Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Explaining the A Priori', 'Intro to 2nd ed of Principia Mathematica' and 'Constitutional Code I'

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3 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
Given all true atomic propositions, in theory every other truth can thereby be deduced [Russell]
     Full Idea: Given all true atomic propositions, together with the fact that they are all, every other true proposition can theoretically be deduced by logical methods.
     From: Bertrand Russell (Intro to 2nd ed of Principia Mathematica [1925], p.xv)
     A reaction: This is evidently his strongest statement of the ideal underlying logical atomism. The atoms were initially sense-date, but then became atomic propositions saying an object has a property.
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things [Peacocke]
     Full Idea: The possession conditions for the concept 'red' of the colour red are tied to those very conditions which individuate the colour red.
     From: Christopher Peacocke (Explaining the A Priori [2000], p.267), quoted by Carrie Jenkins - Grounding Concepts 2.5
     A reaction: Jenkins reports that he therefore argues that we can learn something about the word 'red' from thinking about the concept 'red', which is his new theory of the a priori. I find 'possession conditions' and 'individuation' to be very woolly concepts.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
Prejudice apart, push-pin has equal value with music and poetry [Bentham]
     Full Idea: Prejudice apart, the game of push-pin is of equal value with the arts and science of music and poetry.
     From: Jeremy Bentham (Constitutional Code I [1827], p.139), quoted by J.R. Dinwiddy - Bentham p.114
     A reaction: Mill quoted this with implied outrage, but Bentham was attacking public subsidies to the arts when he said it. It is a basic idea in the debate on pleasure - that pleasures are only distinguished by their intensity, not some other value.