every transfinite cardinal there is an infinite collection of transfinite ordinals, although the cardinal number of all ordinals is the same as or less than that of all cardinals. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §290) | |
A reaction: Sort that one out, and you are beginning to get to grips with the world of the transfinite! Sounds like there are more ordinals than cardinals, and more cardinals than ordinals. |
14124 | Axiom of Archimedes: a finite multiple of a lesser magnitude can always exceed a greater [Russell] |
Full Idea: The Axiom of Archimedes asserts that, given any two magnitudes of a kind, some finite multiple of the lesser exceeds the greater. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §168 n*) |
7530 | Russell tried to replace Peano's Postulates with the simple idea of 'class' [Russell, by Monk] |
Full Idea: What Russell tried to show [at this time] was that Peano's Postulates (based on 'zero', 'number' and 'successor') could in turn be dispensed with, and the whole edifice built upon nothing more than the notion of 'class'. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903]) by Ray Monk - Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude Ch.4 | |
A reaction: (See Idea 5897 for Peano) Presumably you can't afford to lose the notion of 'successor' in the account. If you build any theory on the idea of classes, you are still required to explain why a particular is a member of that class, and not another. |
18246 | Dedekind failed to distinguish the numbers from other progressions [Shapiro on Russell] |
Full Idea: Dedekind's demonstrations nowhere - not even where he comes to cardinals - involve any property distinguishing numbers from other progressions. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], p.249) by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 5.4 | |
A reaction: Shapiro notes that his sounds like Frege's Julius Caesar problem, of ensuring that your definition really does capture a number. Russell is objecting to mathematical structuralism. |
14147 | Denying mathematical induction gave us the transfinite [Russell] |
Full Idea: The transfinite was obtained by denying mathematical induction. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §310) | |
A reaction: This refers to the work of Dedekind and Cantor. This raises the question (about which thinkers have ceased to care, it seems), of whether it is rational to deny mathematical induction. |
14125 | Finite numbers, unlike infinite numbers, obey mathematical induction [Russell] |
Full Idea: Finite numbers obey the law of mathematical induction: infinite numbers do not. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §183) |
14116 | Numbers were once defined on the basis of 1, but neglected infinities and + [Russell] |
Full Idea: It used to be common to define numbers by means of 1, with 2 being 1+1 and so on. But this method was only applicable to finite numbers, made a tiresome different between 1 and the other numbers, and left + unexplained. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §109) | |
A reaction: Am I alone in hankering after the old approach? The idea of a 'unit' is what connected numbers to the patterns of the world. Russell's approach invites unneeded platonism. + is just 'and', and infinities are fictional extrapolations. Sounds fine to me. |
14117 | Numbers are properties of classes [Russell] |
Full Idea: Numbers are to be regarded as properties of classes. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §109) | |
A reaction: If properties are then defined extensionally as classes, you end up with numbers as classes of classes. |
9977 | Ordinals can't be defined just by progression; they have intrinsic qualities [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is impossible that the ordinals should be, as Dedekind suggests, nothing but the terms of such relations as constitute a progression. If they are anything at all, they must be intrinsically something. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §242) | |
A reaction: This is the obvious platonist response to the incipient doctrine of structuralism. We have a chicken-and-egg problem. Bricks need intrinsic properties to make a structure. A structure isomorphic to numbers is not thereby the numbers. |
14162 | Mathematics doesn't care whether its entities exist [Russell] |
Full Idea: Mathematics is throughout indifferent to the question whether its entities exist. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §434) | |
A reaction: There is an 'if-thenist' attitude in this book, since he is trying to reduce mathematics to logic. Total indifference leaves the problem of why mathematics is applicable to the real world. |
14103 | Pure mathematics is the class of propositions of the form 'p implies q' [Russell] |
Full Idea: Pure mathematics is the class of all propositions of the form 'p implies q', where p and q are propositions containing one or more variables, the same in the two propositions, and neither p nor q contains any constants except logical constants. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §001) | |
A reaction: Linnebo calls Russell's view here 'deductive structuralism'. Russell gives (§5) as an example that Euclid is just whatever is deduced from his axioms. |
21555 | For 'x is a u' to be meaningful, u must be one range of individuals (or 'type') higher than x [Russell] |
Full Idea: In his 1903 theory of types he distinguished between individuals, ranges of individuals, ranges of ranges of individuals, and so on. Each level was a type, and it was stipulated that for 'x is a u' to be meaningful, u must be one type higher than x. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], App) | |
A reaction: Russell was dissatisfied because this theory could not deal with Cantor's Paradox. Is this the first time in modern philosophy that someone has offered a criterion for whether a proposition is 'meaningful'? |
18003 | In 'x is a u', x and u must be of different types, so 'x is an x' is generally meaningless [Russell, by Magidor] |
Full Idea: Russell argues that in a statement of the form 'x is a u' (and correspondingly, 'x is a not-u'), 'x must be of different types', and hence that ''x is an x' must in general be meaningless'. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], App B:524) by Ofra Magidor - Category Mistakes 1.2 | |
A reaction: " 'Word' is a word " comes to mind, but this would be the sort of ascent to a metalanguage (to distinguish the types) which Tarski exploited. It is the simple point that a classification can't be the same as a member of the classification. |
11010 | Being is what belongs to every possible object of thought [Russell] |
Full Idea: Being is that which belongs to every conceivable, to every possible object of thought. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903]), quoted by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch.5 | |
A reaction: I take Russell's (or anyone's) attempt to distinguish two different senses of the word 'being' or 'exist' to be an umitigated metaphysical disaster. |
14161 | Many things have being (as topics of propositions), but may not have actual existence [Russell] |
Full Idea: Numbers, the Homeric gods, relations, chimeras and four-dimensional space all have being, for if they were not entities of a kind, we could not make propositions about them. Existence, on the contrary, is the prerogative of some only amongst the beings. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §427) | |
A reaction: This is the analytic philosophy account of being (a long way from Heidegger). Contemporary philosophy seems to be full of confusions on this, with many writers claiming existence for things which should only be awarded 'being' status. |
14173 | What exists has causal relations, but non-existent things may also have them [Russell] |
Full Idea: It would seem that whatever exists at any part of time has causal relations. This is not a distinguishing characteristic of what exists, since we have seen that two non-existent terms may be cause and effect. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §449) | |
A reaction: Presumably he means that the non-existence of something (such as a safety rail) might the cause of an event. This is a problem for Alexander's Principle, in Idea 3534. I think we could redescribe his problem cases, to save Alexander. |
21492 | Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The fundamental hypothesis of the method of science is this: There are real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinion of them. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877]), quoted by Albert Atkin - Peirce 3 'method' | |
A reaction: He admits later that this is only a commitment and not a fact. It seems to me that when you combine this idea with the huge success of science, the denial of realism is crazy. Philosophy has a lot to answer for. |
6949 | If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Nobody can really doubt that there are Reals, for, if he did, doubt would not be a source of dissatisfaction. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.19) | |
A reaction: This rests on Peirce's view that all that really matters is a sense of genuine dissatisfaction, rather than a theoretical idea. So even at the end of Meditation One, Descartes isn't actually worried about whether his furniture exists. |
14163 | Four classes of terms: instants, points, terms at instants only, and terms at instants and points [Russell] |
Full Idea: Among terms which appear to exist, there are, we may say, four great classes: 1) instants, 2) points, 3) terms which occupy instants but not points, 4) terms which occupy both points and instants. Analysis cannot explain 'occupy'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §437) | |
A reaction: This is a massively reductive scientific approach to categorising existence. Note that it homes in on 'terms', which seems a rather linguistic approach, although Russell is cautious about such things. |
21341 | Philosophers of logic and maths insisted that a vocabulary of relations was essential [Russell, by Heil] |
Full Idea: Relations were regarded with suspicion, until philosophers working in logic and mathematics advanced reasons to doubt that we could provide anything like an adequate description of the world without developing a relational vocabulary. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], Ch.26) by John Heil - Relations | |
A reaction: [Heil cites Russell as the only reference] A little warning light, that philosophers describing the world managed to do without real relations, and it was only for the abstraction of logic and maths that they became essential. |
10586 | 'Reflexiveness' holds between a term and itself, and cannot be inferred from symmetry and transitiveness [Russell] |
Full Idea: The property of a relation which insures that it holds between a term and itself is called by Peano 'reflexiveness', and he has shown, contrary to what was previously believed, that this property cannot be inferred from symmetry and transitiveness. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §209) | |
A reaction: So we might say 'this is a sentence' has a reflexive relation, and 'this is a wasp' does not. While there are plenty of examples of mental properties with this property, I'm not sure that it makes much sense of a physical object. Indexicality... |
10585 | Symmetrical and transitive relations are formally like equality [Russell] |
Full Idea: Relations which are both symmetrical and transitive are formally of the nature of equality. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §209) | |
A reaction: This is the key to the whole equivalence approach to abstraction and Frege's definition of numbers. Establish equality conditions is the nearest you can get to saying what such things are. Personally I think we can say more, by revisiting older views. |
7781 | I call an object of thought a 'term'. This is a wide concept implying unity and existence. [Russell] |
Full Idea: Whatever may be an object of thought, or occur in a true or false proposition, or be counted as one, I call a term. This is the widest word in the philosophical vocabulary, which I use synonymously with unit, individual, entity (being one, and existing). | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §047) | |
A reaction: The claim of existence begs many questions, such as whether the non-existence of the Loch Ness Monster is an 'object' of thought. |
14166 | Unities are only in propositions or concepts, and nothing that exists has unity [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is sufficient to observe that all unities are propositions or propositional concepts, and that consequently nothing that exists is a unity. If, therefore, it is maintained that things are unities, we must reply that no things exist. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §439) | |
A reaction: The point, I presume, is that you end up as a nihilist about identities (like van Inwagen and Merricks) by mistakenly thinking (as Aristotle and Leibniz did) that everything that exists needs to have something called 'unity'. |
14164 | The only unities are simples, or wholes composed of parts [Russell] |
Full Idea: The only kind of unity to which I can attach any precise sense - apart from the unity of the absolutely simple - is that of a whole composed of parts. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §439) | |
A reaction: This comes from a keen student of Leibniz, who was obsessed with unity. Russell leaves unaddressed the question of what turns some parts into a whole. |
14112 | A set has some sort of unity, but not enough to be a 'whole' [Russell] |
Full Idea: In a class as many, the component terms, though they have some kind of unity, have less than is required for a whole. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §070) | |
A reaction: This is interesting because (among many other things), sets are used to stand for numbers, but numbers are usually reqarded as wholes. |
14170 | Change is obscured by substance, a thing's nature, subject-predicate form, and by essences [Russell] |
Full Idea: The notion of change is obscured by the doctrine of substance, by a thing's nature versus its external relations, and by subject-predicate form, so that things can be different and the same. Hence the useless distinction between essential and accidental. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §443) | |
A reaction: He goes on to object to vague unconscious usage of 'essence' by modern thinkers, but allows (teasingly) that medieval thinkers may have been precise about it. It is a fact, in common life, that things can change and be the same. Explain it! |
14107 | Terms are identical if they belong to all the same classes [Russell] |
Full Idea: Two terms are identical when the second belongs to every class to which the first belongs. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §026) |
11849 | It at least makes sense to say two objects have all their properties in common [Wittgenstein on Russell] |
Full Idea: Russell's definition of '=' is inadequate, because according to it we cannot say that two objects have all their properties in common. (Even if this proposition is never correct, it still has a sense). | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903]) by Ludwig Wittgenstein - Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 5.5302 | |
A reaction: This is what now seems to be a standard denial of the bizarre Leibniz claim that there never could be two things with identical properties, even, it seems, in principle. What would Leibniz made of two electrons? |
22303 | It makes no sense to say that a true proposition could have been false [Russell] |
Full Idea: There seems to be no true proposition of which it makes sense to say that it might have been false. One might as well say that redness might have been a taste and not a colour. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §430), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 29 'Analy' | |
A reaction: Few thinkers agree with this rejection of counterfactuals. It seems to rely on Moore's idea that true propositions are facts. It also sounds deterministic. Does 'he is standing' mean he couldn't have been sitting (at t)? |
6940 | The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The feeling of believing is a more or less sure indication of there being established in our nature some habit which will determine our actions. Doubt never has such an effect. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.10) | |
A reaction: It is one thing to assert this fairly accurate observation, and another to assert that this is the essence or definition of a belief. Perhaps it is the purpose of belief, without being the phenomenological essence of it. We act in states of uncertainty. |
6943 | A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The mere putting of a proposition into the interrogative form does not stimulate the mind to any struggle after belief; there must be a real and living doubt. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.11) | |
A reaction: This the attractive aspect of Peirce's pragmatism, that he is always focusing on real life rather than abstract theory or pure logic. |
6941 | We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce] |
Full Idea: As soon as a firm belief is reached we are entirely satisfied, whether the belief be true or false. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.10) | |
A reaction: This does not deny that the truth or falsehood of a belief is independent of whether we are satisfied with it. It is making a fair point, though, about why we believe things, and it can't be because of truth, because we don't know how to ensure that. |
6942 | We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce] |
Full Idea: We seek for a belief that we shall think to be true; but we think each one of our beliefs to be true, and, indeed, it is mere tautology to say so. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.11) | |
A reaction: If, as I do, you like to define belief as 'commitment to truth', Peirce makes a rather startling observation. You are rendered unable to ask whether your beliefs are true, because you have defined them as true. Nice point… |
6598 | We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce] |
Full Idea: It is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs be determined by nothing human, but by some external permanency - by something upon which our thinking has no effect. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.5 | |
A reaction: This very sensible and interesting remark hovers somewhere between empiricism and pragmatism. Fogelin very persuasively builds his account of knowledge on it. The key point is that we hardly ever choose what to believe. See Idea 2454. |
6944 | Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce] |
Full Idea: It is a common idea that demonstration must rest on indubitable propositions, either first principles of a general nature, or first sensations; but actual demonstration is completely satisfactory if it starts from propositions free from all actual doubt. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.11) | |
A reaction: Another nice example of Peirce focusing on the practical business of thinking, rather than abstract theory. I agree with this approach, that explanation and proof do not aim at perfection and indubitability, but at what satisfies a critical mind. |
6948 | Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce] |
Full Idea: To satisfy our doubts it is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs may be determined by nothing human, but by some external permanency - by something upon which our thinking has no effect. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.18) | |
A reaction: This may be the single most important idea in pragmatism and in the philosophy of science. See Fodor on experiments (Idea 2455). Put the question to nature. The essential aim is to be passive in our beliefs - just let reality form them. |
6945 | Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Some people seem to love to argue a point after all the world is fully convinced of it. But no further advance can be made. When doubt ceases, mental action on the subject comes to an end; and, if it did go on, it would be without purpose. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.11) | |
A reaction: This is the way Peirce's pragmatism, which deals with how real thinking actually works (rather than abstract logic), deals with scepticism. However, there is a borderline where almost everyone is satisfied, but the very wise person remains sceptical. |
10583 | Abstraction principles identify a common property, which is some third term with the right relation [Russell] |
Full Idea: The relations in an abstraction principle are always constituted by possession of a common property (which is imprecise as it relies on 'predicate'), ..so we say a common property of two terms is any third term to which both have the same relation. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §157) | |
A reaction: This brings out clearly the linguistic approach of the modern account of abstraction, where the older abstractionism was torn between the ontology and the epistemology (that is, the parts of objects, or the appearances of them in the mind). |
10582 | The principle of Abstraction says a symmetrical, transitive relation analyses into an identity [Russell] |
Full Idea: The principle of Abstraction says that whenever a relation with instances is symmetrical and transitive, then the relation is not primitive, but is analyzable into sameness of relation to some other term. ..This is provable and states a common assumption. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §157) | |
A reaction: At last I have found someone who explains the whole thing clearly! Bertrand Russell was wonderful. See other ideas on the subject from this text, for a proper understanding of abstraction by equivalence. |
10584 | A certain type of property occurs if and only if there is an equivalence relation [Russell] |
Full Idea: The possession of a common property of a certain type always leads to a symmetrical transitive relation. The principle of Abstraction asserts the converse, that such relations only spring from common properties of the above type. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §157) | |
A reaction: The type of property is where only one term is applicable to it, such as the magnitude of a quantity, or the time of an event. So symmetrical and transitive relations occur if and only if there is a property of that type. |
14110 | Proposition contain entities indicated by words, rather than the words themselves [Russell] |
Full Idea: A proposition, unless it happens to be linguistic, does not itself contain words: it contains the entities indicated by words. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §051) | |
A reaction: Russell says in his Preface that he took over this view of propositions from G.E. Moore. They are now known as 'Russellian' propositions, which are mainly distinguished by not being mental event, but by being complexes out in the world. |
19164 | If propositions are facts, then false and true propositions are indistinguishable [Davidson on Russell] |
Full Idea: Russell often treated propositions as facts, but discovered that correspondence then became useless for explaining truth, since every meaningful expression, true or false, expresses a proposition. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903]) by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 6 | |
A reaction: So 'pigs fly' would have to mean pigs actually flying (which they don't). They might correspond to possible situations, but only if pigs might fly. What do you make of 'circles are square'? Russell had many a sleepless night over that. |
14111 | A proposition is a unity, and analysis destroys it [Russell] |
Full Idea: A proposition is essentially a unity, and when analysis has destroyed the unity, no enumeration of constituents will restore the proposition. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §054) | |
A reaction: The question of the 'unity of the proposition' led to a prolonged debate. |
19157 | Russell said the proposition must explain its own unity - or else objective truth is impossible [Russell, by Davidson] |
Full Idea: Moore and Russell reacted strongly against the idea that the unity of the proposition depended on human acts of judgement. ...Russell decided that unless the unity is explained in terms of the proposition itself, there can be no objective truth. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], p.42) by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 5 | |
A reaction: Put like this, the Russellian view strikes me as false. Effectively he is saying that a unified proposition is the same as a fact. I take a proposition to be a brain event, best labelled by Frege as a 'thought'. Thoughts may not even have parts. |
6939 | What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The guiding principle is that what is true of one piece of copper is true of another; such a guiding principle with regard to copper would be much safer than with regard to many other substances - brass, for example. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p. 8) | |
A reaction: Peirce is so beautifully simple and sensible. This gives the essential notion of a natural kind, and is a key notion in our whole understanding of physical reality. |
14175 | We can drop 'cause', and just make inferences between facts [Russell] |
Full Idea: On the whole it is not worthwhile preserving the word 'cause': it is enough to say, what is far less misleading, that any two configurations allow us to infer any other. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §460) | |
A reaction: Russell spelled this out fully in a 1912 paper. This sounds like David Hume, but he prefers to talk of 'habit' rather than 'inference', which might contain a sneaky necessity. |
14172 | Moments and points seem to imply other moments and points, but don't cause them [Russell] |
Full Idea: Some people would hold that two moments of time, or two points of space, imply each other's existence; yet the relation between these cannot be said to be causal. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §449) | |
A reaction: Famously, Russell utterly rejected causation a few years after this. The example seems clearer if you say that two points or moments can imply at least one point or instant between them, without causing them. |
14174 | The laws of motion and gravitation are just parts of the definition of a kind of matter [Russell] |
Full Idea: For us, as pure mathematicians, the laws of motion and the law of gravitation are not properly laws at all, but parts of the definition of a certain kind of matter. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §459) | |
A reaction: The 'certain kind of matter' is that which has 'mass'. Since these are paradigm cases of supposed laws, this is the beginning of the end for real laws of nature, and good riddance say I. See Mumford on this. |
14168 | Occupying a place and change are prior to motion, so motion is just occupying places at continuous times [Russell] |
Full Idea: The concept of motion is logically subsequent to that of occupying as place at a time, and also to that of change. Motion is the occupation, by one entity, of a continuous series of places at a continuous series of times. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §442) | |
A reaction: This is Russell's famous theory of motion, which came to be called the 'At-At' theory (at some place at some time). It seems to mathematically pin down motion all right, but seems a bit short on the poetry of the thing. |
14171 | Force is supposed to cause acceleration, but acceleration is a mathematical fiction [Russell] |
Full Idea: A force is the supposed cause of acceleration, ...but an acceleration is a mere mathematical fiction, a number, not a physical fact. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §448) | |
A reaction: This rests on his at-at theory of motion, in Idea 14168. I'm not sure that if I fell off a cliff I could be reassured on the way down that my acceleration was just a mathematical fiction. |
14160 | Space is the extension of 'point', and aggregates of points seem necessary for geometry [Russell] |
Full Idea: I won't discuss whether points are unities or simple terms, but whether space is an aggregate of them. ..There is no geometry without points, nothing against them, and logical reasons in their favour. Space is the extension of the concept 'point'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §423) |
14156 | Mathematicians don't distinguish between instants of time and points on a line [Russell] |
Full Idea: To the mathematician as such there is no relevant distinction between the instants of time and the points on a line. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §387) | |
A reaction: This is the germ of the modern view of space time, which is dictated by the mathematics, rather than by our intuitions or insights into what is actually going on. |
14169 | The 'universe' can mean what exists now, what always has or will exist [Russell] |
Full Idea: The universe is a somewhat ambiguous term: it may mean all the things that exist at a single moment, or all things that ever have existed or will exist, or the common quality of whatever exists. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §442) |
6938 | Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce] |
Full Idea: It is probably of more advantage to an animal to have his mind filled with pleasing and encouraging visions, independently of their truth; and thus, upon unpractical subjects, natural selection might occasion a fallacious tendency of thought. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p. 8) | |
A reaction: Note that this is a pragmatist saying that a set of beliefs might work fine but be untrue. So Peirce does not have the highly relativistic notion of truth of some later pragmatists. Good for him. Note the early date to be thinking about Darwin. |
6946 | If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce] |
Full Idea: If death is annihilation, then the man who believes that he will certainly go straight to heaven when he dies, provided he have fulfilled certain simple observances in this life, has a cheap pleasure which will not be followed by the least disappointment. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.12) | |
A reaction: This is a nicely wicked summary of one side of Pascal's options. All the problems of the argument are built into Peirce's word "cheap". Peirce goes on to talk about ostriches burying their heads. |
20716 | False prophets will perform wonders to deceive even the elect [Mark] |
Full Idea: For false messiahs and false prophets will appear and perform signs and wonders to deceive, if possible, even the elect. | |
From: St Mark (02: Gospel of St Mark [c.66], 13:22), quoted by Brian Davies - Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion | |
A reaction: This casts a rather different light on the miracles of Jesus, since they were performed in a context in which even Jesus believed that lots of people (and not just the son of God) could perform miracles. Undermines any Argument from Miracles. |