3 ideas
21681 | Given all true atomic propositions, in theory every other truth can thereby be deduced [Russell] |
Full Idea: Given all true atomic propositions, together with the fact that they are all, every other true proposition can theoretically be deduced by logical methods. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Intro to 2nd ed of Principia Mathematica [1925], p.xv) | |
A reaction: This is evidently his strongest statement of the ideal underlying logical atomism. The atoms were initially sense-date, but then became atomic propositions saying an object has a property. |
8875 | Sense experiences must have conceptual content, since they are possible reasons for judgements [Brewer,B] |
Full Idea: Given that sense experiential states do provide reasons for empirical beliefs, they must have conceptual content, ...where a mental state with conceptual content is one where the content is of a possible judgement by the subject. | |
From: Bill Brewer (Perceptual experience has conceptual content [2005], I) | |
A reaction: This is, I believe, wrong. Even complex observations, like a pool of blood, only become reasons when they have been interpreted. Otherwise they are just the raw ingredients of evidence. How could an uninterpreted red patch be a 'reason'? |
17722 | The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things [Peacocke] |
Full Idea: The possession conditions for the concept 'red' of the colour red are tied to those very conditions which individuate the colour red. | |
From: Christopher Peacocke (Explaining the A Priori [2000], p.267), quoted by Carrie Jenkins - Grounding Concepts 2.5 | |
A reaction: Jenkins reports that he therefore argues that we can learn something about the word 'red' from thinking about the concept 'red', which is his new theory of the a priori. I find 'possession conditions' and 'individuation' to be very woolly concepts. |