32 ideas
6947 | Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Metaphysical systems have not usually rested upon any observed facts, or not in any great degree. They are chiefly adopted because their fundamental propositions seem 'agreeable to reason', which means that which we find ourselves inclined to believe. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.15) | |
A reaction: This leads to Peirce's key claim - that we should allow our beliefs to be formed by something outside of ourselves. I don't share Peirce's contempt for metaphysics, which I take to be about the most abstract presuppositions of our ordinary beliefs. |
6937 | Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The object of reasoning is to find out, from the consideration of what we already know, something else which we do not know. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p. 7) | |
A reaction: I defy anyone to come up with a better definition of reasoning than that. The emphasis is on knowledge rather than truth, which you would expect from a pragmatist. …Actually the definition doesn't cover conditional reasoning terribly well. |
21492 | Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The fundamental hypothesis of the method of science is this: There are real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinion of them. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877]), quoted by Albert Atkin - Peirce 3 'method' | |
A reaction: He admits later that this is only a commitment and not a fact. It seems to me that when you combine this idea with the huge success of science, the denial of realism is crazy. Philosophy has a lot to answer for. |
6949 | If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Nobody can really doubt that there are Reals, for, if he did, doubt would not be a source of dissatisfaction. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.19) | |
A reaction: This rests on Peirce's view that all that really matters is a sense of genuine dissatisfaction, rather than a theoretical idea. So even at the end of Meditation One, Descartes isn't actually worried about whether his furniture exists. |
6940 | The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The feeling of believing is a more or less sure indication of there being established in our nature some habit which will determine our actions. Doubt never has such an effect. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.10) | |
A reaction: It is one thing to assert this fairly accurate observation, and another to assert that this is the essence or definition of a belief. Perhaps it is the purpose of belief, without being the phenomenological essence of it. We act in states of uncertainty. |
6943 | A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The mere putting of a proposition into the interrogative form does not stimulate the mind to any struggle after belief; there must be a real and living doubt. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.11) | |
A reaction: This the attractive aspect of Peirce's pragmatism, that he is always focusing on real life rather than abstract theory or pure logic. |
6941 | We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce] |
Full Idea: As soon as a firm belief is reached we are entirely satisfied, whether the belief be true or false. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.10) | |
A reaction: This does not deny that the truth or falsehood of a belief is independent of whether we are satisfied with it. It is making a fair point, though, about why we believe things, and it can't be because of truth, because we don't know how to ensure that. |
6942 | We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce] |
Full Idea: We seek for a belief that we shall think to be true; but we think each one of our beliefs to be true, and, indeed, it is mere tautology to say so. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.11) | |
A reaction: If, as I do, you like to define belief as 'commitment to truth', Peirce makes a rather startling observation. You are rendered unable to ask whether your beliefs are true, because you have defined them as true. Nice point… |
6598 | We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce] |
Full Idea: It is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs be determined by nothing human, but by some external permanency - by something upon which our thinking has no effect. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.5 | |
A reaction: This very sensible and interesting remark hovers somewhere between empiricism and pragmatism. Fogelin very persuasively builds his account of knowledge on it. The key point is that we hardly ever choose what to believe. See Idea 2454. |
6944 | Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce] |
Full Idea: It is a common idea that demonstration must rest on indubitable propositions, either first principles of a general nature, or first sensations; but actual demonstration is completely satisfactory if it starts from propositions free from all actual doubt. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.11) | |
A reaction: Another nice example of Peirce focusing on the practical business of thinking, rather than abstract theory. I agree with this approach, that explanation and proof do not aim at perfection and indubitability, but at what satisfies a critical mind. |
6948 | Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce] |
Full Idea: To satisfy our doubts it is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs may be determined by nothing human, but by some external permanency - by something upon which our thinking has no effect. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.18) | |
A reaction: This may be the single most important idea in pragmatism and in the philosophy of science. See Fodor on experiments (Idea 2455). Put the question to nature. The essential aim is to be passive in our beliefs - just let reality form them. |
6945 | Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce] |
Full Idea: Some people seem to love to argue a point after all the world is fully convinced of it. But no further advance can be made. When doubt ceases, mental action on the subject comes to an end; and, if it did go on, it would be without purpose. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.11) | |
A reaction: This is the way Peirce's pragmatism, which deals with how real thinking actually works (rather than abstract logic), deals with scepticism. However, there is a borderline where almost everyone is satisfied, but the very wise person remains sceptical. |
20014 | Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall] |
Full Idea: There are different levels of action, including at least: unconscious and/or involuntary behaviour, purposeful or goal-directed activity, intentional action, and the autonomous acts or actions of self-consciously active human agents. | |
From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 1) | |
A reaction: The fourth class is obviously designed to distinguish us from the other animals. It immediately strikes me as very optimistic to distinguish four (at least) clear categories, but you have to start somewhere. |
20019 | Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall] |
Full Idea: Some say that the movement's of agent's body are never actions. It is only the agent's direct moving of, say, his leg that constitutes a physical action; the leg movement is merely caused by and/or incorporated as part of the act of moving. | |
From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 1.2) | |
A reaction: [they cite Jennifer Hornsby 1980] It seems normal to deny a twitch the accolade of an 'action', so I suppose that is right. Does the continual movement of my tongue count as action? Only if I bring it under control? Does it matter? Only in forensics. |
20021 | Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall] |
Full Idea: Some philosophers have favored the overt arm movement the agent performs, some favor the extended causal process he initiates, and some prefer the relevant event of trying that precedes and 'generates' the rest. | |
From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 1.2) | |
A reaction: [Davidson argues for the second, Hornsby for the third] There seems no way to settle this, and a compromise looks best. Mere movement won't do, and mere trying won't do, and whole processes get out of control. |
20022 | To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall] |
Full Idea: If someone fires a bullet to kill someone, misses, and dislodges hornets that sting him to death, this implies that an intentional action must include succeeding in a manner according to the original plan. | |
From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 2) | |
A reaction: [their example, compressed] This resembles Gettier's problem cases for knowledge. If the shooter deliberately and maliciously brought down the hornet's nest, that would be intentional murder. Sounds right. |
20023 | If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall] |
Full Idea: If someone enters the lottery with the bizarre belief that they can control who wins, and then wins it, that suggest that intentional actions must not depend on sheer luck, but needs competent exercise of the relevant skill. | |
From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 2) | |
A reaction: A nice companion to Idea 20022, which show that a mere intention is not sufficient to motivate and explain an action. |
20025 | We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall] |
Full Idea: If an agent tries to do something by two different means, only one of which can succeed, then the behaviour is rational, even though one of them is an attempt to do an action which cannot succeed. | |
From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 2) | |
A reaction: [a concise account of a laborious account of an example from Bratman 1984, 1987] Bratman uses this to challenge the 'Simple View', that intention leads straightforwardly to action. |
20031 | On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall] |
Full Idea: On the simple desire-belief model, an intention is a combination of desire-belief states, and an action is intentional in virtue of standing in the appropriate relation to these simpler terms. | |
From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 4) | |
A reaction: This is the traditional view found in Hume, and is probably endemic to folk psychology. They cite Bratman 1987 as the main opponent of the view. |
20028 | Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall] |
Full Idea: Rational group action may involve a 'collectivising of reasons', with participants acting in ways that are not rationally recommended from the individual viewpoint. This suggests that groups can be rational, intentional agents. | |
From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 2) | |
A reaction: [Pettit 2003] is the source for this. Gilbert says individuals can have joint commitment; Pettit says the group can be an independent agent. The matter of shared intentions is interesting, but there is no need for the ontology to go berserk. |
20027 | If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall] |
Full Idea: An account of mutual obligation to do something may require that we give up reductive individualist accounts of shared activity and posit a primitive notion of 'joint commitment'. | |
From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 2) | |
A reaction: [attributed to Margaret Gilbert 2000] If 'we' are trying to do something, that seems to give an externalist picture of intentions, rather like all the other externalisms floating around these days. I don't buy any of it, me. |
20016 | Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall] |
Full Idea: A Strong Cognitivist is someone who identifies an intention with a certain pertinent belief about what she is doing or about to do. | |
From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 1.1) | |
A reaction: (Sarah Paul 2009 makes this distinction) The belief, if so, seems to be as much counterfactual as factual. Hope seems to come into it, which isn't exactly a belief. |
20017 | Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall] |
Full Idea: A Weak Cognitivist holds that intentions are partly constituted by, but are not identical with, relevant beliefs about the action. Grice (1971) said an intention is willing an action, combined with a belief that this will lead to the action. | |
From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 1.1) | |
A reaction: [compressed] I didn't find Strong Cognitivism appealing, but it seems hard to argue with some form of the weak version. |
20018 | Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall] |
Full Idea: Strong Cognitivists say intentions/beliefs are not based on observation or evidence, and are causally reliable in leading to appropriate actions, so this is a mode of 'practical' knowledge that has not been derived from observation. | |
From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 1.1) | |
A reaction: [compressed - Stanford unnecessarily verbose!] I see no mention in this discussion of 'hoping' that your action will turn out OK. We are usually right to hope, but it would be foolish to say that when we reach for the salt we know we won't knock it over. |
20012 | Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall] |
Full Idea: Some have maintained that we explain why an agent acted as he did when we explicate how the agent's normative reasons rendered the action intelligible in his eyes. | |
From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], Intro) | |
A reaction: Modern psychology is moving against this, by showing how hidden biases can predominate over conscious reasons (as in Kahnemann's work). I would say this mode of explanation works better for highly educated people (but you can chuckle at that). |
20013 | It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall] |
Full Idea: The view that reason explanations are somehow causal explanations remains the dominant position. | |
From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], Intro) | |
A reaction: I suspect that this is only because no philosopher has a better idea, and the whole issue is being slowly outflanked by psychology. |
20029 | Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall] |
Full Idea: Most causalists allow that reason explanations are teleological, but say that such purposive explanations are analysable causally, where the primary reasons for the act are the guiding causes of the act. | |
From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 3) | |
A reaction: The authors observe that it is hard to adjudicate on this matter, and that the concept of the 'cause' of an action is unclear. |
20890 | Why do sexual relationships need permanence, if other relationships don't? [Punzo] |
Full Idea: What is the reason for demanding permanence in the relationship of sexual partners when we do not see such permanence as being importance to other human relationships? | |
From: Vincent C. Punzo (Morality and Human Sexuality [1969], p.220) | |
A reaction: The distinction may not be that simple. 'Loyalty' must certainly be mentioned. Friends can legitimately drift apart, but to desert a close friend at a time of great need might be as great a crime as adultery. When is loyalty particularly needed? |
20891 | Does engaging in sexual intercourse really need no more thought than playing tennis? [Punzo] |
Full Idea: It seems strange for a man and a woman to give no more thought to the question of whether they should engage in sexual intercourse than to the question of whether they shoud play tennis. | |
From: Vincent C. Punzo (Morality and Human Sexuality [1969], p.221) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a reasonable point, but times have moved on since 1969, and for plenty of people nowadays playing tennis is a bigger issue than having sex, because of the time, equipment and effort involved. |
6939 | What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce] |
Full Idea: The guiding principle is that what is true of one piece of copper is true of another; such a guiding principle with regard to copper would be much safer than with regard to many other substances - brass, for example. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p. 8) | |
A reaction: Peirce is so beautifully simple and sensible. This gives the essential notion of a natural kind, and is a key notion in our whole understanding of physical reality. |
6938 | Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce] |
Full Idea: It is probably of more advantage to an animal to have his mind filled with pleasing and encouraging visions, independently of their truth; and thus, upon unpractical subjects, natural selection might occasion a fallacious tendency of thought. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p. 8) | |
A reaction: Note that this is a pragmatist saying that a set of beliefs might work fine but be untrue. So Peirce does not have the highly relativistic notion of truth of some later pragmatists. Good for him. Note the early date to be thinking about Darwin. |
6946 | If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce] |
Full Idea: If death is annihilation, then the man who believes that he will certainly go straight to heaven when he dies, provided he have fulfilled certain simple observances in this life, has a cheap pleasure which will not be followed by the least disappointment. | |
From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.12) | |
A reaction: This is a nicely wicked summary of one side of Pascal's options. All the problems of the argument are built into Peirce's word "cheap". Peirce goes on to talk about ostriches burying their heads. |