11 ideas
14767 | The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Concerning the Author [1897], p.2) |
14764 | I am saturated with the spirit of physical science [Peirce] |
Full Idea: I am saturated, through and through, with the spirit of the physical sciences. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Concerning the Author [1897], p.1) |
14768 | Infallibility in science is just a joke [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Infallibility in scientific matters seems to me irresistibly comical. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Concerning the Author [1897], p.3) |
14765 | Association of ideas is the best philosophical idea of the prescientific age [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The doctrine of the association of ideas is, to my thinking, the finest piece of philosophical work of the prescientific ages. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Concerning the Author [1897], p.2) |
8825 | It seems impossible to logically deduce physical knowledge from indubitable sense data [Kim] |
Full Idea: It is agreed on all hands that the classical epistemological project, conceived as one of deductively validating physical knowledge from indubitable sensory data, cannot succeed. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (What is 'naturalized epistemology'? [1988], p.304) | |
A reaction: This is the 'Enlightenment Project', which had a parallel in morality. Kim refers to the difficulty as 'The Humean Predicament'. Hume also hoped that induction might be deductive. One obvious move is to expand from 'deduction' to 'reason'. |
19558 | Our own intuitions about whether we know tend to vacillate [Cohen,S] |
Full Idea: One robust feature of our intuitions about whether we know things is that they tend to vacillate. | |
From: Stewart Cohen (Contextualism Defended (and reply) [2005], 1) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as important. If we were tacit invariantists (Idea 19557) we should be able to ask ourselves whether we 'really and truly' know various things, but we can't decide. I know lots about Nietzsche in a pub, and very little in a university. |
19561 | We shouldn't jump too quickly to a contextualist account of claims to know [Cohen,S] |
Full Idea: Maybe contextualists are too quick to appeal to our conflicting intuitions regarding knowledge. | |
From: Stewart Cohen (Contextualism Defended (and reply) [2005], 1) | |
A reaction: An important point (from Earl Conee). I thoroughly approve of contextualism, but the whole status of whether a witness or a teacher knows what they are talking about is in danger of collapsing into relativism. This is what peer review is all about. |
19563 | The context sensitivity of knowledge derives from its justification [Cohen,S] |
Full Idea: On my own view, the context sensivity of knowledge is inherited from one of its components, i.e. justification. | |
From: Stewart Cohen (Contextualism Defended (and reply) [2005], 1) | |
A reaction: That sounds right, and it reinforces the idea that 'justification' is a more important epistemological concept than 'knowledge'. 'Am I justified in believing p?' Answer: 'it depends how well you have researched it'. |
19560 | Contextualism is good because it allows knowledge, but bad because 'knowing' is less valued [Cohen,S] |
Full Idea: Contextualism is a 'good news, bad news' theory. The good news is that we have lots of knowledge and many surfaces are 'flat'; the bad news is that knowledge and flatness are not all they were cracked up to be. | |
From: Stewart Cohen (Contextualism Defended (and reply) [2005], 3) | |
A reaction: That is exactly my position. I lost all interest in whether someone precisely 'knows' or 'does not know' something a long time ago (even in scientific or forensic contexts). In the case of flatness the case is even more obvious. |
19559 | Contextualists slightly concede scepticism, but only in extremely strict contexts [Cohen,S] |
Full Idea: Contextualism concedes that there is some truth to skepticism, but contains the damage by holding that skeptical claims are true only relative to atypically strict contexts. | |
From: Stewart Cohen (Contextualism Defended (and reply) [2005], 1) | |
A reaction: My attitude to scepticism is that everything we ever affirm should have a footnote saying '...but you never know...', and it should then be ignored. In the strictest context everything is doubted simultaneously (including language), and that is paralysis. |
14766 | Duns Scotus offers perhaps the best logic and metaphysics for modern physical science [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The works of Duns Scotus have strongly influenced me. …His logic and metaphysics, torn away from its medievalism, …will go far toward supplying the philosophy which is best to harmonize with physical science. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Concerning the Author [1897], p.2) |