Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Architecture of Theories', 'Has Philosophy Lost Contact with People?' and 'On the Reality of Accidents'

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6 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
Inspiration and social improvement need wisdom, but not professional philosophy [Quine]
     Full Idea: Professional philosophers have no peculiar fitness for inspirational and edifying writing, or helping to get society on an even keel (though we should do what we can). Wisdom may fulfil these crying needs: 'sophia' yes, but 'philosophia' not necessarily.
     From: Willard Quine (Has Philosophy Lost Contact with People? [1979], p.193)
     A reaction: This rather startlingly says that philosophy is unlikely to lead to wisdom, which is rather odd when it is defined as love of that very thing. Does love of horticulture lead to good gardening. I can't agree. Philosophy is the best hope of 'sophia'.
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
For a good theory of the world, we must focus on our flabby foundational vocabulary [Quine]
     Full Idea: Our traditional introspective notions - of meaning, idea, concept, essence, all undisciplined and undefined - afford a hopelessly flabby and unmanageable foundation for a theory of the world. Control is gained by focusing on words.
     From: Willard Quine (Has Philosophy Lost Contact with People? [1979], p.192)
     A reaction: A very nice statement of the aim of modern language-centred philosophy, though the task offered appears to be that of an under-labourer, when the real target, even according to Quine, is supposed to be a 'theory of the world'.
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 4. Concept Nominalism
Abstracta are abbreviated ways of talking; there are just substances, and truths about them [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: I consider abstracta not as real things but as abbreviated ways of talking ...and to that extent I am a nominalist, at least provisionally ...It suffices to posit only substances as real things, and, to assert truths about these.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (On the Reality of Accidents [1688]), quoted by Richard T.W. Arthur - Leibniz
     A reaction: I am a modern nominalist, in my hostility to a serious ontological commitment to abstracta. You get into trouble, though, if you say there are only objects or substances. Physics says reality may all be 'fields', or something.... 'Truths' is good.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
Physical and psychical laws of mind are either independent, or derived in one or other direction [Peirce]
     Full Idea: The question about minds is whether 1) physical and psychical laws are independent (monism, my neutralism), 2) the psychical laws derived and physical laws primordial (materialism), 3) physical law is derived, psychical law primordial (idealism).
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Architecture of Theories [1891], p.321)
     A reaction: I think you are already in trouble when you start proposing that there are two quite distinct sets of laws, and then worry about how they are related. Assume unity, and only separate them when the science forces you to (which it won't).
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
The world is full of variety, but laws seem to produce uniformity [Peirce]
     Full Idea: Exact law obviously never can produce heterogeneity out of homogeneity; and arbitrary heterogeneity is the feature of the universe the most manifest and characteristic.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Architecture of Theories [1891], p.319)
     A reaction: This is the view of laws of nature now associated with Nancy Cartwright, but presumably you can explain the apparent chaos in terms of the intersection of vast numbers of 'laws'. Or, better, there aren't any laws.
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Darwinian evolution is chance, with the destruction of bad results [Peirce]
     Full Idea: Darwinian evolution is evolution by the operation of chance, and the destruction of bad results.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Architecture of Theories [1891], p.320)
     A reaction: The 'destruction of bad results' is a much better slogan for Darwin that Spencer's 'survival of the fittest'. It is, of course, a rather unattractive God who makes progress by endlessly destroying huge quantities of failed (but living) experiments.