3 ideas
7296 | 'Grue' is not a colour [Milsted] |
Full Idea: 'Grue' is not a colour. | |
From: Tom Milsted (talk [2006]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: This simple observation strikes me as rather crucial in assessing Goodman's paradox. Blue is a colour, but grue is some sort of behaviour. Blue is a secondary quality, but grue seems to be a primary quality. |
19087 | The meaning or purport of a symbol is all the rational conduct it would lead to [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The entire intellectual purport of any symbol consists in the total of all modes of rational conduct which, conditionally upon all the possible different circumstances and desires, would ensue upon the acceptance of the symbol. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Issues of Pragmaticism [1905], EP ii.246), quoted by Danielle Macbeth - Pragmatism and Objective Truth p.169 n1 | |
A reaction: Macbeth says pragmatism is founded on this theory of meaning, rather than on a theory of truth. I don't see why the causes of a symbol shouldn't be as much a part of its meaning as the consequences are. |
4761 | The 'error theory' of morals says there is no moral knowledge, because there are no moral facts [Mackie, by Engel] |
Full Idea: Mackie's 'error theory' of ethics says that if a fact is something that corresponds to a true proposition, there are actually no moral facts, hence no knowledge of what moral statements are about. | |
From: report of J.L. Mackie (Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong [1977]) by Pascal Engel - Truth §4.2 | |
A reaction: Personally I am inclined to think that there are moral facts (about what nature shows us constitutes a good human being), based on virtue theory. Mackie is a good warning, though, against making excessive claims. You end up like a bad scientist. |