Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Truly Understood', 'Magna Carta' and 'Mathematics and Philosophy: grand and little'

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13 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Philosophy aims to reveal the grandeur of mathematics [Badiou]
     Full Idea: Philosophy's role consists in informing mathematics of its own speculative grandeur.
     From: Alain Badiou (Mathematics and Philosophy: grand and little [2004], p.11)
     A reaction: Revealing the grandeur of something sounds more like a rhetorical than a rational exercise. How would you reveal the grandeur of a sunset to someone?
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
In mathematics, if a problem can be formulated, it will eventually be solved [Badiou]
     Full Idea: Only in mathematics can one unequivocally maintain that if thought can formulate a problem, it can and will solve it, regardless of how long it takes.
     From: Alain Badiou (Mathematics and Philosophy: grand and little [2004], p.17)
     A reaction: I hope this includes proving the Continuum Hypothesis, and Goldbach's Conjecture. It doesn't seem quite true, but it shows why philosophers of a rationalist persuasion are drawn to mathematics.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Mathematics shows that thinking is not confined to the finite [Badiou]
     Full Idea: Mathematics teaches us that there is no reason whatsoever to confne thinking within the ambit of finitude.
     From: Alain Badiou (Mathematics and Philosophy: grand and little [2004], p.19)
     A reaction: This would perhaps make Cantor the greatest thinker who ever lived. It is an exhilarating idea, but we should ward the reader against romping of into unrestrained philosophical thought about infinities. You may be jumping without your Cantorian parachute.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Mathematics inscribes being as such [Badiou]
     Full Idea: Mathematics inscribes being as such.
     From: Alain Badiou (Mathematics and Philosophy: grand and little [2004], p.12)
     A reaction: I don't pretend to understand that, but there is something about the purity and certainty of mathematics that makes us feel we are grappling with the core of existence. Perhaps. The same might be said of stubbing your toe on a bedpost.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
It is of the essence of being to appear [Badiou]
     Full Idea: It is of the essence of being to appear.
     From: Alain Badiou (Mathematics and Philosophy: grand and little [2004], p.16)
     A reaction: Nice slogan. In my humble opinion 'continental' philosophy is well worth reading because, despite the fluffy rhetoric and the shameless egotism and the desire to shock the bourgeoisie, they occasionally make wonderfully thought-provoking remarks.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
Concepts are distinguished by roles in judgement, and are thus tied to rationality [Peacocke]
     Full Idea: 'Concept' is a notion tied, in the classical Fregean manner, to cognitive significance. Concepts are distinct if we can judge rationally of one, without the other. Concepts are constitutively and definitionally tied to rationality in this way.
     From: Christopher Peacocke (Truly Understood [2008], 2.2)
     A reaction: It seems to a bit optimistic to say, more or less, that thinking is impossible if it isn't rational. Rational beings have been selected for. As Quine nicely observed, duffers at induction have all been weeded out - but they may have existed, briefly.
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference [Peacocke]
     Full Idea: My basic Fregean idea is that a sense is individuated by the fundamental condition for something to be its reference.
     From: Christopher Peacocke (Truly Understood [2008], Intro)
     A reaction: For something to actually be its reference (as opposed to imagined reference), truth must be involved. This needs the post-1891 Frege view of such things, and not just the view of concepts as functions which he started with.
Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions [Peacocke]
     Full Idea: The Fregean view is that the essence of a concept is given by the fundamental condition for something to be its reference.
     From: Christopher Peacocke (Truly Understood [2008], 2.1)
     A reaction: Peacocke is a supporter of the Fregean view. How does this work for concepts of odd creatures in a fantasy novel? Or for mistaken or confused concepts? For Burge's 'arthritis in my thigh'? I don't reject the Fregean view.
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
Concepts have distinctive reasons and norms [Peacocke]
     Full Idea: For each concept, there will be some reasons or norms distinctive of that concept.
     From: Christopher Peacocke (Truly Understood [2008], 2.3)
     A reaction: This is Peacocke's bold Fregean thesis (and it sounds rather Kantian to me). I dislike the word 'norms' (long story), but reasons are interesting. The trouble is the distinction between being a reason for something (its cause) and being a reason for me.
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
Any explanation of a concept must involve reference and truth [Peacocke]
     Full Idea: For some particular concept, we can argue that some of its distinctive features are adequately explained only by a possession-condition that involves reference and truth essentially.
     From: Christopher Peacocke (Truly Understood [2008], Intro)
     A reaction: He reached this view via the earlier assertion that it is the role in judgement which key to understanding concepts. I like any view of such things which says that truth plays a role.
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
Encountering novel sentences shows conclusively that meaning must be compositional [Peacocke]
     Full Idea: The phenomenon of understanding sentences one has never encountered before is decisive against theories of meaning which do not proceed compositionally.
     From: Christopher Peacocke (Truly Understood [2008], 4.3)
     A reaction: I agree entirely. It seems obvious, as soon as you begin to slowly construct a long and unusual sentence, and follow the mental processes of the listener.
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / b. Literature
All great poetry is engaged in rivalry with mathematics [Badiou]
     Full Idea: Like every great poet, Mallarmé was engaged in a tacit rivalry with mathematics.
     From: Alain Badiou (Mathematics and Philosophy: grand and little [2004], p.20)
     A reaction: I love these French pronouncements! Would Mallarmé have agreed? If poetry and mathematics are the poles, where is philosophy to be found?
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / b. Rule of law
Magna Carta forbids prison without trial, and insists on neutral and correct process [-, by Charvet]
     Full Idea: The Magna Carta forbids the King to imprison indefinitely without trial, and also binds the King to follow due process in his courts and not allow the justice provided to be for sale.
     From: report of - (Magna Carta [1215]) by John Charvet - Liberalism: the basics 02
     A reaction: Very exasperating for a medieval monarch. In current times British law is exceedingly slow (so long imprisonment before trial), and the necessary effective advocates cost vastly too much for all but a tiny minority. So it's going badly.